

CULTURE, IDENTITIES, RELIGIONS

**ALEXANDROS YPSILANTI'S CODE OF LAWS
(PRAVILNICEASCA CONDICĂ).
FROM THE DOWRY "ANTE NUPTIAS" AND "POST NUPTIAS"
TO THE "SHEET OF DOWRY" OF THE OLD ROMANIAN LAW**

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Abstract: *The examination and assessment of the contents of the Code of Laws published in the year 1780 by Alexandros Ypsilanti, Prince of Wallachia (1774–1782; 1796–1797) – known as Pravilniceasca Condică – is the result of an interdisciplinary research, carried out on the basis of documentary material of prime importance for the history of Romanian medieval law and the country's old legal institutions.*

One of these legal institutions was marriage, which occupied a leading place in the framework of juridical institutions of the Romanian principalities, even though in some Codes and Collections of secular legislation – such as the one of 1780 – we find provisions that concern only certain matrimonial documents (dowry, dowry sheet, testamentary inheritance, etc.).

Since in the specialized literature there is no interdisciplinary study with historical and legal content about Ypsilanti's Code of Laws, or about its "sheets of dowry", through our research we managed to bring new contributions regarding the genesis and legal status of the "dowry", as well as about the process of reception of Byzantine law in the Romanian geographical space at the end of the 18th century.

Keywords: *Phanariot period, Roman and Byzantine legislation, customary law, dowry, marriage*

Rezumat: Codul de legi al lui Alexandru Ipsilanti (Pravilniceasca Condică). De la dota “ante nuptias” și “post nuptias”, la “foaia de zestre” din vechiul drept românesc. Examinarea și evaluarea conținutului Codului de legi publicat în anul 1780 de Alexandru Ipsilanti, Domn al Țării Românești (1774 - 1782; 1796 - 1797) – cunoscut sub numele de Pravilniceasca Condică – este rezultatul unei cercetări interdisciplinare, efectuate pe baza unui material documentar de primă importanță pentru istoria dreptului medieval românesc și a vechilor instituții juridice ale Țărilor Române. Una dintre aceste instituții a fost căsătoria, ce a ocupat un loc important în peisajul instituțiilor juridice, deși în unele Coduri și Colecții de legiuiri laice – cum este și cea din 1780 – găsim prevederi care privesc doar unele acte matrimoniale (dota, foaia de zestre, moștenirea testamentară etc.).

Întrucât, în literatura de specialitate nu exista niciun studiu interdisciplinar cu conținut istoric și juridic despre Codul lui Ipsilanti Vodă, și nici despre „foaia de zestre”, prin demersul muncii noastre de cercetare am reușit să aducem noi contribuții privitoare la geneza și statutul juridic al „foilor de zestre”, precum și la procesul de receptare a dreptului bizantin în arealul românesc la finele secolului al XVIII-lea.

INTRODUCTION

The *Code of laws of Alexandros Ypsilanti*, Prince of Wallachia (1774–1782; 1796–1797), also known as *Pravilniceasca Condică* (1780), includes both the provisions of the Roman-Byzantine legislation and some provisions of the legal customs of the country, which led to this institution being expressed in the spirit of “Jus Valahicum”, i.e., the Old Romanian Law¹, made up of its two constituent elements, that is “jus consuetudinaris” (customary law) and “jus scriptum” (written law), in which the “dowry” and the conclusion of “dowry deeds” had a bimillenary tradition in the Romanian space, also confirmed by the Romanian wedding traditions², including those that precede or succeed it.

In Romanian culture, this practice of prenuptial and nuptial gifts has taken the form of “agreements” between the parents of the young couple, which are attested even by those ordinances or “wedding rules”³ according to which “at first

¹ N. V. Dură, C. Mititelu, *Istoria Dreptului românesc. Contribuții și evaluări cu conținut istorico-juridico-canonic* [History of Romanian Law. Contributions and evaluations with historical-legal-canonical content], Bucharest, University Publishing House, 2014, pp. 45-84.

² See S. F. Marian, *Nunta la români. Studiu istorico-comparativ etnografic* [Romanian wedding. A historical-comparative ethnographic study], 2nd vol. I, Bucharest, Saeculum Vizual Publishing House, 2008, *passim*.

³ I. Mârza, *Regulile nunților* [Wedding rules], Huși, 1872, p. 10.

the women did not give dowries to the man; later, however, they did so, and if the couple divorced because of the man's fault, he had to return the whole dowry, ..., and if the divorce occurred due to the woman's fault, then the man had the right to withhold a sixth of the dowry for each child, and up to half the dowry"⁴.

In order to familiarize the reader with the topic of the work – which has an interdisciplinary content (historical and legal) – in the introductory part, we present some of the main ideas that have guided us in our scientific research, and which have given us the opportunity to make new enlightening contributions on the genesis and the application in the Romanian society of one of the old legal institutions, namely the *dowry*.

The old *Pravilas* of the Romanian Lands – the existence of which has been testified by Greek, Slavonic and Romanian manuscripts since the 15th–16th centuries – prove that the dowry was a legal institution in the Romanian society. That is why, in the pages of this work, we want to emphasize not only this reality, which is present to this day, although, both in the Civil Code of Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1864)⁵ and in the New Civil Code (2009)⁶, this ancient juridical institution is no longer related to the sacred act of marriage, which in the Christian world of the "Pars Orientis" including, therefore, the Romanian Principalities, was perceived as a Sacrament of the Church, and not as a *marriage covenant*⁷, a legal act assimilated by the two codes into a marriage contract, as it was defined by the famous Roman jurisconsults of the classical era of Roman law (2nd–3rd centuries).

Although the dowry system had an ancient legal tradition in the Romanian Lands, which has its foundations both in the old customary law and in Roman law (old and new), this legal tradition of dowry was nevertheless eliminated from the Romanian legal landscape by Napoleon Bonaparte's Civil Code, promulgated in 1804, which was adopted in the Romanian Principalities in 1864, and was to be applied in "the other Romanian territories"⁸.

⁴ S. F. Marian, *Nunta la români ...*, vol. I, p. 107.

⁵ *Codul civil român* [Romanian Civil Code], edition C. Hamangiu, Bucharest, Carol Müller's Bookstore Publishing House, 1897, p. 310.

⁶ *Noul Cod civil. Comentarii, doctrină și jurisprudență* [The New Civil Code. Commentary, Doctrine and Jurisprudence], vol. I, Bucharest, Hamangiu Publishing House, 2012, p. 420.

⁷ D. Alexandresco, *Explicațiunea teoretică și practică a Dreptului civil român* [The theoretical and practical explanation of Romanian Civil Law], tom. VIII, pt. I, Bucharest, 1916, p. 156.

⁸ I. Niculescu, *Despre convențiile matrimoniale* [On matrimonial conventions], <https://www.juridice.ro/153816/despre-conventiile-matrimoniale.html> (Accessed on 08. 07. 2024).

In Romania, the dowry of the woman to be married was known “for almost a century (1865–1954)”⁹ under the name of *marriage convention*, but the provisions of the Romanian Civil Code of 1864 concerning marriage and matrimonial regimes were repealed by Decree no. 32 of January 31, 1954, which established “a single legal matrimonial regime”¹⁰.

In order to better understand the meaning of the rules concerning the institution of dowry, we will present, in the next chapter, the historical context in which this *Pravila* appeared, which, according to the assertion accredited by the Romanian-language literature, represents a happy synthesis between the customary law of the Country and Byzantine law.

However, according to professor Panagiotis Zepos¹¹, “the history of ancient Romanian Law is closely linked not to Byzantine law, but to the history of Hellenistic-Byzantine Law”¹², whose influence becomes – in his opinion – increasingly evident well before the 16th century, when collections of canonical and nomocanonical law in Greek and Slavonic were a reality in the Romanian area, as it is further attested by the numerous manuscripts of the *Syntagma kata stoicheion* (the Alphabetical Collection) of Matthew Blastares, published in 1395.

The same Greek jurist and Byzantinologist stated – among other things – that the Phanariot epoch is characterized by the adoption not of the Byzantine law in the Romanian Principalities, but of numerous Greek-Byzantine legislative texts and codes of laws, and that the impact of Greek-Byzantine law on the Romanian legislation of the Phanariot epoch, Alexandros Ypsilanti’s Code included, is – in his opinion – the only source for *Pravilniceasca Condică*. Certainly, such opinions are in total disagreement not only with the statements and opinions of Romanian scholars and editors, but also with the country’s historical and legal realities. For example, about the *Pravilniceasca Condică*, professor P. Zepos stated that the Romanians have allegedly declared that Wallachian customary law takes precedence over Byzantine customary law, and that the main sources of Ypsilanti’s Code are

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ Prof. Panagiotis Zepos, a historian of Byzantine law, made some bizarre statements not only about the second edition of Alexandros Ypsilanti’s Code of Laws, published in Bucharest in 1936, but also about its sources (cf. P. Zepos, *L’influence du droit byzantin sur la législation roumaine de la période des princes phanariotes*, in “Studi in memoria di Paolo Koschaker. L’Europa e il diritto romano”, Milano, 1954, vol. 1, pp. 427-438).

¹² P. Zepos, *Βιβλιοκρισία: Legiuirea Caragea, Ediție critică - Pravilniceasca Condicta 1870*, critical edition, 1957, <https://ir.lib.uth.gr/xmlui/handle/11615/19617> (Accessed on 06. 07. 2024).

“Byzantine-Greek law”¹³ and “customary law of the Greeks”, and not “the impoverished Romanian customary law”¹⁴, which – in his opinion – cannot take precedence over Byzantine customary law.

In another study, professor Zepos stated that “the Phanariot Codes are the greatest glory of the modern history of Greco-Roman law”¹⁵, because this Phanariot epoch was a “true age of enlightenment for the two Danubian Countries”¹⁶, and that, at the same time, it was “a brilliant page in the history of the Hellenists”¹⁷. Hence his statement that the Code of Ypsilanti is of “Greco-Byzantine origin”¹⁸, and not Byzantine, although the Code had as its main source the customs of the Country and the Byzantine law.

ABOUT ALEXANDROS YPSILANTI, PRINCE OF WALLACHIA, AND THE DOWRY SHEETS. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

As a consequence of the establishment of the Phanariot regime, “princes from among the Greeks, or Greekized princes, were appointed directly by the *Sublime Porte (Ottoman Porte)* to the seats of Iași and Bucharest”, because they “presented more guarantees for the Ottoman power”¹⁹. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Ottoman rule, the Turkocracy, “became more oppressive in the Romanian Lands, and they moved even further away from the Western model and, although a few Western influences manifested themselves in the arts, a few boyars, or pretenders to the throne (3–4 in a century!) traveled to the West and were marked by that experience, these phenomena remained marginal and superficial, without any real impact on the «collective mind» of the country”²⁰.

This is the historical setting and context in which the Greek Phanariot Alexandros Ypsilanti arrived as a Prince on the throne of Wallachia. Nevertheless, “of

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ P. Zepos, *Byzantine law in the Danubian countries*, in “Balkan studies”, vol. 7, 1966, p. 356.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 347.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 353.

¹⁹ C. Bălan, *Domniile fanariote în Țara Românească și Moldova* [Phanariote reigns in Wallachia and Moldova], in *Istoria Românilor* [History of the Romanians], vol. VI, Bucharest, Encyclopaedic Publishing House, 2012, p. 432.

²⁰ N. Djuvara, *Între Orient și Occident. Țările Române la începutul epocii moderne (1848)* [Between East and West. The Romanian Countries at the Beginning of the Modern Era (1848)], 7th edition, trans. from French by M. Carpov, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2009, p. 9.

all the Orthodox peoples of Eastern Europe, the Romanians were the ones whose Westernization was the most rapid and, above all, the most spontaneous, favored by their belonging to the family of non-Latin peoples and ..., finally, by the almost obsessive affirmation of Latinity, which became a strong idea in the struggle for Europeanization”²¹. However, one should not ignore the fact that, through the Byzantine culture and spirituality, Romanians continued to find themselves – albeit indirectly – in the realm of European culture, which also facilitated the process of Westernization and implicit Europeanization.

About Alexandros Ypsilanti (1724/1726–1807), the Prince of Wallachia, historical sources testify that he had previously held the position of “Great translator of the Sublime Porte”, and that “he showed a wide range of interests, from physics to Hellenistic culture. During his years of service to the *Sublime Porte* in Istanbul, he had the opportunity to learn about the reform policy promoted by the «enlightened despots» (Frederick II, Maria Theresa, etc.) and to discuss with diplomats and merchants from the West”²².

In a manuscript (miscellanea) dated from 1782, “the coat of arms of Wallachia is drawn in pen, with the initials of Alexandros Ypsilanti” (*Ms. 3384*, Fasc. 151)²³, under whose signature the “*Pravila*” of 1780 was published. Furthermore, from a manuscript (miscellanea) dating from the 18th–19th centuries, we learn that “in Wallachia, Alexandros Ipsilant, who was a boyar (*postelnic*) in Moldavia, was made ruler” (*Ms. 3775* from B.A.R.)²⁴.

It has been said of the reform policy of the Phanariot Princes, including that of Alexandros Ypsilanti, that it “appears as a Romanian variant of the «enlightened despotism», characteristic of 18th-century Europe”²⁵. However, “the historical framework in which the measures of the European monarchs considered as enlightened despots and those of the Phanariot Princes were enacted was quite different”²⁶.

With regard to the legal status of the Romanian Lands, it has been said that, in the “fanariot age”, i. e., in the period between 1711/1716 and 1821, “no fundamental change took place, ..., but the status of tributary protection (*'ahd ad-*

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 9-10.

²² F. Constantiniu, *Reformele lui Alexandru Ypsilanti* [The reforms of Alexandros Ypsilanti], in *Istoria Românilor*, vol. VI, ..., p. 499.

²³ G. Ștrempel, *Catalogul Manuscriselor Românești. B.A.R., 3101-4413* [The Catalogue of Romanian Manuscripts. B.A.R., 3101-4413], Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publishing House, 1987, p. 108.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 240.

²⁵ F. Constantiniu, *Reformele lui Alexandru Ypsilanti*, ..., p. 501.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

dhimma) continued”, although after the Peace of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, “the unilateral Ottoman protectorate started to be replaced by a double protectorate, through the legalization of Russia’s right to intervene in favor of the Danubian Principalities, ..., which was equivalent to the beginning of the internationalization of the legal status of these countries, a process completed in 1856 with the establishment of the status of collective protection”²⁷.

However, until the securing (*manu militari*) of the independence of the Romanian Principalities from Ottoman rule, in 1877, the Phanariot Princes continued to be appointed by the “*Sublime Porte*”, which invested them “with the insignia of power granted by the Sultan (the supreme source of law, and therefore of power) at the Topkapi Palace”²⁸, after which followed “the welcoming ceremony at the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, where the ancient hymns of the coronation of the Byzantine emperors were sung to the new ruler”²⁹, and finally, the appointment and investiture of the new ruler in one of the Romanian Principalities was concluded with “the ceremony in the country, including his being anointed with myrrh by the metropolitan (at the Metropolitan Palace) and the reading of the order of appointment (at the Princely Palace)”³⁰.

According to historical testimonies, it was Prince Alexandros Ypsilanti who asked the Ecumenical Patriarch Sophronius II (1775–1780) to grant the metropolitan See of Ungrovlahia – occupied during the Phanariot epoch by Greek archbishops – the honorary title of “deputy of the throne of Caesarea of Cappadocia”³¹, which was not “the first in the series of metropolitan Sees dependent on the Patriarchate of Constantinople”³², but the metropolitan See of Heraclea Thraciae was and is still mentioned in the first place in the Diptychs of the Constantinopolitan See.

The legislative work of Alexandros Ypsilanti, embodied “in numerous Charters (Hrisoave), ..., was crowned by the first code of laws of the Phanariot period, the

²⁷ M. Maxim, *Statutul juridic al Țărilor Române față de Înalta Poartă (1711/1716-1821)* [The legal status of the Romanian Principalities in relation to the Sublime Porte (1711/1716-1821)], in *Istoria Românilor*, vol. VI, ..., p. 587.

²⁸ M. Maxim, *Statutul domnilor. Aspecte protocolare* [The status of Princes/Hospodars. Protocol aspects,], in *Istoria Românilor*, vol. VI, ..., p. 594.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ M. Țipău, *Domnii fanarioți în Țările Române (1711-1821). Mică enciclopedie* [The Phanariot princes in the Romanian Countries (1711–1821). Little Encyclopedia], 2nd edition, Bucharest, Omonia Publishing House, 2008, p. 97.

³² *Ibidem*.

Pravilniceasca Condică, drafted in Romanian and Greek and promulgated in 1780”³³.

As regards the provisions of Ypsilanti’s Code concerning the dowry sheets drawn up before and after the wedding, it has been argued that they did not have the expected impact on the Romanian society of that time, because many marriages “negotiated in front of the court”³⁴ were not “durable”, and consequently, ended “with a scandal”³⁵.

For example, even after the appearance of this Code of Laws, many marriages broke up because, according to the testimonies of the time, the sons-in-law were not satisfied with the dowry received and, usually, although the agreement between the parties had been concluded, they sent their wives “to the parental house with the request to ask for more than what they had received”³⁶.

As for the dowry, the documents of the time – both historical and legal – also attest to the fact that, at the end of the 18th century, a woman could not marry “without a dowry”, i.e., “dowry proper (houses, estates, stores, money, etc.)”³⁷. Moreover, the sheets of dowry had to list all the movable and immovable objects and goods that the family gave to their daughter on the occasion of her marriage, which constituted her dowry, which was supposed to be “in no way inferior to the rank and wealth of the family”³⁸.

In some of his works, namely in the *Didahii* (Sermons) and in *Capete de învățătură* (Chapters of teaching), Anthim Ivireanul („the Iberian”, i.e. from Iberia, Georgia), the metropolitan of Wallachia (1708–1716), also left us important information “on the manner of drafting important acts that will govern ... the social life of the people. These are wills and dowry sheets”³⁹. Among other things, in these works, Anthim the Iberian stipulated that three witnesses and a priest must be present when drawing up these dowry sheets for them to be credible in court. It was also this metropolitan who attributed “the entire responsibility for drawing

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 500.

³⁴ C. Vintilă-Ghițulescu, *Focul amorului: despre dragoste și sexualitate în societatea românească (1750-1830)* [The fire of love: about love and sexuality in Romanian society (1750–1830)], Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2006, p. 111.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ C. Ghițulescu, *În șalvari și cu ișlic. Biserică, sexualitate, căsătorie și divorț în Țara Românească a secolului al XVIII-lea* [In shalwars and ishlik. Church, sexuality, marriage and divorce in 18th-century Wallachia], Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, p. 135.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 136.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 138.

up a dowry list to the priest”⁴⁰.

This order continued to be observed and applied in the life of Romanian society (civil and ecclesiastical) until the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, when, by the provisions of his Civil Code, the *Mitrical* records of baptisms, marriages and deaths passed to the civil authority, and the dowry was replaced by the matrimonial covenants⁴¹.

About “some dotal sheets”, used in writing in the mid-seventeenth century, it has been noted that they are found “hidden under mysterious names among other types of documents, such as wealth registers (catastife/diate)”⁴². In fact, the earliest testimonies concerning the drawing up of dowry sheets are to be found in the *Pravilas of the Country*, which appeared long before Ypsilanti's Code, which proves that this legal institution was a reality in Romania before the Phanariot epoch.

The traditional practice of drawing up the dowry sheets is also testified by the collection of old books in the state and ecclesiastical archives (Patriarchate, dioceses and monasteries), which remains a first-rate source for historians and jurists alike.

PRAVILNICEASCA CONDICĂ. ITS GENESIS, SOURCES AND CONTENT

In order to better understand the contents of the provisions of this *Code of Laws* of 1780 – known as *Pravilniceasca Condică* – we must also take into account the fact that, at that time, the two Romanian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia) were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, which did not allow them to exercise the right of issuing laws “without its approval”⁴³. But the peace treaty concluded between Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire at Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 would give the Romanian Principalities the opportunity to claim their “old rights, the old “prerogatives” of the countries”⁴⁴, including the “right to issue laws

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ C. Mihailovici, *De la zestre la convenții matrimoniale* [From dowry to matrimonial covenants], in <https://notardebucuresti.ro/2022/06/29/de-la-zestre-la-conventii-matrimonialeiunie-2022/> (Accessed on 07. 07. 2024).

⁴² P. A. Lazăr, *Foaia de zestre în Moldova sec. XVI-XVIII: constituire și validare. Normele de întocmire ale unei foi de zestre, cuprinse în Prăvălioara de la Iași din 1784* [The dowry sheet in 16th–18th-c. Moldova: establishment and validation. The rules for drawing up a dowry sheet, included in the 1784 *Pravila of Iași*], in “*Studium*”, vol. 10, 2017, p. 6.

⁴³ *Pravilniceasca Condică 1780*, critical edition, Bucharest, Romanian Academy's Publishing House, 1957, p. 9.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

without foreign interference”⁴⁵.

This reality could also explain the fact that in *Alexandros Ypsilanti's Code of Laws* we cannot detect any “impact of the Ottoman factor on the status of women”⁴⁶. On the contrary, this Code of Laws presents some “particularities of the social and legal position held by women”⁴⁷ of that epoch, such as the “register of a wife’s dowry” or of the goods and revenues, “including the gifts given during the marital union”⁴⁸, as it was in fact foreseen by the provisions of the Byzantine law, whose principles were also reiterated by this Code, according to which the husband was “not to be entitled to the wife’s dowry, or its revenues”⁴⁹, but had “to guarantee the dowry’s safety-net”⁵⁰, as it was also foreseen by the Code of Calimah in chapter 31, “*On marital contracts*”, printed in 1817, that is 37 years after *Ypsilanti's Code of Laws*.

That it was not ignored in Ypsilanti’s Code (*Pravilniceasca Condică*) either, “the feminine side of Romanian history”⁵¹ is also attested by the fact that even “historical records” of the Romanian Principalities show that “women – especially those belonging to the high society – had many more privileges than those of other European countries”⁵².

As a result of the facilitations offered by this bilateral peace treaty (of October 23, 1775), Alexandros Ypsilanti promulgated – through a Royal Charter – the work entitled *Pentru rânduiala departamentelor de judecăți* (“For the organization of the departments of judgement”). Written and printed in Greek, the work was called “Ὁ νόμος”⁵³ (The Law), translated in Romanian by the word “Pravila” at the time.

The use of the name “*Pravila*”, both for this work and for the *Pravilniceasca Condică* – approved in 1780 – was due to the fact that their authors had as a main

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶ L. Zabolotnaia, *The Impact of the Ottoman Factor on the Status of Women in the South-Eastern European Countries in the Middle Ages through Historiography Perspectives*. in “Codrul Cosminului”, XX, 2013, no. 1, pp. 127-140.

⁴⁷ Eadem, *Unveiling the private life of the 18th century. A divorce act of 1795*, in “Codrul Cosminului”, XXI, 2015, no. 1, p. 143.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 145.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 146.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ L. Zabolotnaia, *Women's Power in Moldova (14th - 17th Centuries)*. *Gender Studies*, in “Codrul Cosminului”, XXIII, 2017, no. 1, p. 7.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 11.

⁵³ *Pravilniceasca Condică ...*, pp. 42-44.

source for their text the "Imperial *Pravila*", that is, the Byzantine laws promulgated by the emperors of the Eastern Roman Empire⁵⁴, which had been introduced in the Danubian-Pontico-Carpathian area (of contemporary Romania) since the time of the first Byzantine emperor, namely Emperor Justinian⁵⁵ (527–565).

Although the Romanian laws of the Phanariot epoch (1711–1821) aimed to be a "product"⁵⁶ of the local legal culture, some of these "*Pravilas*" were originally written in Greek and then appeared in bilingual format (Greek & Romanian). Such was the case of *Alexandros Ypsilanti's Code of Laws* of 1780, which, in 1957, the Collective for the Old Romanian Legislation of the Romanian Academy, led by Acad. Andrei Rădulescu, viewed as "the first of our newer codes"⁵⁷.

This Code of Laws was printed in Greek in the printing house of the Metropolitanate of Bucharest, but with "the title exclusively in Greek"⁵⁸, namely "Σύνταγματιον Νομικόν"⁵⁹, meaning a "Code of Laws", which was inaccurately translated into Romanian as "The Little Constitution" or "The Little Legal Order"⁶⁰.

In a document dated December 20, 1791, we see *Alexandros Ypsilanti's Code of Laws* under the title of "*Condică pravilnicească*"⁶¹, which we find again in the second edition of this *Pravila*, published in 1841 (Kluceru N. Brăiloiu), where this code has the same title, "*Pravilnicească Condică a Domnului Alexandru Ioan Ipsilant V.V.*". Conversely, from a manuscript (miscellanea) dated from the "18th–19th centuries" we learn that this Code of Laws had been originally entitled "*Mic manual de legi*" (Small legal manual). However, said manuscript lacks the "beginning and the end" (Ms. 4143, Fasc. 1-15, 212, 265-269, B.A.R.)⁶². But, since the text of this manuscript is only in Greek, it cannot lead us to believe that it was intended

⁵⁴ N. V. Dură, C. Mititelu, *The State and the Church in IV-VI Centuries. The Roman Emperor and the Christian Religion*, in "SGEM Conference on Political Sciences, Law, Finance, Economics & Tourism", vol. I, 2014, Albena, pp. 923-930.

⁵⁵ N. V. Dură, *The Byzantine Nomocanons, fundamental sources of old Romanian Law*, in "Exploration, Education and Progress in the third Millennium", Galati University Press, Galati, vol. I, no. 3, 2011, pp. 25-48; C. Mititelu, *The legislation of emperor Justinian (527-565) and its reception in the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic space*, in "Analecta Cracoviensia", vol. 48, 2016, pp. 383-397.

⁵⁶ *Pravilniceasca Condică* ..., p. 17.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 37.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p. 207 (doc. no. 15).

⁶² G. Ștrempel, *Catalogul Manuscriselor* ..., p. 349.

only for the use of the Phanariot Greeks in Wallachia, as it was also named “Prohiron ton Nomon” (Handbook of laws).

Compared to the Prohiron of Emperor Basil I “the Macedonian” (867–886), which had incorporated not only state-norms of Roman-Byzantine law, but also “numerous old state laws concerning church affairs”⁶³, Alexandros Ypsilanti’s Code of Laws was intended to be useful to the jurists of the country. Moreover, this Code was much smaller in terms of contents.

As for this title of *Prohiron ton Nomon*, it is not to be ruled out that it should have been chosen by the authors of *Alexandros Ypsilanti’s Code of Laws*, taking inspiration from the title of the work of Mihail Fotinopulos (Fotino), who, between 1765 and 1777, elaborated a work entitled *Nomikon Procheiron* (Legal Manual) in Bucharest. In turn, this “great legal expert of Wallachia of the second half of the eighteenth century”⁶⁴, that is, Mihail Fotinopulos, took the title *Nomikon Procheiron* from the Collection of Byzantine Laws that had appeared in 870 by the order of Emperor Basil I the Macedonian (867–886). In the text of his work, Fotino reproduces numerous “Byzantine laws, ..., cites classical works and authors of Byzantine law – the Basilika, Blastares, Harmenopoulos...”⁶⁵.

The Legal Manuals written by Mihail Fotinopulos (Fotino)⁶⁶, published in different years (1765, five Titles; 1766, eight Titles and 1777, Book I), served indeed as a model and a documentary source to the authors of *Alexandros Ypsilanti’s Code of Laws*. And according to certain scholars, Alexandros Ypsilanti would have appropriated from Fotino not only the titles of his textbooks, but also entire paragraphs on “the ruler, clerks and the organization of the Courts of law”⁶⁷. However,

⁶³ I. N. Floca, *Drept canonic ortodox. Legislație și administrație bisericească* [Orthodox canon law. Church legislation and administration], vol. I, Bucharest, Publishing House of Biblic Institutul, 1990, p. 103.

⁶⁴ V. Georgescu, *Un al treilea manuscris ieșean al Manualului de legi – Νομικὸν Πρόχειρον – din 1766 al lui Mihail Fotino (Fotinopulos)* [A third manuscript of Iași of the Legal Manual – Νομικὸν Πρόχειρον – from 1766 by Mihail Fotino (Fotinopulos)], in “Studii. Revistă de istorie” [Studies. Journal of History], no. 6, 1961, p. 1515.

⁶⁵ R. Theodorescu, *Pornind de la un Manual de legi* [Starting from a Legal Manual], apud <https://www.universuljuridic.ro/pornind-de-la-un-manual-de-legi/> (Accessed on 28. 09. 2023).

⁶⁶ G. Cronț, *Recenzie* [Review] for P. I. Zepos, *Manual de legi al lui Mihail Fotinopulos (București, 1765). Editat pentru întâia dată după codicele manuscris din Arhivele Statului din Iași*, Atena, 1959, XII + 304 pages and 8 plates [Mihail Fotinopulos’s Legal Manual (Bucharest, 1765). First published after the manuscript codex in the State Archives of Iași, Athens, 1959], in “Studii. Revistă de istorie”, XIII, 1960, nr. 2, pp. 272–275.

⁶⁷ V. Georgescu, E. Popescu-Mihuț, *Organizarea de stat a Țării Românești (1765–1782)*.

Mihail Fotino had also taken a documentary material from the *Ecloga of the Isaurians*, published between 738 and 741, which served him “as the source of Book I of the 1777 Legal Manual”⁶⁸.

The authors of *Alexandros Ypsilanti's Code of Laws* also took over – through the work of Fotino – the chapter *Despre dotă (zestre)* (On dowry) from the *Ecloga*. According to the statement made by Jean Anselme Bernard Mortreuil, the *Ecloga* of the Isaurian Emperors, Leo III (717–741) and Constantine V (741–775), was promulgated “some time before the death of Leo the Isaurian”, more precisely “in the years 740–741 of the era of Dennis the Little”⁶⁹. The two emperors turned to the text of Roman law offered by the Corpus of laws of Emperor Justinian, as stated in the title of the work itself, which was defined as a “Selection of laws” (Ἐκλογὴ τῶν νόμων), that is, from the Institutes, Digest, Code and Novels, which the authors of the *Ecloga* “corrected to be more humane”⁷⁰, that is, in the terms in which Emperor Justinian once expressed himself, establishing that “as a general rule, the establishment of an heir implies the granting of liberty”, which is why he promulgated an Imperial Constitution “... out of a new love of men” (*nova humanitatis ratione*) (*Justiniani Institutiones* lb. VI, 2).

As for marriage, the *Ecloga* stipulated that it could be accomplished by concluding a “dowry deed in the presence of three witnesses” (Tit. II, 2, 3)⁷¹, which is also provided in the text of *Ypsilanti's Code of Laws*. Therefore, these provisions of the *Ecloga* confirm that its texts were in fact a source of inspiration for the authors of the *Pravilniceasca Condiță* in matters of dowry, testamentary inheritance, etc., and not only in the organization of the judicial system.

From the text of *Alexandros Ypsilanti's Code of Laws*, we find that its authors were fully aware that such laws were necessary in “all areas”, and especially in the

Fragmente din proiectele de cod general sau manualele de legi redactate de Mihail Fotino în 1765 (cinci titluri), 1766 (opt titluri) și 1777 (cartea I) [State organization of Wallachia (1765–1782). Excerpts from the drafts of the general code or manuals of laws drawn up by Mihail Fotino in 1765 (five titles), 1766 (eight titles) and 1777 (book I)], critical edition, Bucharest, Romanian Academy's Publishing House, 1989, p. 254.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

⁶⁹ J. A. B. Mortreuil, *Histoire du droit byzantin ou du droit romain dans l'Empire d'Orient depuis la mort de Justinien jusqu'à la prise de Constantinople en 1453*, vol. I, Marseille, 1843, p. 365.

⁷⁰ A. Momferratos, *Ecloga Leonis et Constantini cum appendice*, Atena, 1888, p. 1.

⁷¹ *Ecloga Leonis et Constantini, Epanagoge Basilii Leonis et Alexandri*, ed. Zacharia von Lingenthal, Karl Eduard, Lipsiae, 1852, <https://archive.org/details/eclogaleonisetcc00linggoog/page/n6/mode/2up> (Accessed on 21. 11. 2023).

courts of law, where “all the Ruler’s decisions (*anaforalii*) and books of judgment” were to be found (*Pravilniceasca Condică*, ch. II. *Pentru judecătoria a veliților boeri* no. 2)⁷², that is, for “the judgement of the great boyars”.

The main artisans of this “*Pravila*” were some of the country’s most prominent lawyers, knowledgeable about the Greek language, about Byzantine law and Romanian law (written and customary ones), such as, for example, the Chancellor (*logofăt*) Nestor, who proved to be a good connoisseur of the old Romanian law, Enechiță Văcărescu and Mihail Fotino (a naturalized Greek), who in 1765 published, by the order of the Prince of Wallachia, Ștefan Racoviță, a Legal Manual entitled “*Prohiron*”, in which he made express reference to the imperial laws, and especially to the monumental collection of Byzantine laws entitled the *Basilika*.

The authors of the Code of Laws promulgated by the Prince of Wallachia, Alexandros Ypsilanti, proved to have “... extensive legal knowledge; they were acquainted with the works of Montesquieu (*L’Esprit des lois*), Beccaria (*Dei delitti e delle pene*), the Instructions of *Catherine the Great*; they were familiar with the ideas of reform of the second half of the eighteenth century, and they included some fundamentally progressive principles long before other legislations”⁷³.

According to the established order of the Romanian Principalities, this Code of Laws “was subjected, according to the law of the country in the field of lawmaking, to the Public Council (*Sfatul de Obște*), which was composed of the Metropolitan, Bishops and great boyars”⁷⁴, then it was “reviewed by the Prince”⁷⁵, who promulgated it through his Royal Charter in 1780, where Alexandros Ypsilanti pointed out that this “*Pravila*”, i.e., the *Pravilniceasca Condică*, was drafted “as a source and guide to all those who will find themselves judging ..., so that, they may issue fair judgements, and that all those who have been damaged may find justice ..., and that justice may be shown to all our subjects, since the judgment ..., is the prerogative of God”⁷⁶.

Therefore, *Pravilniceasca Condică* had been written to be a “source” and a “guide” for all those who had to make judicial decisions on the basis of the *Pravila*, for “all subjects”⁷⁷.

The desire of the Prince Alexandros Ypsilanti was that, through these

⁷² *Pravilniceasca Condică* ..., pp. 50-51.

⁷³ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 44.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*.

"judgements", all those who had been "wronged" should find their "justice", which had to be "victorious" because the judgement actually came from "God"⁷⁸, and it must therefore "give to each one that to which he is entitled (*ius suum cuique tribuens*)" (*Justiniani Institutiones*, lb. I, 1).

As it is known, *Alexandros Ypsilanti's Code of Laws* was not "expressly" repealed by *Legiuirea Caragea* (the Caragea Legislation) of 1818, but only "tacitly repealed by contrary provisions written in the new law"⁷⁹, although *Pravilniceasca Condică* "had actually been used in writing the *Legiuirea Caragea*, in the composition of which many of the rules of the *Ypsilanti's Code of Laws* were used"⁸⁰.

For the most part, *Pravilniceasca Condică* remained in force until 1865, when the Civil Code promulgated in that year repealed not only the Calimah and Caragea Codes, but also the other previous civil laws (acc. to Art. 1912 of the *Civil Code 1864*).

The fact that the authors of the *Pravilniceasca Condică* (*Ypsilanti's Code of Laws*) used the old sources of Romanian law is confirmed even by the texts of its three annexes, namely: "*Annex I A*: Royal charters and books preceding the writing of the *Pravilniceasca Condică* or related to its promulgation and application"; "*Annex I B*: Royal charters, books and decrees and the anaphorales, which explain or modify the text of the *Pravilniceasca Condică*"; "*Annex II*: Case law" and "*Annex III*: Bibliographic information".

PRAVILNICEASCA CONDICĂ AND ITS PROVISIONS ON THE "DOWRY DEED"

In a royal charter from 1775, entitled "For the organization of the departments of judgement", Alexandros Ypsilanti, the Prince of Wallachia, said that he had also written "a Pravila" in Greek, which he would translate "in the Romanian language"⁸¹, and he would print it so that the judges could judge "according to the

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 16-17.

⁸¹ *Hrisovul lui Alexandru Ion Ipsilante Voevod cu privire la organizarea judecătorească a Țării Românești, în care se anunță și întocmirea Condicii Pravilnicești* [The Royal charter of Alexandros Ion Ipsilante Voevod on the judicial organization of Wallachia, which also announces the drawing up of the *Pravilniceasca Condică*], in "*Pravilniceasca Condică*" ..., Annex I, p. 165.

Pravila and justice”⁸². This royal charter also announced the “drafting of the *Pravilniceasca Condiță*”, whose content was of “pravilnic” (nomocanonical) nature⁸³, that is, it included both the State laws and the Church laws, as was the norm in the Byzantine empire.

About the criminal code of Alexandros Ypsilanti⁸⁴, published in 1775 – which circulated as a manuscript –, it has been said that its text included provisions on marriage, family, etc., which served the ecclesiastical judges of that time not only as a model and basis in the formulation of their decisions, but also in the resolution of cases concerning the “dowry deed”. Among other things, in the Decree of promulgation of his Code, the Prince of Wallachia, Alexandros Ypsilanti, stated that for the administration of “justice and truth”⁸⁵ we must judge “by the likeness of the Judge of all”⁸⁶, that is, according to the “judgement of God” (τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ)⁸⁷.

For the purpose of ensuring human justice in the spirit of God’s judgment, Alexandros Ypsilanti – together with the *Divan* (Privy Council) and his legal counsellors (customary and civil law) – wished to endow the country and its inhabitants with a “*Pravila*” (*Code of Laws*), being aware that “a greater misfortune cannot be found among a people, and especially among people of good faith, than to live without laws, that is to say, to have no rules or to fail to follow those rules”⁸⁸, i.e., “κατὰ νόμου”⁸⁹ (according to the law).

Regarding the “people of Wallachia”, i.e., the Romanians, Alexandros Ypsilanti stated that they “sometimes follow the Byzantine imperial Laws, and other times the customs of the country, ... because they are of old times, ... But they did not respect the customs of the country either, because they invoked the provisions of the Byzantine imperial Laws, and at other times they opposed them with the power of the customs”⁹⁰. However, Prince Ypsilanti decided that the decision of a judge who “would oppose the Byzantine laws and the customs of the country,

⁸² *Ibidem*, p. 163.

⁸³ *Ibidem*, p. 161.

⁸⁴ See V. Georgescu, *Présentation de quelques manuscrits juridiques de Valachie et de Moldavie (XVe - XIXe siècles)* II, in “Revue des études sud-est européennes”, no. 8, 1969, pp. 335-365.

⁸⁵ *Pravilniceasca Condiță* ..., p. 42.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 42-43.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 42-44.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 44-45.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 44.

should have no power”⁹¹.

Above of all, the statements of Prince Alexandros Ypsilanti suggest that the legal custom of the country and the Byzantine imperial Laws were the two legal sources of Wallachia in the field of judgement, while acknowledging that, usually, Romanians preferred following their customary rules, to the detriment of the legal norms provided in the Byzantines laws, even the Basilika, which also circulated – in the abbreviated form – in the Romanian principalities.

In the First part of *Pravilniceasca Condiță*, reference is made to the institution of marriage by means of the chapter entitled “For dowry” (Περὶ Προικοῦ)⁹², which provides that “the dowry of the woman”, which was to be evaluated “either before the wedding, or after the wedding, within forty days or no more than sixty”⁹³, was part of the “moving goods”, and the “dowry deeds” had to be recorded “in the ledgers,... (and) be kept safe in the great monasteries of the diocese that the wedding was held in, so that no persecutions and oaths would take place to destroy the dowry deeds”⁹⁴.

The dowry deeds were therefore to be recorded in “ledgers” (εἰς κώδικας) – that is, a kind of register of civil status of that epoch – which were to be deposited in the archive or library of one of the great monasteries in the diocese where the Holy Sacrament of Marriage was administrated, so as to avoid the issues that accompanied their drafting.

Those who wrote these dowry deeds and drew up those “Ledgers” were the clergymen of the Church and they continued to carry out this task and keep the deeds in the archives of Churches and Monasteries until 1865, when the Documents of civil status – known as the *Mitrical* records (records of baptisms, marriages and deaths) – passed into the possession of the State.

Alexandros Ypsilanti's Code of Laws provides that the woman's dowry be handed over to the groom, who had to sign the “dowry deed”, and then “strengthened”, i.e., confirmed, by the hierarchs “of the area or signed by trustworthy witnesses, so as to make for better proof”⁹⁵.

In this respect, *Ypsilanti's Code of Laws* reaffirmed the provisions of principle laid down by the Roman Law and the “Byzantine Imperial Laws”. For example, in the ancient Roman Law, we find many references about “prenuptial gifts or

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 66.

⁹² *Ibidem*, p. 92-93.

⁹³ *Ibidem*, p. 92-94.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 94.

⁹⁵ *Pravilniceasca Condiță ...*, p. 94.

dowry", as it is also obviously shown by the Imperial constitution of February 21 428 of Emperors Theodosius and Valentinian, which expressly spoke about "pre-nuptial gifts or dowries" and, among other things, they foresee that "lack" of these makes the marriage "lack validity" (*Codex Theodosianus*, lb. III, tit. 7, 3)⁹⁶.

In the new Roman Law, that is, the Byzantine Law, it is also provided that "what brings the marriage about is not the dowries, but the mutual intention of the cohabitants" (Justinian, *Novels* 18, 4; 22, 3)⁹⁷. In the same law we also find the provisions about the necessity of having the "dowry deeds" signed by witnesses. For example, Emperor Justinian stated that "the men of illustrious rank" cannot enter "into legal marriage without making marriage contracts"⁹⁸ in the presence of "three or four of the church's most reverend clergy, and make out a certificate..., but no fewer than three – are to sign it, to that effect"⁹⁹. Hence the mention that "the defender of that most venerable church is then to deposit such papyrus, carrying the said signed statements, among the archives of the same most holy church" (*Novel* 74, 4, 1-2)¹⁰⁰.

In *Pravilniceasca Condică* it was stipulated that both the "groom" and his "heirs" would return "that dowry in full, without any subtraction, that is, exactly at that value"¹⁰¹. But, if this "value" or evaluation was not established at the agreed time, neither the "man" nor his "heirs" were liable "... to return in full the dowry that was provided in the dowry deed, and the woman or her heirs were to take only that part of the dowry they could find"¹⁰².

From the text of *Pravila* it can also be noted that, although the legislator recognized a man's right of "preference with privilege", i.e., a right of priority conferred by the law, Ypsilanti's Code of Laws still recognized some rights of women, which for that time was already a legal approach favourable to them, which the *Pravila*'s authors referred to by the phrase the woman's "protimis" (priority) to the parental home.

Indeed, the *Pravila* mentions that "for the parental homes, for it has been

⁹⁶ *The Theodosian Code and Novels, and the Sirmondian Constitutions: A Translation with Commentary, Glossary, and Bibliography*, edited by C. Pharr, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952, p. 70.

⁹⁷ *The Novels of Justinian. A Complete Annotated English Translation*, edited by D. Miller, P. Sarris, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 211 and 235.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 528.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰¹ *Pravilniceasca Condică* ..., p. 94.

¹⁰² *Ibidem*.

decided that they should also be called home, which gives the family name of that family, (for not all estates shall be called homes), preference with privilege could be held in relation to such a home only by men, that is to say, their male heirs (who are called aniondes), up to the sons and grandchildren from sons, and other relatives up to nephews from brothers, so that the name of the family would not perish, and never by the female side, for they have not the right to ask for the parental home, lest it may lose its name, because the woman takes the name of her husband: but nevertheless she also has the right of preference over that home, provided that she makes this request in due time, for kinship"¹⁰³.

Therefore, although the male side had an acknowledged right of priority, because it carried on the name of the "parental home", the *Pravila of Ypsilanti* provided that the woman also had a "right of priority over that home", on condition that she request this right in due time.

The presence of the right of pre-emption, known in the Byzantine law under the name of "protimis", proves that in the Romanian society of that time there was really an innovative concept regarding the woman's right to her husband's inheritance.

The same *Pravila* also provided the right of brothers to endow their sisters if they remained unmarried upon the death of their parents¹⁰⁴. A "girl" could receive from her "brothers, from her parents' property, a dowry that was of lesser value than the dowry received previously by a sister while their parents still lived"¹⁰⁵.

In other words, a sister could not be endowed by her brothers with a dowry greater than that received by another sister while their parents lived. This is also highlighted by the Cassation Court in 1867, which had found that, in that case, the legislator "... had placed the hereditary benefits of children of any sex under parental providence"¹⁰⁶, and "rejected the possibility of an inheritance in which the brothers received almost everything, and the sisters almost nothing" (*Annex II*, Articles 2, and 3)¹⁰⁷.

In Chapter XXI, the *Code of Laws* of 1780 offered explicit clarifications regarding the inheritance of the property that is passed down to the wife after the

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, p. 100.

¹⁰⁴ C. Mititelu, *Regimul succesoral în Cartea românească de învățătură și Îndreptarea legii* [The Succession Regime in the Romanian Book of Teaching and in the Straightening of the Law], in "Analele Universității OVIDIUS Constanța / Seria Drept și Științe Administrative", no. 1, 2004, pp. 157-163.

¹⁰⁵ *Pravilniceasca Condică ...*, p. 100.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 213.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*.

death of her husband, namely “the woman that has children with her husband, if their children live past his death, shall take from her man’s wealth only that share corresponding to her child, which she will use to procure food, and not rightfully own, that is to sell or to give away as she pleases”¹⁰⁸.

But this provision was also taken from the text of the “Byzantine Imperial Laws”, which made the *Pravila* of 1780 reiterate the provisions of principle laid down by the Roman law¹⁰⁹. At the same time, it was stated that “after the death of her husband”¹¹⁰, “the barren woman”, i.e., the woman with no children, “could also recover her dowry in full”¹¹¹. In other words, “gifts given before the wedding, but only when there was no debt incurred by the husband before the wedding, but not after the wedding”¹¹².

Pravilniceasca Condică allowed the widow, even if she had no children, to also receive what she had been gifted by her “husband the day after the wedding”¹¹³. In this regard, the authors of this *Pravila* had applied the provisions of the customary law of the country, as follows from a Decision of the Cassation Court dated November 17, 1925, according to which “the popular custom that the surviving spouse receive a share of the deceased spouse’s property – in Moldova, as well as in Wallachia – was consecrated in the “*Pravila*” of Alexandros Ypsilanti, which recognized the entitlement of the surviving spouse to a larger or smaller share, depending on the concurrent rights of their children, or brothers and sisters, or other kin”¹¹⁴.

In Chapter XIX of *Pravila of Ypsilanti*, entitled “On dowry”, it was stipulated that, after the death of the husband, the woman “... must be sure to make a registry separate from her husband’s property, and from her dowry, ... (and) from the heirs”¹¹⁵. In the event of the woman’s death, “then her heirs, if they have come of age, shall be able to claim their right to inherit her dowry”¹¹⁶. This testimony proves that the *Pravila* of Ypsilanti reaffirmed in fact the provision of principle of

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 102.

¹⁰⁹ C. Mititelu, *Matrimonium (Marriage) in Roman Law. The Impact of the Provisions of “Jus Romanum” on International and National Matrimonial Law*, in “Bulletin of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences”, vol. 14, no. 4, 2020, pp. 120-130.

¹¹⁰ *Pravilniceasca Condică* ..., p. 102.

¹¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹¹² *Ibidem*.

¹¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 213.

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 96.

¹¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 98.

Novel 22 of Emperor Justinian¹¹⁷, which had been reiterated in the Ecloga of the Isaurians and in the laws of the Macedonian emperors (the Prochiron, the Ep-anagoge, the Basilika and the Constitutions of Leo VI the Wise).

As for the inheritance, *Ypsilanti's Code of Laws (Pravilniceasca Condică)* provides that "after a girl receives a dowry from her parents, she shall have no right upon the death of her parents to receive any of their inheritance but will be content with the dowry that she has received"¹¹⁸.

According to the provisions of *Pravilniceasca Condică*, women who after the death of their husband were married before the end of their year of mourning were deprived of all property, both testamentary and resulting from donations.

That the Byzantine Imperial Laws have also provided for the same ordinances is confirmed by the legislation of Emperor Justinian, who by three Imperial Constitutions (*Novel 2, 22 and 39*) categorically forbade a woman to remarry before one year after the death of her husband, and the woman who failed to comply with these provisions would find herself in the impossibility of claiming the right to inherit, even if a testament existed. And the punishment of the unfaithful woman who gave birth 11 months after her husband's death was being "deprived" of both her "prenuptial gifts" and her "dowry" (*Novel 39, 2*).

Pravilniceasca Condică has indeed appropriated the provisions of Justinian's legislation regarding both "pre-marriage gifts" and "post-marriage gifts", including the case of the remarriage of a widow before the end of the year of "mourning".

Pravilniceasca Condică also provided the obligation that the "testaments" and "dowry deeds" were to be written "by the chancellor (*logofețel*)"¹¹⁹, but "should also be signed by the archbishop, or, where no archbishop is available, for ease of issue, to be signed by the abbots of the great monasteries"¹²⁰. And, at that time, i.e., in the year 1780, "testaments" and "dowry deeds" were therefore still under the jurisdiction of both institutions of the country, the State and the Church, as in the former Byzantium.

In *Pravilniceasca Condică* – as in the *Legiuirea Caragea* – there are no provisions for marriages with foreigners, because in those times "... naturalization, in the absence of special rules, was achieved by tolerance and by the intention of

¹¹⁷ *Novellae Constitutiones*, ed. by R. Schöll, W. Kroll, in "Corpus iuris civilis", vol. III, Berolini, 1954, <https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Corpus/Nov22.htm> (Accessed in 08. 12. 2023).

¹¹⁸ *Pravilniceasca Condică* ..., p. 98.

¹¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

¹²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 78-80.

foreigners to remain bound to the land of the country, appropriating a part of it, provided that they were of the Christian faith"¹²¹.

By such provisions, the laws of the Phanariot epoch prove to respect both the "Law of the land" and the right to religion¹²², but not the right to change one's religion¹²³, which was provided for by the international law in the last decades of the last century¹²⁴. This legal regime regarding the marriage with foreigners of Christian faith was legislated and perpetuated by the Phanariot rulers, so that they could take possession of a significant part of the country's land, as would be confirmed by the reforms undertaken by Kogălniceanu during the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza.

CONCLUSIONS

The *Pravila of Alexandros Ypsilanti*, entitled "Σύνταγματιον Νομικόν" (Code of Laws), also unsuitably referred to as a "Small legal manual"¹²⁵, has been endowed with constitutional authority by the Prince of the Country through the Charter of its promulgation, thus following the procedure of the Byzantine emperors, and not that of the "Greek Byzantine law", as some historians and jurists¹²⁶ tried to claim in a "nationalistic" spirit.

Although the "*Pravila*" of 1780 is a Code of Laws, its text also refers to the institutions of the Church, such as the diocese, archbishopric, metropolitan Church, monastery, etc., which attests that the "Byzantine Imperial Laws", which

¹²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 214.

¹²² N. V. Dură, C. Mititelu, *The Freedom of Religion and the Right to Religious Freedom*, in "SGEM Conference on Political Sciences, Law, Finance, Economics & Tourism", Albena, Bulgaria, vol. I, 2014, pp. 831-838.

¹²³ N. V. Dură, *Proselytism and the Right to Change Religion: The Romanian Debate*, in "Law and Religion in the 21st Century. Relations between States and Religious Communities", edited by S. Ferrari and R. Cristofori, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England, 2010, pp. 279-290.

¹²⁴ N. V. Dură, *The Right to Religion: Some Considerations of the Principal International and European Juridical Instruments*, in "Religion and Equality. Law in conflict", edited by W. Cole Durham Jr. and D. Thayer, Routledge, UK, 2016, pp. 15-24; N. V. Dură, *The Right and its Nature in the Perception of the Roman Jurisprudence and of the Great Religions of the Antiquity*, in A. Sandu et al (Coord.), "Rethinking Social Action. Core Values", Bologna, Medimond, 2015, pp. 517-524.

¹²⁵ S. Longinescu, *Istoria dreptului românesc din vremile cele mai vechi și până azi* [History of Romanian law from the earliest times until today], Bucharest, 1908, p. 356.

¹²⁶ P. Zepos, *L'influence du droit byzantin ...*, pp. 427-438.

were its main source, attributed to it an eminently nomocanonical (*pravilnic*) content, that is of the State laws and of Church laws, as confirmed by the 1841 edition of this *Pravila*, accredited to Kluceru Brăiloiu, which bears the title "*Pravilnicească Condică a Domnului Alexandru Ioan Ipsilant voievod*", and about which Professor Ștefan Longinescu rightly remarked that *Pravilniceasca Condică* is "the title under which the Code of Ypsilanti was commonly known"¹²⁷.

From the examination and hermeneutic analysis of the text of the *Pravila* of 1780 it was possible to find out that the country's customs were the main source of this *Pravila*, as also pointed out by Ștefan Berechet, according to whom "it is not out of the question that the Legal Manual of Mihail Fotinopolos might have also been taken into account, ..., in 1765"¹²⁸.

With regard to *Pravilniceasca Condică*, it can also be noted that, with regard to the systematization of its contents, it differs from the Codes or Collections of laws previously published, such as those of "Iacob Ioanitul (1645) and Mihail Fotinopolos (1765), which followed the syntagmatic model or that of the Byzantine laws"¹²⁹, because in the text of the *Pravila of Ypsilanti* one can also see certain influences of the modern Western law. Regarding the collections of laws that appeared after the *Pravilniceasca Condică*, such as, for example, the Code of Calimah (*Codul Calimah*) of 1817 and the Caragea Law (*Legiuirea Caragea*) of 1818, it was said that they imitated "the Western legislators of the early nineteenth century"¹³⁰, but in fact, the presence of the provisions of the "Byzantine Imperial Laws" and of the customs of the country in the text of these collections of Romanian legislation from the beginning of the 19th century, made the influence of the collections of Western legislation still anaemic and inoperative in the landscape of the old Romanian law of that period.

From the text of *Ypsilanti's Code of Laws*, known as *Pravilniceasca Condică*, the reader of our paper will also find out that, for its authors, the institution of marriage was not a priority, but, as stated in the Royal Charter, the judicial organization, the organization of the Courts of law, the legal procedure, etc. were the determining factors of its occurrence, for which its authors turned to the Basilika of the Emperors of the Macedonian dynasty and the Hexabiblos of Constantine Harmenopoulos¹³¹.

¹²⁷ S. Longinescu, *Istoria dreptului românesc* ..., p. 358.

¹²⁸ S. Berechet, *Istoria vechiului drept românesc*, vol. I, *Izvoarele* [History of the old Romanian law, Vol. I, Sources], Iași, 1933, p. 222.

¹²⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹³⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹³¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 222-223.

Nevertheless, these considerations did not prevent the authors of this *Code of Laws* from also presenting the legal status of some of the main contractual acts, such as, for example, the dowry deed, the testament etc. in the spirit of the Byzantine matrimonial law and of the customary law of the Romanian country.

From the examination and the hermeneutic analysis of the text of Alexandros Ypsilanti's *Code of Laws* (Pravila), promulgated in 1780, we have found that the sources used by its authors were both the written law (Byzantine legislation) and the customary law of the Country, which contributed to their registration in the area of ancient Romanian law, i.e., of "Jus valahicum", whose origins go back to the customary law of our Thracian-Geto-Dacian ancestors and to the "Jus scriptum" of the other Fathers of our nation, that is, to the "Jus romanum", in which there are also specific provisions regarding the "dowry sheet", which were also reaffirmed – in their principle provisions – in the text of the Alexandros Ypsilanti's *Code of Laws* (*Pravilniceasca Condică*), and were in force until Alexandru Ioan Cuza's Civil Code.

Finally, from the pages of our study the reader will also find out that the provisions of Ypsilanti's Code of Laws concerning the dowry sheets governed the social life of our people until the epoch of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, and that Anthim the Iberian, the metropolitan of Wallachia, was the one who left us important information on the manner of drafting these dowry sheets, which had been preserved until 19th century.

Last, but not least, from our paper, in which we have made some emendations concerning the assertions of certain historians and jurists with regard to the Code of Laws of Ypsilanti, the reader will also find our scientific contributions regarding the genesis and the way of application in the Romanian society of one of the old legal institutions, namely the dowry, as well as regarding Alexandros Ypsilanti, one of the main actors in the historical framework of his epoch, i.e. the epoch of the Phanariot regime.

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SCATTERED AMONG "THE OTHERS". THE GREEK PRESENCE IN BUKOVINA IN THE 19TH CENTURY

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Abstract: Administratively organised and reorganised, 19th-century Bukovina was a full-fledged imperial limes and an outpost of the Habsburg civilisation in the so-called "Semi-Asia", located at the crossroads of East and West and on the ethnic border between the Slavic, Finno-Ugric and Latin peoples. It was also considered a viable form of multiculturalism and ethnic, confessional, civic, and political pluralism within the Austrian paradigm, with complex, fluid, hybrid and heterogeneous identities. Some of its autochthonous population and those who had colonised or migrated there earlier, particularly their elites, proved valuable to the imperial project, due to the tolerant orientalist curiosity of the modernising agents. Although incomplete during the first part of the 19th century, statistics on the ethnic structure of the imperial province demonstrate the prominence and demographic growth of Romanians, Ruthenians, Germans, Jews, Poles, Armenians, Gypsies, and Lipovan-Russians. However, Bukovina was home to other ethnic groups, all statistically smaller and frequently included among the "others": Italians, Slovaks, and Greeks. In the latter case, the information is dispersed throughout various documents. However, the lack of evidence, thereby hindering historical analysis, makes the presence of Greeks in Bukovina a research challenge because a community's worth is determined not only by its size but also by the traits and roles of its members. The paper focuses on information on "marginals" in official statistics – their local communities, characteristics, and personalities in political and cultural life. The main locations of the "Greek presence", the social categories in which it is found, and the elites who assumed the Greek identity or were referred to as "Greeks from Bukovina" are both identified and discussed.

Keywords: ethnicity, self-identification, modernity, assimilation, coexistence

Rezumat: Risipiți printre „ceilalți”. Prezența grecilor în Bucovina secolului al XIX-lea. Organizată și reorganizată administrativ, Bucovina secolului al XIX-lea a fost un limes imperial cu drepturi depline și un avanpost al civilizației habsburgice în așa-numita „Semi-Asia”, situată la răscrucea dintre Est și Vest și la granița etnică a popoarelor slave, fino-ugrice și latine. De asemenea, a fost considerată o formă viabilă de multiculturalism și pluralism etnic, confesional, civic și politic în cadrul paradigmei austriece, cu identități complexe, fluide, hibride și eterogene. Unele elemente ale populației sale autohtone sau cele colonizate/imigrate în fazele istorice anterioare (în special elitele lor) și-au dovedit utilitatea în proiectul imperial, bucurându-se de curiozitatea orientalistă tolerantă a agenților modernizatori. Deși incomplete pentru prima parte a secolului al XIX-lea, statisticile care reflectă structura etnică a provinciei imperiale indică, clar, concentrarea și evoluția numerică a românilor, rutenilor, germanilor, evreilor, polonezilor, armenilor, țiganilor și rușilor-lipoveni. Cu toate acestea, în Bucovina au existat mai multe grupuri etnice, mai mici numeric și, de obicei, grupate în categoria „ceilalți”: italieni, slovaci și greci. În cazul celor din urmă, informațiile sunt dispersate în diverse surse. Dar tocmai această lipsă de date și, pe cale de consecință, de analiză istorică face din prezența grecilor în Bucovina o provocare, pentru că valoarea unei comunități nu rezidă doar în numărul membrilor ei, ci și în caracteristicile și îndatoririle lor. Lucrarea își propune să evidențieze informații despre „marginalii” din statisticile oficiale, reprezentativi pentru comunitățile locale, caracteristici și, mai ales, personalități ale vieții politice și culturale. Sunt nominalizate principalele locuri în care „prezența grecească” poate fi documentată, categoriile sociale în care aceasta se regăsește precum și elitele care și-au asumat identitatea elenă sau au fost numiți drept „greci din Bucovina”.

INTRODUCTION

The album about Suceava County, published by the Suceava County Council and the National Centre for Tourist Information and Promotion in 2019, describes Bukovina as "Europe in miniature", stating that "numerous other ethnicities settled there and created a homeland for themselves, among them: Armenians, Jews, Germans, Greeks, Italians, Hungarians, Poles, Roma, Russian-Lipovians, Ukrainians, etc."¹ Historians agree that Bukovina during the Austrian rule: 1775–1918 became a "multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-confessional conglomerate, offering a complex, challenging, and also enriching cultural horizon".² On the other hand, historical sources are severely deficient in

¹ *** , *Bucovina*, Suceava, Centrul național de Informare și promovare turistică, 2019, p. 16.

² Adolf Ambruster, *Vom Moldauwappen zum Doppeladler: Ausgewählte Beiträge zur Geschichte der Bukowina*, Vol. II, Augsburg, Verlag Hofman, 1993, pp. 10-15; Emmanuel

information about Greeks and Italians, while statistics and analyses on Romanians, Ukrainians and Germans abound. This deficiency might explain the fascination with the Greek community, which is mentioned in a few reports, memoirs, travel impressions, notes, and observations but inadequately documented in official records.

Between 1800 and 1918, the statisticians of the Austrian small duchy failed to account for the Greek population, lumping them in with the "others", along with Italians, French, English, and so forth. During the interwar period, researchers such as Nicolae Iorga, Constantin C. Giurescu and Teodor Bălan identified, in the documents they carefully collected and edited records that revealed the identities and public functions or basic occupations of some of the Greeks in Bucovina. Regrettably, contemporary scholars still regard these "others" traits and circumstances as unimportant, although notable figures from Bukovina's past may be associated with them.

This study proposes a first and unprecedented retrospective on the Greeks' presence in Bucovina addressing three issues: where they lived, what made them stand out in the community, and prominent individuals who played a role in the region's history.

1. WHERE IN BUKOVINA IS THE GREEK PRESENCE DOCUMENTED?

The Greeks established a permanent presence in Moldavia, beginning with the Middle Ages. Their unique status, reinforced by the confessions of the local population, gave them access to public positions, noble ranks, and properties. Greek traders were settled in the cities of Moldavia (the term "Greek" became synonymous with "merchant"³), some of them leading the merchants' guild. Many Greeks became governors, treasurers, customs officers, and seneschals. When referring to the two important towns in the future Austrian province of Bukovina, mention should be made about the great treasurer "pan lane, who was called

Turczynski, *Geschichte der Bukowina in der Neuzeit. Zur Sozial und Kulturgeschichte einer mittel europäisch geprägten Landschaft*, Wiesbaden, 1993, SS. 26-31, 42-53; Ștefan Purici, *Bucovina – Metamorfozele unei provincii* [Bukovina – the Metamorphoses of a Province], in "Analele Bucovinei", Vol. 59, 2022, no. 2, p. 343-344.

³ Andrei Pippidi, *Changes of Emphases: Greek Christendom, Westernization, South-Eastern Europe, and Neo-Mitteuropa*, in „Balkanologie. Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires", 1999, Vol. III, no. 2: <http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/747>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/balkanologie.747> (Accessed on 01.11.2023).

Calughere Koligheropolos",⁴ Manoil was the Greek ruler,⁵ Chiracola/Kiracola, the treasurer and customs officer of Suceava,⁶ and the starostas Ienacachi Millo⁷ and Dimitrie Macri from Chernivtsi.⁸

The Habsburg Empire's 1775 annexation of Bukovina sparked political, social, cultural, and ethnic transformations. The Court of Vienna encouraged foreigners, including Poles, Germans, and Hungarians, to settle in the region. Travelling through Bukovina in the early 1800s, the statistician Joseph Rohrer wrote, "this part of the monarchy was built to offer refuge to all confessions and nations", allowing "Moldovans, Szeklers, Jews, Armenians, Poles, Russians, Greeks, and Gypsies" to live in a "confined territory".⁹ German journals from the first two decades of the 1800s described the same ethnic mosaic. One of them mentioned that the "majority population in Bukovina is Vlach, with a smaller population of Greeks, Gypsies, Armenians, and more than 200,000 dispersed Jews".¹⁰ Another journal noted, "By 1800, 35,307 families, or 190,389 individuals live there. These people reside in 259 villages, three fairs, and three towns - Czernowitz, Sereth, and Suczawa. Germans, Moldavians, Szeklers, Jews, Armenians, Poles, Russians, Greeks, and Gypsies are frequently found within a few miles of each other".¹¹ The Greek community in the Principality of Moldavia,

⁴ Emil Ioan Emandi, Mihai Ștefan Ceașu, *Contribuții de morfologie urbană la cunoașterea istoriei orașului Suceava, 1388-1988* [Contributions of Urban Morphology to the Knowledge of the History of Suceava. 1388–1988], in "Suceava. Anuarul Muzeului Județean", Vol. XV, 1988, p. 73.

⁵ Nicolae Iorga, *La cronologia vechilor domni moldoveni* [On the Chronology of the Old Moldavian Rulers], in "Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice", Tom XII, 1931, p. 40.

⁶ Constantin C. Giurescu, *Istoria Românilor* [History of the Romanians], Bucharest, Royal Foundation for Literature and Art, 1943, p. 458.

⁷ Nicolae Iorga, *Geschichte des rumänischen Volkes im Rahmen seiner Staatsbildungen*, Gotha, Vol. II, 1905, p. 181, 185; Idem, *Documentele familiei Callimachi* [The Documents of Callimachi Family], Bucharest, Vol. II, 1903, p. 190.

⁸ Mihai-Bogdan Atanasiu, *Cariera unui grec, staroste al ținutului Cernăuți – Dimitrie Macri* [The Career of a Greek, Starosta of the Chernivtsi County - Dimitrie Macri], in Mihai-Bogdan Atanasiu, Mircea-Cristian Ghenghea (eds.), *Pro Bucovina. Repere istorice* [Pro Bucovina. Historical Landmarks], Bucharest, Mitropolit Iacov Putneanul Publishing House, 2010, p. 39-48.

⁹ Joseph Rohrer, *Bemerkungen auf einer Reise von der Türkischen Gränze über die Bukowina durch Ost- und Westgalizien, Schlesien und Mähren nach Wien*, Wien, 1804, S. 43.

¹⁰ ***, *Rheinisches Conversations. Lexicon de encyclopädisches Handwörterbuch für gebildete Stände*, Bd. V, 1825, S. 432.

¹¹ ***, *Leipzig der in der Expedition and Literatur - Zeitung in der Königlich Sächsischen Zeitungs*, in "Expedition Neue Leipziger Literaturzeitung", Bd. III, 1808, S. 2282.

whether Romanianized or not, was separated by the new borders. Historians refer to the Greeks in Bukovina as "Romanianized" since Ioan Budai Deleanu described them, at the start of the 19th century, as "few" and "most of them nationalised".¹²

Ethnic Greeks settled mainly in or close to towns and fairs. Thus, a "Greek Lane"¹³ was marked in Suceava, close to the church of St. Nicholas (*Nicogaïos*, constructed in the sixteenth century). The 1865 cadastral document, created during the Austrian administration, included the same toponym, although fewer Greeks lived in Suceava than in the 17th century.¹⁴ The great merchants of Suceava – Constantin, Stamati, and Dumitraș Pantazi – are remembered from the early years of Austrian occupation. They brought furniture, jewellery, and clothing from Leipzig and Vienna that were in line with French or Viennese fashion.¹⁵ Enzenberg, the Governor of Bukovina, established an annual tax obligation of one Florin for Greek traders.¹⁶ Some Greeks from Suceava dealt with crafts. For example, Dele and Mihai Ioan were registered in the Cadastral Register of Suceava, in 1785, as "Furriers".¹⁷ Others were itinerant instructors,¹⁸ although this occupation gradually disappeared in the first half of the 19th century. By 1850, it was recommended that Armenian and Greek students be taught German, as "their mother tongue is neither Romanian nor Ruthenian".¹⁹ Additionally, learning the language of the new imperial administration had become essential; the Greek

¹² Ioan Chindriș, Niculina Iacob, *Ioan Budai-Deleanu în mărturii antologice* [Ioan Budai-Deleanu in Anthological Testimonies], Cluj-Napoca, Napoca Star Publishing House, 2012, p. 505.

¹³ Or „Hellenic Lane”, according to *Atlas istoric al orașelor din România. Suceava* [Historical atlas of cities in Romania. Suceava], Bucharest, Enciclopedică Publishing House, 2005, Appendix IX.

¹⁴ In 1639, ruler Vasile Lupu exempted 100 "Greek" subjects of the Metropolis, placed in two areas, near the Suceava market, called "Greeks", from all royal taxes. See Emil Ioan Emandi, Mihai Ștefan Ceașu, *Contribuții de morfologie urbană...* [Contributions of Urban Morphology ...], p. 73.

¹⁵ The location of the properties (Constantin had inherited a house on „Great Lane”) or the huts (Dumitraș had two huts in the "Market" of Suceava) further reflect the solid reputation of the Greeks from the Pantazi family in the Suceava community, according to Emil Ioan Emandi, *Habitatul urban și cultura spațiului* [The Urban Habitat and the Culture of Space], Iași, Glasul Bucovinei Publishing House, 1996, p. 564-565.

¹⁶ Liviu-George Maha, Gabriel Donici, Sorin-Ștefan Maha, *The Economic Development of Bukovina (I). The First Period of Austrian Rule: 1774 – 1849*, in "Review of Economic and Business Studies", Vol. III, 2010, no. 2, p. 236.

¹⁷ Emil Ioan Emandi, *Habitatul urban...*, p. 568, 570.

¹⁸ Dr. I. Nistor, *Zur Geschichte des Schulwesens in der Bukowina*, in "Jahresbericht der gr. - or. Ober-Realschule in Czernowitz", Bd. XLVIII, 1912, S. 23.

¹⁹ ***, *Die Bevölkerung der Bukowina. II*, in "Bukowina", 1862, no. 37, 5. April, S. 3.

Angelaki from the Câmpulung Moldovenesc court was mentioned in an account of early Austrian Bukovina. The man "could neither read nor write" German.²⁰ The presence of Greeks in Siret, which Victor Prelicz reported to have been populated in the 17th century, cannot be confirmed; he wrote that "absolutely no memory has been preserved"²¹ of them. Even so, in 1821, a Greek, Apostolo Dumitropoulos and his family would have been present. According to researcher Willi Kosiul, up until the end of the 1800s, Greek merchants, craftsmen, and tenants were drawn to Chernivtsi due to its status as an urban centre and later as the province's capital.²² Other Greeks (merchants, tailors, tenants, and boyars with servants, priests, and teachers) sought refuge in Bukovina following the Ottoman military intervention in Moldavia and the suppression of the Eterist insurrection. Focusing on Austria's treatment of the Greeks between 1821 and 1830, historian Christos Aliprantis wrote "When individuals or groups seemed less politically motivated but needed real humanitarian assistance, the Austrian state was less suspicious and more willing to help (...)." Metternich, who held strong humanitarian and Christian principles, wrote to the police and border guards in Bukovina, asking them to look after these unfortunate people. The only requirement was that these individuals had not participated in any of the revolutions that occurred in their home countries".²³

The locations where the Greek refugees either temporarily or permanently settled are listed in the documents published by Teodor Bălan: Capu Câmpului, Chernivtsi, Costâna, Sadagura, Siret, Stroiesti, Suceava, Valea Seacă, and Vascăuți pe Ceremuș. Feeling threatened by "the unrest in the Turkish provinces," some said they would remain until the spring of 1823 "because of the winter," but others realized that being part of the Greek nation could cause problems for them when they returned to Moldavia.²⁴

²⁰ Prof. H.J. Bidermann, *Die Bukowina unter Österreichischer Verwaltung, 1775-1875*, Lemberg, 1876, S. 32.

²¹ Victor Prelicz, *Geschichte der Stadt Sereth und Ihre Alterthümer*, Iași, TipoMoldova Publishing House, 2011, S. 104.

²² Willi Kosiul, *Czernowitz – Tschernowitz, die damalige Landeshauptstadt der Bukowina*, https://bukovinasociety.org/bsa-file_villages-e/bsa-file_villages_list-e/bsa-file_villages_czernowitz-hauptstadt-der-bukowina-d/ (Accessed on 30.10.2023)

²³ Christos Aliprantis, *Policing Subversion in Post-Napoleonic Europe: Austria and the Greek Revolution of 1821–1830*, in "Journal of Modern European History", Vol. 21, 2023, no. 2, p. 252.

²⁴ Teodor Bălan, *Refugiați moldoveni în Bucovina, 1821 și 1848* [Moldavian Refugees in Bukovina, 1821 and 1848], București, Cartea Românească Publishing House, 1929, pp. 78-87.

2. WHO WERE THE GREEKS IN BUKOVINA?

In the 19th century, the Greek population of Bukovina was not large enough to be recorded in statistics. Migration is one of the primary causes that affected the Greek population's growth in Bukovina. Political and economic contexts favoured both emigration and immigration. The political motivations partially stem from separating the more or less assimilated Greek community from the Principality of Moldavia following Bukovina's annexation. Economic factors, such as unfair competition or strong business rivalry with the Armenians and the Jews significantly impeded the Greek artisans and merchants.²⁵ The Greeks who chose to live in Bukovina were described as speaking "partially modern Greek and partly German or Romanian" in an 1862 issue of the journal "Bukowina".²⁶

It is challenging to determine the overall Greek population in Bukovina because the scant data mostly refers to the two major cities, Suceava and Chernivtsi, rather than the province as a whole. Professor Bidermann mentioned that in 1779, 80 Greek families lived in Suceava. He also noted that "the Greeks were gradually lost among the Moldavians". Concerning Czernowitz, the priest-scholar Constantin Morariu wrote about the Secondary School in Chernivtsi "from 1850 to 1888", where three Greek students had also studied.²⁷ At Upper Royal Orthodox-Oriental School in Chernivtsi "from 1864 to 1888", twenty-three young Greeks had been trained,²⁸ alongside thousands of Jewish, German, and Polish pupils and hundreds of Romanians and Ruthenians.

One specific mention of the number of Greeks in Bukovina can be found in a provincial newspaper. The information was derived "partly from official statistical works", partly from the authors' "own experience and compilations undertaken over the years" along with "historical sources that are recognized as accurate and therefore reliable". The 1857 census stated that "the total population of Bukovina

²⁵ Ștefan Petrescu, *Grecii din România: Însemnările de călătorie ale unui jurnalist ateniian la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea* [Greeks from Romania: The Travel Notes of an Athenian Journalist at the end of the 19th Century], in "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie A. D. Xenopol" Yearbook of the Institute of History A. D. Xenopol, Vol. LIV, 2017, p. 185.

²⁶ ***, *Die Bevölkerung der Bukowina. I*, in "Bukowina", 1862, no. 36, 3. April, S. 3.

²⁷ Constantin Morariu, *Părți din istoria românilor bucovineni* [Parts of the History of Romanians from Bukovina], Chernivtsi, Arh. Silvestru Morariu Andrievici Publishing House, 1893, p. 119.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

was 456,920 souls", 1,679 of whom were Greeks.²⁹

The relatively small number of Greeks can also be attributed to the evolution of events in the second half of the 19th century and the "discovery" made by many of the intellectuals or large landowners of the time that they were not Greeks, but Romanians, Albanians, Bulgarians or Macedonians. These people were eager to integrate, "with a quasi-religious zeal", among the majority of those they perceived to be their own.³⁰ It is certain that, in the "General Census of the Romanian Population" held on December 29, 1930, 23 individuals identified themselves as "Greek" by nationality, out of the 853,009 residents of Bukovina.³¹

The Greeks displayed differing views toward their identities. Most of them mentioned the province of origin (Epirotes, c(h)Ephalonites, Chiots). Those who were fluent in Greek, which served as a genuine communication link for many Balkan residents, including Macedonians, Bulgarians, and Albanians, identified as "Greeks," particularly if they had ties to the business world. Within the Austrian bureaucratic lexicon, the term "Greeks" carried confessional overtones, referring to individuals of the Orthodox rite (Greek-Eastern, as opposed to Greek-Western, which signified the Orthodox Church merged with the Roman Catholic one). This is why it is so challenging to identify the ethnic Greeks in Bukovina.

It is very likely that, in addition to their first name, some of them went by an informal name, related to their origin: "Russian", "German", or "Greek", such as Mayor Nicolae Zaharia Grecu/ Nicolae Zaharia the Greek and his brothers, Constantin, Lazăr, and Michalaki, who dealt in real estate and land in Czernowitz;³² the merchant Stavri Grecul/Stavri the Greek, a refugee in Suceava after the etherist movement,³³ etc. As evidenced by the Bukovina "Register of Nobility" from 1803, one of the families bearing this name was elevated to the status of "von Grekul". Some of his descendants' names (e.g., "Demeter",³⁴

²⁹ ***, *Die Bevölkerung der Bukowina. I*, in "Bukowina", 1862, no. 36, 3. April, S. 3.

³⁰ Peter Mackridge, *Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976*, OUP Oxford, 2010, p. 188.

³¹ Alexandru Procopovici, *Bucovina noastră* [Our Bukovina], in "Transilvania", 1941, no. 5-6, p. 347.

³² The table with the names of the owners in Chernivtsi, according to the *Pitzelli Protocol and Plan*, see Alexandru Bocănețu, *Istoria orașului Cernăuți* [The History of Chernivtsi], Cernăuți, Zelena Bukovyna Publishing House, 2010 p. 82.

³³ Teodor Bălan, *Refugiați moldoveni în Bucovina...*, p. 84.

³⁴ *Verordnungsblatt für die k. k. Landwehr. Allerhöchste Entschlüsseungen. Seine k. und k. Apostolische Majestät geruhten allergnädigst (mit 1. Mai 1879)*, 1879, no. 15, 23. April, S. 73.

"Dionys/Dionisie"³⁵, and "Themistokles"³⁶) will suggest their Greek ancestry, but the family is typically identified as having "purely Romanian" ancestry.³⁷

3. WHO WERE THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS GREEKS FROM BUKOVINA?

According to Professor Bidermann, among the 114 "big landowners of the country" on the electoral list for the imperial council and parliament on April 9, 1875, there were 42 Romanians, 38 Catholic Armenians and Poles, 14 Jews, 12 Armenians "of oriental faith," 4 Germans, 1 Hungarian, and an Italian. However, the author further stated that even though the boyars looked like "Romanians," "Logothetti, Mustatza, and Petrino were of Greek origin".³⁸ The results of the 1864 local council elections in Chernivtsi, where Baron "Mustazza Nikolaus," a Greek "by nationality," was declared the winner, show the same point.³⁹

Historians and researchers believe that baron Teodor Musteață - one of the wealthiest Bukovinians in the first half of the 19th century - was actually a "Vlach" from Ottoman Macedonia. His "new homeland" of Moldavia granted him the status of "Greek" due to his place of origin and his "alişveriş" practices.⁴⁰ Land transactions "in a grand style, from which one could make significant incomes" were his main area of interest. He got an "immense fortune" through the purchase, sale, and rental of estates in Moldavia and Bukovina. He leased "all the revenue of the Sadagura fair", where he owned - besides the mansion surrounded by the park, 'similar to the Cernauca one of Doxachi Hurmuzachi'⁴¹ (another "Romanian, with a Greek name"⁴², mentioned in Dēmētrios Darvaris' *Enkyklopaideia*, from 1829⁴³) – mills, taverns and guesthouses.⁴⁴ As a result of Musteață's transactions in the Habsburg Empire, his reputation as a "great merchant", his "good behaviour," and his ability to pay "impeccably all his obligations" inspired the government adviser

³⁵ ***, *Kleine Chronik – Verzeichnis*, in "Bukowinaer Rundschau", 1887, no. 329, 24. Februar, S. 3.

³⁶ ***, *Demaskierung*, in "Bukowinaer Post", 1903, no. 1516, 13. Oktober, S. 10.

³⁷ Arcadie M. Bodale, *Un recensământ necunoscut al mazililor și ruptașilor din Bucovina* [An Unknown Census of the Mazils and Ruptaş from Bukovina], in "Analele Bucovinei", 2016, no. 2, p. 255.

³⁸ H. J. Bidermann, *Die Bukowina unter Österreichischer Verwaltung...*, p. 48.

³⁹ ***, *Der Neue Gemeinderath von Czernowitz*, in "Bukowina", 1864, no. 172, 31. August, S. 2.

⁴⁰ Teodor Bălan, *Refugiați moldoveni în Bucovina...*, p. 6.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴² Nicolae Iorga, *Românismul în trecutul Bucovinei* [Romanianism in the Past of Bukovina], Bucharest, 1938, p. 78.

⁴³ Dēmētrios N. Darvaris, *Enkyklopaideia*, J. V. Sbek, 1829, p. 15.

⁴⁴ Teodor Bălan, *Refugiați moldoveni în Bucovina...*

Iordachi Balș to recommend him for "a better social position", "granting him the rank of a nobleman".⁴⁵ The letter to the people of Ciupelovo, in the Zagor region, shows that the ties with Epirus, where his family had its roots, remained intact even after years. Some asked for assistance (Demetra, the widow of Nicolae Antoniad, the baron's cousin), while others expressed their gratitude (twenty locals were grateful for the amount of 950 "Dutch florins" sent by Mustățea for the school village and the Bogovu monastery).⁴⁶

The descendants of Baron Teodor Musteata have been mentioned several times throughout Bukovina's history; Ioan (Johann, Iancu/Janku) inherited the Sadagura estate and the spirit of enterprise in land acquisition from his father.⁴⁷ He was a member of the Bukovina committee tasked with drafting the provincial electoral law and the Constitution; in the spring of 1861, he joined the Diet of Bukovina, where he took the side of the "federalists".⁴⁸ His son, Baron Nicolae (Nikolaus), was a representative of the Romanian party in Bukovina, as well as a "threat from within", showing the highest degree of loyalty to the German language and culture. He was the main character in one of the incidents that the newspapers reported on and then discussed later. Bukovina dignitaries presented Baron Nicholas Mustatza as "a particularly good Romanian, a quality that befits the head of the national party" to the King of Romania, Carol I, upon his arrival at the Chernivtsi train station. "Truly thinking he was speaking with a Romanian of pure blood," the king addressed him in Romanian and was "astonished" to hear Mustatza responding in German: "Here, we are educated in German!" The Romanians turned bright red with embarrassment as their hero apologized ("Wir sind hier Deutsch erzogen!"), admitting to not knowing Romanian.⁴⁹ While Nicolae Iorga tried to suggest that Mustatza's unusual conduct was the result of a Viennese conspiracy, the incident earned the baron "an Austrian decoration, many Austrian

⁴⁵ 1794, Noem. 5, Lemberg: Diploma of Nobility of Teodor Mustiața. «Nos Collegium Statuum Regnorum Galliciae et Lodomeriae... supplici petito Theodori Mustiaca honorum Sadagura in circulo bucovinensi... notum testatumque facimus modernum supplicantem Theodorum Mustiaca de Sadagura... primo classi nobilium eiusdem circuli adnumeratum esse, titulisque ac praerogativis huic statui competentibus legaliter gaudere», according to Teodor Bălan, *Documente bucovinene* [Bukovinian Documents], Vol. VI (1760-1833), Bucharest, 1941, p. 389.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴⁸ Mihai Ștefan Ceaușu, *Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi versus Alexandru Petrino. Centralism contra federalism (1861-1871)* [Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi versus Alexandru Petrino. Centralism against Federalism (1861-1871)], in "Analele Bucovinei", 2010, no. 1, p. 26.

⁴⁹ ***, *Glückliche Katastrophe*, in "Bukowinaer Rundschau", 1898, no. 2789, 29. Juli, S. 1.

sympathies and the disapproval of all Romanians from Bukovina".⁵⁰ In turn, Ion Nistor blamed Musteatza, emphasizing his "foreign" origins and his peerage as a reward for the "Greek merchants" who provided the Habsburgs ammunition during the Napoleonic Wars.⁵¹ Yet, Nicolae Must(e)ața's German response could also be perceived as a polite gesture towards a German-speaking Hohenzollern. Furthermore, the Mustatza family's close ties to Vienna's political hub were demonstrated by their use of German, which was Habsburg's monarchy standard tongue.⁵² However, his reputation as a "non-conformist fanariot"⁵³ persisted; according to his contemporary, "it was easy for Nikolaus Mustratza to collaborate with all the ethnic groups in Bukovina, but also to disappoint them just as easily because his only true love was Greece".⁵⁴

Equally controversial were some of the actions of Alexandru Petrino, labelled by the Viennese researcher Lothar Höbelt, as "the Greek condottiere in the Austrian Parliament".⁵⁵ Regarding the Petrino family, Iorga described it as "of Greek origin, and with Greek feelings";⁵⁶ Teodor Bălan suggested that it was of Macedonian-Romanian descent, and an 1867 "Almanac" said it was Albanian.⁵⁷ Two brothers, Hristodulo and Apostolo Ioan Petrino, made Iasi their home and sold "colonials" there. They arrived in Bukovina in 1809, becoming "Austrian citizens" at Teodor Musteață's insistence.⁵⁸ Apostolo acquired the estates in Bukovina and Hristodulo in Moldavia, following the distribution of wealth in 1816. Still, Hristodulo temporarily relocated to Bukovina, where he had relatives by alliance (his son Petru married Eufrosina, daughter of Doxachi Hurmuzachi). He went back to the Bessarabian estates and, on December 1826, swore "of faith and eternal obedience to the throne of Russia" to become a member of the Bessarabian

⁵⁰ Nicolae Iorga, *Neamul românesc în Bucovina* [The Romanian Nation in Bukovina], Bucharest, Institutul de Arte Grafice Minerva, 1905, p. 236.

⁵¹ Ion Nistor, *Istoria Bucovinei* [The History of Bukovina], Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1991, p. 208-209.

⁵² Andrei Corbea-Hoisie, *La Bucovine - Éléments d'histoire politique et culturelle*, Paris, Institut d'Études Slaves, 2004, p. 20.

⁵³ Lothar Höbelt, *Aleksander Petrino. A Greek condottiere in the Austrian Parliament*, in "Parliaments, Estates & Representation", Vol. 42, 2022, no. 2, p. 178, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02606755.2022.2084288>

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

⁵⁶ Nicolae Iorga, *Românismul în trecutul Bucovinei...*, p. 79.

⁵⁷ Sigmund Hahn, *Reichsraths-Almanach für die Session 1867*, Prag, H. Carl I. Satow, vorm . f. f. Hof-Buch- und Kunsthandlung F. A. Credner, 1867, S. 132.

⁵⁸ Teodor Bălan, *Refugiați moldoveni...*, p. 10.

nobility.⁵⁹ However, he was also unable to separate from Bukovina. Towards the end of his life, he compensated his brothers-in-law, sold off his wealth and moved to Cernauca and Czernowitz where he drafted his will in January 1828.⁶⁰



Cartoon of the politician Alexandru/Alexander von Petrino (1824-1899), revealing his "Greek" origins and habits

(Source: "Der Floh", 2 Oktober 1870, p. 3; <https://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno?aid=flo&datum=18701002&seite=3>, accessed on 12.08.2023)

Fifty years after Hristodulo's ennoblement, his grandson, poet Dimitrie Petrino, "living in Bukovina," addressed "the request to be freed from Russian subordination".⁶¹ Although gifted, he had a wasteful behaviour and a passion for

⁵⁹ Dinu Poștarencu, *Din istoria familiei Petrino* [From the History of the Petrino Family], in "Analele Bucovinei", 2020, no. 2, p. 415.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 415.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 421-422.

drunkenness". He passed away without leaving any heirs. The only male members of the Petrino family were Nicolae (Nikola) and Alexandru, the sons of Apostolo. Nicholas was appointed to the so-called "enlarged Imperial Council", in 1860 and Alexandru distinguished himself as "the most active parliamentarian in Bukovina". His "pivot" attitude in dealing with the Romanians, Poles, Armenians, Jews, and Germans from Bukovina brought him both praise and criticism. Many of his peers did not comprehend the compromise between the Romanian and Armenian-Poles groups, regarding the allocation of seats in the Imperial Parliament to the large landowners from Bukovina. The "stigma" of being a "fanariot" helped him gain the title of "ideal candidate in power mediation". Furthermore, when his brother Nikola left some of his fortune to the city of Athens,⁶² the Petrino family's Phanariote ties became evident to all. Surprisingly, the writer of Alexandru's obituary from April 1899 revived the story of some Armenian (not Greek) ancestors, questioning the alienation from his Greek heritage.⁶³

Finally, Giacomo (Iacob, Iacov) Logothetti assumed a long history of Byzantine filiation, with ancestry dating back to the emperor Nichifor I Logothetes (802–811), and roots on the Ionian island of Zakynthos.⁶⁴ An officer of the Venetian Republic who was ennobled for his services to Venice, he settled in Moldavia, and married Ecaterina, the daughter of the well-known starost of Cernăuți, Leon d'Ymbault (Imbault), in August 1775.⁶⁵ As a result of this marriage, he inherited several properties. His mother-in-law granted him both the title of "*clironom* over the grandchildren's property" and all of the movable and immovable properties because he "showed care towards the children, being a good father"⁶⁶ (...), a good master of the household (...), a good husband for her daughter Ecaterina and (...) a good son-in-law".⁶⁷ The Romanian branch of the

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁶³ ***, *Inland*, in "Neue Freie Presse", 1899, no. 12447, 18. April, S. 2.

⁶⁴ Other sources indicate the island of Corfu as the birthplace of the Logothetti family, see ***, *Tagespost. Todesfall*, in "Bukowinaer Post", 1896, no. 388, 31. Mai, S. 3.

⁶⁵ Teodor Bălan, *Documente bucovinene* [Bukovinian Documents], Vol. VIII-IX, Iași, Taida Publishing House, 2006, p. 104.

⁶⁶ Iacob Logothetti had six children: Leon, Iosef, Aloys, Franz, Maria and Suzana. Iosef is mentioned in the document of June 25, 1809, when the prefect of Bukovina, Johan von Platzer, invited him, along with other boyars, to a conference on the "defence of the country". The other two sons, Aloys and Francisc (Franz), embraced the military career, serving in the Austrian army, in different parts of the empire, according to Teodor Bălan, *Documente bucovinene...*, p. 41-42.

⁶⁷ Alina Felea, *Câteva date despre familia Imbault* [Some Facts about the Imbault Family], in "Tyragetia", Vol. XVII, 2008, no. 2, p. 138.

Logothetti family tree was set by Leon, Iacob's eldest son. One of his descendants, Count Luis de Logothetti, felt "completely Romanian", and sought to address all issues affecting "the country to which he belonged". Adjusting to the "spirit of his time," he was aware of "neither religious intolerance nor national hatred".⁶⁸ His son, Emanuil Logothetti lived a short life (only 23 years old) but stood out in the Romanian national group as the vice president of the academic society "România Jună" ("Young Romania")⁶⁹ and the president of the Provisional Committee for the preparation of the Putna Celebration on August 15, 1870, a manifestation of a Romanian nationalist nature. His three sisters - Elena, Olga and Catinca - donated the sum of 2,000 florins to the Society for Romanian Culture and Literature in Bukovina to establish the "Count Emanuil Logothetti" Foundation, which provided scholarships to Romanian students. Elena Popovici-Logothetti would stand out as the founder and, for many years, president of the "Society of Romanian Ladies from Bukovina" while Olga de Grigorcea-Logothetti was the founder and honorary member of the "Junimea" Academic Society, which she generously sponsored.⁷⁰

CONCLUSIONS

The presence of Greeks in Bukovina remains insufficiently documented due to a scarcity of information and disparate or undiscovered data, maps and property documents. In the absence of reliable historical sources capable of shedding light on, for example, the history of the small Greek communities in Suceava or Chernivtsi, with their surroundings, the only certainty remains their transnational character and the function of a lens, useful for the analysis of administrative or social policies and measures - cultural from a certain period. Furthermore, distinguishing between "old Greeks" (on a trend of Romanization) and "new Greeks" (arrived as a result of economic activities or as political-military refugees) adds to the research's interest, nuance and complexity.

Coexistence and mixed marriages, as well as perfect adaptation to the conditions of the Austrian province, made it more difficult to categorise certain Greeks as "Greeks" or "Romanians", as demonstrated by the representatives of the great Musteață, Petrino and Logothetti families. The country they aspired to call

⁶⁸ ***, *Tagespost. Todesfall...*, S. 3.

⁶⁹ Dragoș Olaru, *Un personaj important al Serbării de la Putna din 1871: Emanuel Logothetti. Schiță biografică* [A Key Participant in the 1871 Putna Celebration: Emanuel Logothetti. Biographical sketch], in "Analele Putnei", 2022, no. 1, pp. 75-88.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

"homeland" and their desire to be "perfect citizens," or human models ready to defend their country against enemies from within or without, were among their mutual material and cultural benefits, along with significant wealth, successful businesses, and public positions.

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3. Atanasiu Mihai-Bogdan, *Cariera unui grec, staroste al ținutului Cernăuți – Dimitrie Macri* [The Career of a Greek, Starosta of the Chernivtsi County - Dimitrie Macri], in Mihai-Bogdan Atanasiu, Mircea-Cristian Ghenghea (eds.), *Pro Bucovina. Repere istorice* [Pro Bucovina. Historical Landmarks], Bucharest, Mitropolit Iacov Putneanul Publishing House, 2010.
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CONSTRUCTING THE SOVIET MODEL OF THE UKRAINIAN PAST: THE HISTORICAL IMAGE OF “REGNUM RUTHENORUM” DURING STALINISM

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Abstract. *The paper examines how the past of Ukrainian lands was portrayed in Soviet science, culture and ideology during the Stalinist era, focusing on the “Regnum Ruthenorum” state concept. The author explores the meaning of historical heritage displays of the Kingdom of Rus in the pre-war period and the evolution of the political and ideological context during Stalinism. The Soviet Union's past recall relies heavily on the idea of state control over culture. The paper traces the ideological transformation of the term “Regnum Ruthenorum” into “Galicia-Volyn principality” and the academic and ideological omission of the former in Soviet historiography and politics.*

Keywords: *Regis Russiae, King Danylo Romanovych, Regnum Ruthenorum, historical heritage, scheme of history, Soviet model, official discourse.*

Rezumat. *Construirea modelului sovietic al trecutului ucrainian: imaginea istorică a „Regnum Ruthenorum” în epoca stalinistă. Articolul este dedicat reprezentării trecutului ținuturilor ucrainene în știința, cultura și ideologia sovietică a epocii lui Stalin, folosind exemplul modelării conceptului statal Regnum Ruthenorum. Autorul analizează „lectura” schemelor moștenirii istorice a statului Rus (tradus „Rusia kieveană”, în istoriografia română postbelică) în perioada antebelică și modelarea fondului lor politic și ideologic în perioada stalinismului. Un rol important este atribuit reprezentării controlului statului asupra culturii în crearea memoriei istorice sovietice. Articolul prezintă transformarea ideologică a expresiei „Regnum Ruthenorum” în „principatul Galicia-Volyn” și negarea/evitarea*

academică și ideologică a primei expresii în politica istorică și istoriografia sovietică.

INTRODUCTION

The historiographic process of studying the emergence and the initial stage of the Soviet version of the historical heritage of medieval Rus, specifically the analysis of the initial ideas regarding the creation of the concept “Galicia-Volyn principality” instead of the more historically accurate *Regnum Ruthenorum*, has not yet been thoroughly examined in a comprehensive scientific manner.

Prince Danylo Romanovych's crowning and his state's transformation into the Kingdom of Rus continue to generate considerable interest among scientists. Despite the extensive coverage of the Romanovych State in scientific literature, historians still have divergent opinions in assessing this event.¹ The certainty of the coronation event is indisputable in modern Ukrainian historiography. However, the Soviet stereotype of interpreting King Danylo as “Prince Daniel Galician” or his state as the “Galician-Volyn Principality” persists. The enduring nature of the concepts in the Soviet historical imagination maintains the perception in society's collective consciousness of the Soviet endeavour to include the memory of the “great ancestors”. The prevalence of a stereotyped portrayal of “prince” Danylo and his “principality” among scientists, along with the ongoing Soviet practice of distorting historical facts, obstructs scholarly discussions on fully understanding the significance of coronation and the influential medieval state on the Western Ukrainian lands in general.² The investigation aims to explore the role of

¹ The publication of a complex two-volume monographic study in Polish, authored by the Toruń historian Dariusz Dąbrowski, mark the culmination of 150 years of research on the life and reign of Prince and King Danylo Romanovych. This study has attracted significant attention from scientists from Poland, Serbia, Hungary, Ukraine and other countries. In his research, the scientist tried to conclusively differentiate pseudo-historical narratives in the history of the prince and the king while focusing entirely on the scientific aspect of the sources. See: D. Dąbrowski, *Daniel Romanowicz król Rusi (ok. 1201–1264). Biografia polityczna* [Daniel Romanovych King of Rus (1201–1264). Political biography], Kraków, Avalon, 2012, 538 p.; D. Dąbrowski, *Król Rusi Daniel Romanowicz. O ruskiej rodzinie książęcej, społeczeństwie i kulturze w XIII w.* [King of Rus Daniel Romanowicz. On the Russian princely family, society and culture in the 13th century], Kraków, Avalon, 2016. 412 p.

² M. Voloshchuk, *Movoiu dzherel? Terminohichni aspekty istoriohrafichnoho derzhavonaimenuvannia na prykladi Halytskoi zemli X–XIV st.* [The language of the sources? Terminological aspects of the historiographical state nominations on the example of the Galician land of

portraying King Danylo as the “Galician prince” and the various ways in which this portrayal was remembered in Soviet society. Additionally, the study seeks to determine the place of “Prince Daniel Galician” and his State in the larger context of the formation of the Soviet historical grand narrative.

Furthermore, researching the role of political-ideological factors, the dynamics between historical thought and the political-social context, the distinct contributions of historians (in particular, Ukrainian ones), and ultimately examining the genesis of the concept of the “Galicia-Volyn state”, will contribute to a deeper understanding of the development of the historiographical process in the USSR³. By providing distinct definitions of political and ideological variables, a deeper understanding of the overall ideological and intellectual context throughout the Soviet era may be achieved. During a time of powerful socio-economic changes (collectivization and industrialization) and the consolidation of Joseph Stalin’s power, the focus of Soviet rhetorical policy was to reinforce the legitimacy the regime and increase the country’s defence readiness. In terms of content, Soviet historical policy turned out to be an unusual combination of revolutionary rhetoric, the cult of Stalin’s personality, and reinterpreted elements of pre-revolutionary era “imperial patriotism”.⁴ Their reconstruction will contribute to the further understanding of the processes of interaction between power institutions and historical science in a totalitarian society⁵.

HISTORICAL SOURCES AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL INTERPRETATIONS

The Galician-Volyn Chronicle is the primary and authentic source that provides information on the crowning of Danylo Romanovych as the legate of Pope Innocent IV at Dorohychyn, as well as the subsequent transformation of his State into the Regnum Ruthenorum. It says, “Thus he [Danilo] received his crown from God, from the Church of the Holy Apostles, from the throne of St. Peter, from his

the 10th–14th centuries], in “Colloquia Russica”, series 2, vol. 4, V. Nagirnyy, M. Voloshchuk (Ed.), *Seredn'ovichna Rus': problemy terminolohiyi* [Medieval Rus': problems of terminology], 2018, Ivano-Frankivsk; Krakow, Lileia-NV, pp. 265–295.

³ M. David-Fox, *Crossing Borders: Modernity, Ideology, and Culture in Russia and the Soviet Union*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015, p. 27.

⁴ G. Roberts, *Stalin's Library: A Dictator and His Books*. New Haven – London, Yale University Press, 2022, p. 14.

⁵ M. Edele, *Debates on Stalinism*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2020, p. 5.

[spiritual] Father Pope Nekentij [IV] and from all his bishops. For Nekentij cursed all those who abused the true Greek faith and wished to call a Council for discussing the true faith and the (autumn 1253) unification of the Church. Danilo accepted his crown from God in the city of Dorohycyn as he was setting out on a campaign with his son Lev and the Polish prince Somovit.”⁶ Given the problematic nature of the chronicle’s mention, this investigation encountered a significant lack of information in the message. As a result, it was necessary to seek additional sources to recreate these events more comprehensively. Researchers are familiar with certain well-known works, including registers of papal bulls, Plano Carpini’s relations, the Life of Innocent IV and various other documents. About the events in Dorohychyn around 1253, Rochnik Krasynskyi mentions “Anno domini 1253 Daniel dux Russie in regem coronatus”⁷. In addition, the Annals of Jan Długosz, which are a later source, tell about the coronation of Danylo Romanovych. Created between 1460 and 1480, they tell the most detailed story about the coronation of Danylo and the transformation of his State into the Kingdom: “Claritarem et preeminenciam regalis nominis atque fastigii Daniel Ruthenorum Kyoviensis et Drohicziensis dux atque Monarcha et qui pro ea tempestate devitiis terris, gentibus, factivitate et industria pollens inter Ruthenorum principes celebrior habebatur, adepturus, intelligens Opiszonom abbatem”⁸.

⁶ *The Hypatian Codex Part Two: The Galician-Volynian Chronicle*, an Annotated Translation, By George A. Perfecty. With an editor’s preface, in “Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies”, vol. 16, Munich, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973, p. 66. More about the different readings and chronology in the Galician-Volyn Chronicle see: M. Homza, N. Malinovska, *Halichsko-volynská kronika. Neznáme rozprávanie o rodine kráľov a kniežat východno-strednej Európy v 13. storočí* [The Galician-Volhynian chronicle. The unknown story about the families of the kings and the princes of the East-Central Europe in the 13th century], vol. 2, Martin, Matica slovenská, 2019, p. 214-221.

⁷ *Rocznik Krasieński*, wydał A. Bielowski, in: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Tomus 3*, Lwów, 1878, p. 132; Also see: O. Holovko, *Koronatsiya knyazya Danyla Romanovycha v konteksti ideolohichnoho zhyttia i mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn slov’yanstva Skhidnoyi Yevropy* [The coronation of Prince Danylo Romanovych in the context of the ideological life and international relations of Eastern European Slavs], in: “Naukovi pratsi Kam”yanets’-Podil’s’koho natsional’noho universytetu imeni Ivana Ohiyenka. Istorychni nauky”, t. 23: *Na poshanu profesora S. Kopylova*, Kamyanets’-Podil’s’kyy, PP “Medobory-2006”, 2013, p. 2.

⁸ *Joannis Długosz senioris canonici Cracoviensis Opera omnia*, ed. A. Przezdziecki, in *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, vol. 2, Kraków, 1873, p. 309-310; For more about this topic, see Ya. Zatylyuk, *Povidomlennya Annaliv pro Yana Dluhosha pro koronatsiyu Danyla*

To comprehend the meaning of “king” and “kingdom” as seen by 13th century’s society, it is important to consider certain Latin sources of that time. The Livonian Chronicle, written by Henry the Latvian, mentions Prince Mstyslav Mstyslavych, who was referred to as the “King of Novgorod”. Although he never officially acquired the royal title, he later joined the struggle for the Galician land⁹. In addition, one of the Hungarian documents recounts the tale of the 1245 battle of Yaroslav, where Danylo Romanovych is referred to as “Rex Ruthenorum”, i.e. “King of Rus”.¹⁰ At the same time, Danylo’s rival, Prince Rostyslav Mykhailovych (who was also an ally of the Hungarian king Béla IV) is documented as “dux Galliciae” (prince of Galicia).¹¹ Considering the evidence of Latin-language sources, it may be inferred that the interpretation of the term “rex” did not necessarily indicate the existence of a royal title. Rather, it served as an indication of the authority of the rulers of Rus, confirming their sovereignty and power. The vice-master of the Teutonic Order, Burghard von Hornhausen, was also referred to as king. In his letter dated 1254, he describes Danylo Romanovych as “excellenti viro Danieli primo rege Ruthenorum”¹². This letter was found in the middle of the 19th century in the library of the Chortorii princes. Its authenticity is unquestioned by experts.

Researchers share the belief that if the European rulers of that era accepted the title of Danylo Romanovych, it may have indicated the transformation of the Galician and Volyn lands into an actual Kingdom of Rus. Such a conclusion can be reached on the basis of the title of Yuriy Lvovych, which is recorded in his seal: “S[igilum] Domini Georgii regis Russiae” and “S[igilum] Domini Georgii principis Ladimiriae”. Yuriy’s seal testifies to the possible revival of the united King Danylo Romanovych state under his rule. However, only the Galician land is the kingdom of Rus¹³. At one time, the Hungarian king Béla III and his son Andriy II aspired to this.

Romanovycha ta yikh pokhodzhennya [The Annals of Jan Dlugos report about the coronation of Danylo Romanovych and their origin], in: “Ruthenica”, t. 13, Kyiv, Instytut istoriyi Ukrayiny NAN Ukrayiny, p. 108.

⁹ *Heinrici Chronicon Livoniae*, rec. L. Arbusow et A. Bauer, in *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum et Monumentis Germaniae Historicis. Separatim editi*, Hannoverae, impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1955, p. 141-142.

¹⁰ *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*, Studio et opera G. Fejer, vol. 2, Budae, 1829, p. 247.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, wyd. Bobowski Mikołaj, t. 3, Varsaviae, 1858, p. 30.

¹³ Translate: “Seal of Yuri – King of Galicia” and “Seal of Yuri – Prince of Lodomeria”. See: Ya. Ysaevych, “*Korolevstvo Halytsyy y Volodymyryy y “Korolevstvo Rusy”* [“Kingdom of

Thus, this status was confirmed by the coronation of Danylo in 1253. The title of the king of Rus is likely not indicative of Yuri's coronation, as the European tradition dictates that acknowledgement of a kingdom's status is determined by the state rather than specific representatives of the ruling dynasty¹⁴. Later, the Austrian emperor Joseph II assumed the title of Yuri and, as a result, in 1772, during the first division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, he acquired this kingdom¹⁵.

The scientific community has not yet fully comprehended the significance of Danylo Romanovych's coronation and subsequent partial transformation of his State into the Kingdom of Rus. Various approaches have been taken in covering this event, ranging from ardent defenders of Danylo's title to partially ignoring it by placing the royal title in quotation marks. Some have also attempted to minimize the significance of the coronation in Dorohychyna, arguing that Danylo himself did not use the title. However, such conclusions are completely opposite to truly authentic and scientifically reliable sources.

Upon examining the source reports, it becomes evident that both European and Old Rus evidence depict Danylo Romanovych as a king, which is a valid indication of a Ruler. In connection with this, the use of the nickname "Galician" or the state's name, "Gallicia-Volyn state" in relation to Danylo, disregarding the royal title and ignoring the transformation of the state into the Kingdom of Rus. This appears to be quite confusing. When examining the historical sources of the first half of the 19th century, it becomes apparent that terms like "Suzdalian", "Smolenian" and "Kyivan" were frequently employed to refer to the princes of Old Rus.

However, upon a detailed study of the historiographical texts of that time, particularly focusing on N. Karamzin, it becomes evident that these adjectives were not nicknames for princes. Instead, they served to describe the land controlled by each prince. In this context, scientists further referred to Volodymyrko Volodarevych and Yaroslav Volodymyrovych, classifying them as "Galicians"¹⁶. It is important to remember that these princes exercised genuine authority over Ga-

Galicia and Lodomeria" and "Kingdom of Rus"'], in: "Drevneyshye hosudarstva na territoryy SRSR. Materyaly y yssledovanyya", Moskva, Nauka, 1986, p. 62-63.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 63.

¹⁵ V. Kaye, *The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, 1772*, in "Canadian Slavonic Papers", vol. 14, 1972, p. 454-464.

¹⁶ N. Kotlyar, *Formirovaniye territorii i vozniknoveniye gorodov Galitsko-Volynskoy Rusi X – XIII vv.* [The formation of the territory and the emergence of towns in Galicia-Volyn Rus in the 10th - 13th centuries], Kiev, Naukova dumka, 1985, p. 80.

licia in the 12th century. The 19th-century logic of historical investigation is inadequate in describing Danilo. The use of the term “Daniel Galician” or “Prince Danylo of Galicia” in reference to Danylo Romanovych is scientifically incorrect, and, therefore, contradicts the attributes of the king as described in the sources. The city of Halych was the capital of Danylo Romanovych’s state for a very short time: from the fall of 1238 when Halych was included in Danylo’s possessions and was designated as his capital until the winter of 1240-1241 when the Mongol troops destroyed the city.

According to the Galician-Volyn chronic, Danylo disliked Halych due to the ongoing conflicts with the local boyar elite. Therefore, at the first good opportunity, the Ruler moved the capital of his state to the city of Kholm, which he sought to turn into one of the great centres of Eastern Europe at the time. The period of development of the town of Kholm saw the highest rise of the Romanovych State: “According to God’s will Danilo built (1237) a city called Xolm~ but we will relate [the story of] its creation later. [Then] Bishop Ivan was chosen by the will of God and placed [in Xolm] by Prince Danilo. [He was selected] from the clergy of the great Church of the Blessed Virgin in Volodimer’. Before this occurred, there was a bishop Asaf in Ugrovesk who seized the metropolitan chair and because of this was dethroned, and the bishopric was transferred to Xolm”¹⁷.

Based on the available sources, there is no mention of “Daniel Galician” or his State, known as “Galician-Volyn principality”. At the same time, historical records documented Prince and King Danylo Romanovych, and his state was referred to as *Regnum Ruthenorum* since 1253¹⁸.

¹⁷ *The Hypatian Codex Part Two: The Galician-Volynian Chronicle*, p. 28; More about this problematic see: V. Aleksandrovych, *Mystetstvo Kholma doby knyazya Danyla Romanovycha* [The art of Holm in the era of Prince Danylo Romanovych], in: “Knyazha doba. Istoriya i kul’tura”, L’viv, Instytut ukrayinoznavstva imeni I. Kryp’yakevycha NAN Ukrainy, 2007, p. 136-153.

¹⁸ *Heinrici Chronicon Livoniae*, rec. L. Arbusow et A. Bauer, in: *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum et Monumentis Germaniae Historicis. Separatim editi*, Hannoverae, impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1955, p. 141; *Joannis Długosz senioris canonici Cracoviensis Opera omnia*, ed. A. Przezdziecki, in *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, Kraków, vol. 2, 1873, p. 310; More representative studies: V. Kaye, *The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria*, 1772, in “Canadian Slavonic Papers”, vol. 14, 1972, p. 456; Ya. Ysaevych, “*Korolevstvo Halysyy y Volodymyryy*” y “*Korolevstvo Rusy*” [“Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria” and “Kingdom of Rus”], in: “Drevneyshye hosudarstva na terrytoryy SRSR. Materyaly y yssledovanyya”, Moskva, Nauka, 1986, p. 62-63.

THE REFLECTION OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A CLASS IDEOLOGY

The Soviet perspective on the history of medieval Rus and the establishment of its historical heritage were determined by political and ideological factors. The topic concerns the context of social and political changes in the USSR that occurred alongside the emergence of the Stalinist form of dictatorship. The establishment of a totalitarian regime rendered the notions of Ukrainian national historiography historically unacceptable. This is particularly relevant to M. Hrushevskyi's perspective of Ukrainian history.

The renowned Ukrainian historian radically separated the history of the Ukrainian nation from the Russian one, beginning from prehistoric times. A significant component of his approach was how he assessed the Kyivan Rus (10th – first half of 13th centuries) in the history of the Eastern Slavs. The scientist's view may be summarised as follows: "Kyiv state, law, and culture were the product of one nationality, Ukrainian-Rus; Volodymyr-Moscow period – the second, Great Russian..."¹⁹. M. Hrushevsky determines a connection between the period of Kyivan Rus and the subsequent period of Ukrainian history: "The Kyiv period did not pass into the Volodymyr-Moscow period, but was pass into the "Galicia-Volyn period" of the 13th century...". Therefore, the scientist concludes: "There can be no All-Rus history, just as there is no All-Rus nationality"²⁰. The process of transitioning from one historical period to another, by cause and effect, determined the continuity of the history of Ukrainians. The Kyeuan Rus, which is the fundamental concept in Ukrainian history, transitioned into the "Galicia-Volyn state" according to the scientific theory of M. Hrushevskyi.

Pre-revolutionary historical science evaluated critically the interpretation of the historical heritage of Rus. It was important for imperial science to "prove" that the centre of Rus had moved from Kyiv to Volodymyr-Suzdal even before the "Mongolian-Tatar yoke", and later, during the "Mongolian-Tatar" era, to Moscow.

¹⁹ M. Hrushevskyi, *Zvychainska shkema ruskoi istorii y sprava ratsionalnoho ukladu istorii Skhidnoho Sloviaanstva* [The usual scheme of Russian history and the matter of a rational arrangement of the history of the Eastern Slavs], in "Stat'y po slavyan-ovedennyu", Sankt-Peterburh, 1904, vyp. 1., p. 291.

²⁰ *Ibid.* Also see another Hrushevskyi's interpretation from A. Presnyakov, *Kniazhoe pravo v Drevnei Rusy. Ocherky po ystoryi X- XII stoletyi. Lektsyy po russkoi ystoryi. Kyevskaia Rus'* [Princely law in Ancient Rus. Essays on the history of the X-XII centuries. Lectures on Russian history. Kievan Rus], Moskva, 1993, p. 580.

Instead, Volyn and Galicia remained a kind of periphery of Rus, which did not play a significant role in the state-building processes on Rus lands. In general, the concept of the "Galicia-Volyn principality" was not solely or primarily a cabinet term invented to explain historical processes. It was a political term that aimed to "prove" the involvement of Volyn and Galicia in Russian history, as well as to emphasize their peripheral status in comparison to Volodymyr-Suzdal, and then the Moscow principalities²¹.

Soviet historical science, which emerged after the October Revolution, in search of a "Marxist-Leninist concept" of the Ukrainian historical process, had to overcome both the "old schemes" of Ukrainian and Russian historiography, as well as new, so-called "pseudo-Marxist schemes". At the turn of the 1920s – 1930s, Soviet historiography, shaped by debates held by the Society of Marxist Historians, generated the opinion that on the one side, the history of the USSR cannot be replaced by the history of Russia, and on the other side, that the history of these nations should not be separated from history the Russian nation²². The process of revising old concepts of Ukrainian and Russian historiography and forming the Soviet version of Ukrainian history stretched on for decades.

The continuation of the policy of "korenization" ("Ukrainization") at the beginning of the 30s of the 20th century acquired more and more "all-Soviet patri-

²¹ S. Piontkovskiy, *Velykoderzhavni tendentsiyi v istoriografii Rosiyi* [Great power trends in the historiography of Russia], in "Istoriik-marksist", t. 17, 1930, p. 22-23; M. Pokrovskiy, *Ocherky ystoryi russkoy kul'tury* [Essays on the history of Russian culture], Moskva – Leningrad, 1925, p. 48.

²² The early Slavic and Slavic periods of Ukrainian history were taught according to the pattern established by Soviet historiography. Its essence was subordination to the dominant concept of the formation of the ancient Russian nation, as the common root of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples. The Kyiv state was assessed as their joint early feudal state. Characteristically, works on the ancient and medieval history of Ukraine were approached using the union scheme, which required analyzing history according to social classes and interpreting it as a part of Russian history, while disregarding nation-building processes. For a more detailed analysis, see: V. Holovko, *Istoriografiya kryzy istorychnoyi nauky. Ukrayins'kyi kontekst* [Historiography of the crisis of historical science. Ukrainian context], Kyiv, 2003, p. 110; Ya. Isayevych, *Problema pokhodzhennya ukrayins'koho narodu: istoriografichnyy i politychnyy aspekt* [The problem of the origin of the Ukrainian people: historiographical and political aspect], in "Ukrayina davnya i nova. Narod, relihiya, kul'tura", L'viv, 1996, p. 22-42; M. Koval', O. Rubl'ov, *Peredmov*a [Preface] in *U leshtakh totalitaryzmu: Instytut istoriyi Ukrayiny NAN Ukrayiny (1936–1956 rr.): Zb. dokumenty i materialy: U 2-kh chastynakh*", upor-yad.: R. Pyrih (kerivnyk), T. Hrytsenko, V. Mazur, O. Rubl'ov, Kyiv, 1996, ch. 1, p. 25.

otic features". Leaders of the ideological "front" tried to model compromise provisions and schemes that would harmonise the traditions of the Russian "great state" and the individualism of other nations of the USSR. In particular, this tendency found its embodiment in the creation of the Soviet concept of the place of the "Galicia-Volyn principality" in the general model of the history of medieval Rus. The new visions of USSR historians relied on the concepts of East Slavic researchers of earlier times, particularly those predating the 1930s.

The initial attempts to change the role of "Galician-Volyn Rus" in the general medieval Rus narrative may be attributed to Marxist historians. In his studies "History of Ukraine", the Ukrainian historian M. Yavorskyi, famous in the 1920s, provides a distinct framework that explains the unique Ukrainian historical process. This is demonstrated by the periodization of the history of Ukraine, where "Galicia-Volyn Rus" occupies a prominent place²³. According to the historian, at the end of the 12th century "three new centres grew: the Novgorod land, the Suzdal principality, which gave rise to the Muscovite state, and the Galician kingdom. The northern tribes, mixed with the Finns, gave rise to the Great Russian nation and the south-western ones to the Ukrainian nation". Yavorskyi's scheme concept was perceived very ambiguously and was condemned as "pseudo-Marxist" in the early 1930s²⁴.

Other leading Russian historians of that time (O. Presnyakov, M. Pokrovsky, M. Lyubavsky, etc.) tried to combine M. Hrushevsky's approach with the traditional Russian one.²⁵ The researchers joined Hrushevskyi's scheme. They distinguished the uniqueness of the historical process of the "Galicia-Volyn state"²⁶ from

²³ M. Yavors'kyy, *Korotka istoriya Ukrayiny* [Short history of Ukraine], Kharkiv, Derzh. vydavnytstvo Ukrayiny, 1926, p. 27; More about this interpretation: *Dyskusiya z pryvodu skhemy istoriyi Ukrayiny M. Yavors'koho* [Discussion about the scheme of the history of Ukraine by M. Yavorskyi], in "Litopys revolyutsiyi", 1930, № 2, p. 270-271.

²⁴ A. Santsevych, *M. Yavors'kyy: narys zhyttya ta tvorchosti* [M. Yavorskyi: Essey of life and creativity], Kyiv, 1995, s. 388; S. Piontkovskiy, *Velikoderzhavnyye tendentsii v istoriografii Rossii* [Great-power tendencies in the historiography of Russia], in "Istorik-markсист", t. 17, 1930, p. 22-23.

²⁵ M. Pokrovskiy, *Ocherki istorii ruskoy kul'tury* [Essays on the history of Russian culture], Moskva – Leningrad, 1925, p. 48; M. Lyubavskiy, *Obrazovaniye osnovnoy gosudarstvennoy territorii velikorusskoy narodnosti. Zaseleniye i ob'yedineniye tsentra* [Formation of the main state territory of the Great Russian nation. Settlement and unification of the center], Moskva, 1929, p. 3-5; A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovaniye velikorusskogo gosudarstva. Ocherki po istorii XII - XVI stoletiy* [Formation of the Great Russian state. Essays on the history of the 12th-16th centuries], Petrograd, 1918, p. 1-26.

²⁶ L. Zaliznyak, *De, yak i koly vynykla davn'orus'ka narodnist' (Do 50-richchya problemy)*

the history of the Russian Empire. It is significant that O. Presnyakov was a supporter of the concept of the “three-unit Rus people”, but he believed that “Ukrainian nationhood was formed in the deep foundations of its national and cultural individuality during the brilliant, albeit short, flowering of the independent political life of Roman Mstislavovych Galicia-Volyn Rus – “autocrat of all Rus” and his famous son “King of Galicia Danylo”.²⁷

M. Rubinstein made a significant contribution to the formation of the Soviet concept of the history of the “Galicia-Volyn principality” in the early 1930s of the 20th century. Relying on the position of O. Presnyakov, the scientist interprets the line of traction from Kyivan Rus to the “Galicia-Volyn principality”²⁸. Kyiv Rus “historically unites the territories of the South Rus Slavs, the North-Eastern Slavs, and the Novgorod Slavs”. After the decline of the “single Kyiv centre”, individual tribes “form new groups around new centres, in this case: Galicia-Volyn, Rostov-Suzdal, Novgorod Principalities”.²⁹

The Polotsk or Smolensk cells are not mentioned. In this regard, M. Rubinstein follows M. Yavorskyi, solely in the unpublished Russian version³⁰. Afterwards, M. Rubinstein acknowledges the individual historical progress of these “new groups”, including the Novgorod one, stating that “each of these groups follows its own personal historical path” from “the same place where the history of Kyivan Rus ends”.³¹

[Where, how and when did the ancient Russian nation arise (To the 50th anniversary of the problem)], in “Pam"yat' stolit'”, 1998, № 6, p. 4-5.

²⁷ S. Brachov, *Russkiy istorik A. Presnyakov (1870 – 1929)* [Russian historian A. Presnyakov (1870 – 1929)], Sankt-Peterburg, 2002, p. 35.

²⁸ M. Rubinshtein, *Narys istoriyi Kyivs'koyi Rusi* [Essay on the history of Kyivan Rus], Kharkiv – Odesa, 1930, p. 7. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, M. Rubinshtein conceived the idea of creating a general course of Ukrainian history that would meet the demands set by Marxist historians. In the early 1930s, he prepared it for printing, but his attempt eventually failed. Not being able to publish the entire narrative as a whole, the scientist tried to publish individual parts. For more details, see: N. Yusova, *Vnesok M. Rubinshteyna u formuvannya radyans'koyi kontseptsiyi istoriyi Ukrayiny* [The role of M. Rubinstein in the formation of the Soviet concept of the history of Ukraine], in *Probl. istoriyi Ukrayiny: fakty, sudzhennya, poshuky: Mizhvid. zb. nauk. pr.*, 2004, vyp. 11, s. 236.

²⁹ M. Rubinshtein, *Narys istoriyi Kyivs'koyi Rusi* [Essay on the history of Kyivan Rus], Kharkiv – Odesa, 1930, p. 5.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

According to M. Rubinstein, a distinct historical process, similar to the Russian one, begins in Ukraine at the end of the 12th century. Specifically, in the Ukrainian case, with the strengthening of the "Galicia-Volyn centre"³². According to the researcher, the history of Ukraine commences with the consolidation of the "Galicia-Volyn state". The period spanning from the 12th to the 14th century in Ukraine was marked by the existence of the "Galicia-Volyn state". However, M. Rubinstein further notes that the history of this state is only the history of one of the Ukrainian lands, which "reflects the course of the Ukrainian historical process within the boundaries of this land"; however, it does not exhaust "the entire content of this process". This era is not characterised by the fact that the political centre moved from Kyiv to Halych, but by the absence of such a centre at all, because of "political disintegration". This disintegration itself was only a consequence of the "process of feudalism, *seigneurisation* of social relations". M. Rubinstein defines this period in the history of Ukraine as "the period of early feudalism"³³.

USES OF MEDIEVAL IMAGE OF RUS IN SOVIET HISTORICAL POLITICS DURING WORLD WAR II

The revived scientific interest in the history of the "Galicia-Volyn principality" was caused by the so-called "reunification of the Ukrainian nation" after the USSR attack on Poland in 1939. To avoid any risks and bring the intellectual situation under party control, the state leadership emphasised the importance of the national factor of Ukrainians in the struggle for "reunification" as part of a single state. The scientific construct of the "Galicia-Volyn principality" focusing on the Ukrainian factor suddenly became very profitable for Soviet historical science. After all, remembering the ancient medieval Western Ukrainian state took place exclusively in the context of the "local principality" (which did not contradict the Great Russian vision of Rus past). In addition, such a scientific vision made it possible to justify the inclusion of Western Ukrainian lands into Soviet Ukraine.

Of course, the historians of the USSR were connected to the ideological campaign of 1939–1940 – the "advanced forces of the ideological front". They pre-

³² M. Rubinshtein, *Zapadnyye puti trgovli Ukrainy-Rusi* [Western trade routes between Ukraine and Rus'], in "Visnyk Odes'koyi Komisiyi Krayeznavstva pry Ukrayins'kiy akademiyi Nauk", Odesa, 1925, ch. 2-3. p. 120-134.

³³ M. Rubinshtein, *Narys istoriyi Kyivs'koyi Rusi* [Essay on the history of Kyivan Rus], Kharkiv – Odesa, 1930, p. 8.

sented both scientific and journalistic works published in periodicals and scientific anthologies. Among the historians of the Union Centre, Academician B. Grekov, the official leader of historical science, wrote on the “reunification” of Ukraine. Using his authority, the scientist established a consensus in Soviet science and the public regarding the position of Kyivan Rus and the significance of the “Galicia-Volyn state” as the precursor of the Ukrainian nation³⁴.

Ukrainian historians also took an active part in the new ideological campaign regarding the propaganda “reunification” of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian SSR. The Institute of the History of Ukraine of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR published a scientific article named “Western Ukraine”³⁵. Kyiv scientists S. Belousov and O. Ogloblin built their history on the thesis of “primitive Ukrainian lands”, which meant the ethnic unity of Western and Eastern Ukrainians³⁶. Upon analysing the collection mentioned above, it becomes evident that there is a certain contrast in the views of all USSR historians in the Soviet centre and those in the capital of Ukraine. This shows that at that time academic circles had different understandings of the new politics of memory, as well as the fact that official Soviet declarations left some room for debate over their interpretations.

The continuation of the thesis about the antiquity of Ukrainian lands, where special attention was paid to the “Galicia-Volyn principality”, was reflected in the large-scale collective study “History of Ukraine: A Short Course” published by the Institute of the History of Ukraine.

This work, released simultaneously in Ukrainian and Russian, initiated the rehabilitation of the national narrative³⁷. For a better understanding of this concept, it is important to consider the position of K. Guslysty, an employee of the Institute of History and Archeology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. In the collective work “Essay on the History of Ukraine”, the scientist writes

³⁴ As we can see, this position was put forward to him by Ukrainian Soviet historians, the concepts of which we considered above: B. Grekov, *Drevneyshiye sud'by Zapadnoy Ukrainy* [The most ancient destinies of Western Ukraine], in “Novyy mir”, 1939, № 10-11, p. 248-256.

³⁵ S. Byelousov, *Krakh pol's'koyi derzhavy i z'yednannya velykoho ukrayins'koho narodu v yedyniy ukrayins'kiy derzhavi – URSR* [The collapse of the Polish state and the unification of the great Ukrainian people in a single Ukrainian state – Ukrainian SSR], in *Zakhidna Ukrayina. Zbirnyk pid red. S.M. Byelousova i O.P. Ohloblina*, Kyiv, 1940, p. 97-109.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

³⁷ I. Hapusenko, *Istoriya Ukrayiny periodu feodalizmu* [History of Ukraine during the period of feudalism], in *Rozvytok istorichnoyi nauky na Ukrayini za roky Radyans'koyi vlady*, Kyiv, 1973, p. 76.

that Danylo Romanovych led the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the “German and Hungarian invaders”, defeating the former at Dorohychyn in 1238, and the latter under Yaroslav in 1245³⁸.

K. Guslysty stated about the unification into a single state of Galician and Volyn lands by Roman Mstyslavych at the end of the XII century: “This is how the mighty Galicia-Volyn principality arose, which for a long time played the main role in the history of Ukraine and sought to unite the fragmented Ukrainian lands into a single centralised state”. Moreover, K. Guslysty used the term “Ukraine”, “Ukrainian lands” to denote South Rus lands even in the 13th century. For example, he writes that under the reign of Prince Yaroslav Osmomysl “Galicia” “became the strongest principality on the territory of Ukraine”. However, K. Guslysty immediately notes that the Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian peoples “finally formed around the 14th – 15th centuries”.

After 1940, references to the great Ukrainian nation in official discourse decreased. Soviet ideologues understood the importance of the past as a means of shaping the collective mentality. Therefore, they sought to find outstanding heroes of the past of the Western Ukrainian lands to strengthen the role of party discourse. Based on this state of affairs, the attempt to make Prince and King Danylo Romanovych an “outstanding hero of the past” seems quite understandable. A new canon of historical heroes of the Republic was created based on and in addition to the Russian list of great ancestors. At that time, no one claimed that this great medieval Eastern Slavic state belonged exclusively to Ukrainian historical memory, but Prince Danylo and the “Galicia-Volyn principality” could already be publicly called the heritage of the Ukrainian nation³⁹. Given the importance of ancestry in nationalist theories, which traced a direct line of heredity from Kyivan Rus to the “Galicia-Volyn principality”, it was dangerous to hold Danylo Romanovych in such high regard. Could Ukrainians glorify the southwestern “Galicia-Volyn princes” if the Russians glorified the northeastern Volodymyr-Suzdal princes as the heirs of the grand princes of Kyiv according to soviet party discourse? If Kyiv Rus served as a shared “cradle” for both Russians and Ukrainians,

³⁸ K. Guslysty, *Danylo Halyts'kyi* [Daniel Galician], Saratov, Ukrvydav pry TsK KP(b)U, 1942, p. 3.; *Narys istoriyi Ukrayiny* [Essay on the history of Ukraine], za red. K. Guslysty, Ufa, Vyd-vo AN URSR, 1942, p. 46-47.

³⁹ „Komunist” [Communist], 24 chervnya 1941, p. 3; Also see.: S. Yekel'chuk, *Imperiya pam'yati. Rosiys'ko-ukrayins'ki stosunki v radyans'kiy istorychniy uyavi* [Empire of memory. Russian-Ukrainian relations in the Soviet historical imagination], Kyiv, Krytyka, 2008, p. 55.

when did their separation begin? However, at that moment, in the context of the military conflict, no one protested against the “Ukrainization” of Prince Danylo.

Danylo’s “Ukrainization” found his visual reflection in M. Bazhan’s 1942 patriotic poem “Danylo Halytskyi”. A famous Ukrainian poet portrayed Danylo Romanovych as an outstanding commander, a fighter against “a rush of German knights”. Despite the risks, the author of the poem called Danylo’s state “Ukraine” twice. Although in the rest of the cases, he used the more neutral names “Rus”, “slavs”, “ruses”⁴⁰. It is obvious that at the peak of the Second World War, the ideological supervisors considered this appropriation of the “Galicia-Volyn Principality” to Ukrainian historical memory acceptable. Subsequently, M. Bazhan received the 2nd class Stalin Prize for “Daniel Galician” and poems of wartime⁴¹.

The apparent acceptability of the image of the “Galicia-Volyn principality” reflects how history gave the Soviet authorities a chance to complete the collection of “all Rus lands”. In March 1944, M. Khrushchev gave a speech at the first wartime session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR⁴². The Soviet Union prepared historical arguments to substantiate his intentions. It declared that the Ukrainian people would strive to include eternal Ukrainian lands, such as Kholmshchyna, Hrubeshiv, Zamostya, Tomashiv and Yaroslav into the Ukrainian Soviet state. The lands mentioned by Khrushchev were once part of the “Galicia-Volyn principality” and, with the exception of Yaroslav, belonged to the Russian Empire between 1832 and 1917. However, after the revolution, they returned to Poland. Before the war, the USSR refrained from asserting its territorial claims over the regions along the Curzon line and did not seek to occupy them in 1939⁴³. Trying to scientifically substantiate this thesis, M. Petrovsky hastily prepared the

⁴⁰ M. Bazhan, *Danylo Halyts'kyi*, in “Tvory v 4-kh tomakh: T. 1. Poeziyi ta poemyy 1923–1983”, Kyiv, Dnipro, 1984, p 11-12.

⁴¹ S. Tsalyk, P. Selihey, *Pro shcho zmovchaly biohrafy Mykoly Bazhana* [What the biographers of Mykola Bazhan kept silent about], in “Tayemnytsi pys'mennyts'kykh shukhlyad: Detektyvna istoriya ukrayins'koyi literatury”, Kyiv, Nash chas, 2010, p. 32-35; S. Yekel'chyk, *Imperiya pam'yati. Rosiys'ko-ukrayins'ki stosunky v radyans'kiy istorychniy uyavi* [Empire of memory. Russian-Ukrainian relations in the Soviet historical imagination], Kyiv, Krytyka, 2008, p. 56.

⁴² More about M. Khrushchev speech see in: M. Tkachenko, *Kholmshchyna, Hrubeshiv, Yaroslav – odvichni ukrayins'ki zemli* [Kholmshchyna, Hrubeshiv, Yaroslav – eternal Ukrainian lands], in “Ukrayins'ka literatura”, 1944, № 5-6, p. 123.

⁴³ S. Yekel'chyk, *Imperiya pam'yati. Rosiys'ko-ukrayins'ki stosunky v radyans'kiy istorychniy uyavi* [Empire of memory. Russian-Ukrainian relations in the Soviet historical imagination], Kyiv, Krytyka, 2008, p. 81.

article “Eternal Ukrainian Lands”, which appeared in “Soviet Ukraine”. He noted that “Danylo Halytsky” died and was buried in Kholm, Bohdan Khmelnytsky claimed this territory, and according to the 1897 census data, the majority of the local population was of Ukrainian descent⁴⁴. However, after lengthy negotiations with the Western allies and the Polish government in exile, Stalin decided that the border between Ukraine and Poland would run along the Curzon line. The Kholm remained in the hands of the Poles⁴⁵.

The invasion of Poland by the USSR in September 1939 became an important factor in shaping the new Soviet Ukrainian historical memory. Similar to past imperial conquests, this one served to strengthen the distinct ethnic identity of the local population and further reinforce ethnicity as a fundamental category of Stalin’s ideological discourse. An important concern arises regarding the stability of the concept of Ukrainization in the “Galicia-Volyn Principality” and its impact on the emergence of ethnic separateness.

After gaining a strategic advantage in the war at the end of 1943, the party leadership made it clear that it did not like the spread of non-Russian national narratives. In turn, this interesting example of Stalinist semantics demonstrates the government’s attempt to use Ukrainian patriotism for military mobilisation. Accordingly, the change in the political paradigm led to the condemnation of national identity⁴⁶. Starting from 1944, the party leadership began to pay attention to a certain slide towards “bourgeois-nationalist” ideology. Finally, in 1946–1947, the “national factor” was categorically condemned⁴⁷. The struggle of the Ukrainian people for “unification” with the Russian people came to the fore as the main factor in history. An important role in this context is occupied by the “correct” coverage of the history of Rus as the “common cradle” of two peoples (Belarusians are

⁴⁴ M. Petrovs’kyi, *Zakhidna Ukrayina* (Istorychna dovidka) [Western Ukraine (Historical reference)], in “Biblioteka ahitatora”, Kyiv, 1945, p. 1. More about M Petrovs’kyi’s scheme see in: M. Tkachenko, *Kholmshchyna, Hrubeshiv, Yaroslav – odvichni ukrayins’ki zemli* [Kholmshchyna, Hrubeshiv, Yaroslav – eternal Ukrainian lands], in “Ukrayins’ka literatura”, 1944, № 5-6, p. 122-129.

⁴⁵ V. Boyechko, O. Hanzha, B. Zakharchuk, *Kordony Ukrayiny: Istorychna retrospektyva ta suchasnyy stan* [Borders of Ukraine: Historical retrospective and current state], Kyiv, Osnovy, 1994, p. 80-85.

⁴⁶ V. Pashuto, *Daniil Galitskiy* [Daniel Galician], in “Istoricheskiy zhurnal”, 1943, № 3-4, p. 41.

⁴⁷ More in historical analysis from: S. Yekel’chyk, *Imperiya pam’yati. Rosiys’ko-ukrayins’ki stosunky v radyans’kiy istorychniy uyavi* [Empire of memory. Russian-Ukrainian relations in the Soviet historical imagination], Kyiv, Krytyka, 2008, p. 82.

also mentioned, but in the works of Ukrainian historians it is mostly about Ukrainians and Russians), as well as their ethnic unity during that period.

REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING THE PAST OF REGNUM RUTHERNORUM AFTER WORLD WAR II

The Soviet authorities actively sought to suppress alternative “nationalist” versions of national memory, and Danylo Romanovych’s attempt at “russification” is particularly revealing. Thus, in the 1943 “Historical Journal”, the Russian historian V. Pashuto called Danylo Romanovych a “Russian prince” who ruled the “Russian” people in the “Southern Russian” lands.⁴⁸ Following him, the writer O. Yugov in his 1944 brochure also considered the prince and his subjects to be “Russian” and declared, “the people of Galicia, Bukovyna and Volhynia endured many historical challenges, defended the Russian language, parents’ faith and preserved an unquenchable love for Great Russia”⁴⁹. This version, endorsed by B. Grekov, focuses on the Polish period of Galician history while neglecting to address the formation of Ukrainian or at least proto-Ukrainian nationality⁵⁰.

During a conference of historians and local party ideologues in early 1945, Professor K. Guslysty tried to raise the problem of the “russification” of Danylo Romanovych in the central press. He especially criticized V. Pashuto’s article⁵¹ and O. Yugov’s pamphlet⁵², which interpreted the “Galicia-Volyn principality” exclusively from the point of view of the “united Russian people”, without directly connecting it with the history of Ukraine. Neither party functionaries nor fellow historians disputed Guslysty’s statement that “Daniel Galician is one of the great ancestors of the Ukrainian people, just as Aleksandr Nevsky is one of the great ancestors of the great Russian people”⁵³.

⁴⁸ V. Pashuto, *Daniil Galitskiy* [Daniel Galician], in “Istoricheskiy zhurnal”, 1943, № 3-4, p. 41.

⁴⁹ A. Yugov, *Daniil Galitskiy* [Daniel Galician], Moskva, Gospolitizdat, 1944, p. 55.

⁵⁰ B. Grekov, *Sud’by naseleniya galitskikh knyazheskikh votchin pod vlast’yu Pol’shi* [The fate of the population of the Galician princely estates under the rule of Poland], in “Istoricheskiy zhurnal”, 1944, № 12, p. 37-43.

⁵¹ V. Pashuto, *Daniil Galitskiy* [Daniel Galician], in “Istoricheskiy zhurnal”, 1943, № 3-4, p. 42.

⁵² A. Yugov, *Daniil Galitskiy* [Daniel Galician], Moskva, Gospolitizdat, 1944, p. 55

⁵³ S. Yekel’chyk, *Imperiya pam’yati. Rossiys’ko-ukrayins’ki stosunki v radyans’kiy istorychniy uyavi* [Empire of memory. Russian-Ukrainian relations in the Soviet historical imagination], Kyiv, Krytyka, 2008, p. 81.

The historiographical discussion continued, leading to criticism of K. Guslysty's previously accepted studies.⁵⁴ The Russian expert M. Tikhomirov, a specialist in the field of Eastern Slavic Middle Ages, voiced a very critical assessment of K. Guslysty's view in his unpublished "Essay on the History of Ukraine". The Ukrainian historian's views on the beginning of the formation of the Ukrainian nation were particularly criticised. Furthermore, M. Tikhomirov claimed that "Galician-Volyn Rus could not be a unifying centre for Ukraine, because the Belarusian and Ukrainian people in the 13th century have not yet developed"⁵⁵. Therefore, based on this statement, it may be inferred that the Russians have already formed as a people. The tendency to identify the Old Rus population with the later great Russian nationality, and to consider Ukrainians and Belarusians as those who separated from the single Russian (actually Russian) people in the 13th – 14th centuries was characteristic of certain authoritative Russian medievalists, even during the reign of the compromise concept of the "common cradle"⁵⁶.

Stalinist ideologues eliminated the remnants of nationalist historical narratives from the public discourse of Western Ukraine. They commissioned "reliable" historians to write sample lectures on the history of the region. The first to respond was M. Petrovskiy, who composed a brief outline of the history of Western Ukraine in an operative manner. Sensing where the new ideological wind of the last years of the war was blowing, he attributed to the people of Galicia an age-old desire to unite not only with Eastern Ukrainians but also with the "fraternal one-

⁵⁴ *Istoriya Ukrayiny: Korotkyy kurs* [History of Ukraine: A Short Course], Pid red. S. Byelousova, K. Guslysty, O. Ohloblina, M. Petrovs'koho, M. Suprunenka, F. Yastrebova. AN URSS. Instytut istoriyi Ukrayiny, Kyiv, Vyd-vo AN URSS, 1940, 412 p.

⁵⁵ M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskiye goroda. Izdaniye vtoroye, dopolnennoye i pererabotannoye* [Old Russian Cities. Second edition, supplemented and revised], Moskva, Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1956, p. 209; More about M. Tikhomirov vision see: N. Yusova, *Vozz'yednannya ukrayins'kykh zemel' i aktualizatsiya problemy pokhodzhennya ukrayins'koyi narodnosti v radyans'kiy istoriohrafiyi: 1939-1947 rr. (v svitli novykh arkhivnykh dzherel)* [The reunification of Ukrainian lands and the actualization of the problem of the origin of the Ukrainian nation in Soviet historiography: 1939-1947 (in the light of new archival sources)], in *Spetsial'ni istorychni dystsypliny: pytannya teorii ta metodyky: zbirka naukovykh prats. NAN Ukrayiny, In-t istoriyi Ukrayiny*, Kyiv, 2004, Chysl. 11, ch. 2: *Do 10-richchya zasnuv. viddilu spets. ist. dystsyplin In-tu istoriyi Ukrayiny NAN Ukrayiny*, p. 183.

⁵⁶ M. Koval', O. Rubl'ov, *Peredmovy* [Preface], in *U leshtakh totalitaryzmu: Instytut istoriyi Ukrayiny NAN Ukrayiny (1936–1956 rr.): Zb. dokumenty i materialy: U 2-kh chastynakh, uporyad.: R. Pyrih (kerivnyk), T. Hrytsenko, V. Mazur, O. Rubl'ov*, Kyiv, 1996, ch. 1, p. 25.

blooded Russian people". He went even further to destroy the patriotic concepts of wartime, criticising the Galician historians M. Hrushevskyi and S. Tomashivskyi for tracing "Ukrainian" statehood from ancient Kyiv to the "Galicia-Volyn principality". Petrovsky wrote that by the 14th century, there were no Ukrainian, Russian, or Belarusian nationalities, only a "single Rus nation". Moreover, even before 1917, eastern and western Ukrainians apparently wanted to unite within the boundaries of a single "Ukrainian state that would be a part of Russia". According to this scheme, little changed after 1917: the Soviet Union replaced the Russian Empire in the process of the final "historical unification" of the Eastern Slavs⁵⁷.

A different understanding of national memory gave rise to new attempts to interpret the past. The concept of the "Galicia-Volyn principality" and its history did not align with the rationale behind the concept of "the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian people". The Soviet ideologues could no longer return to the chauvinistic idea of a single Russian people, which consists of four parts – Great Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Galicians. Because of that, research on the history of the "Galicia-Volyn principality" and its "promotion" in artistic works became something peripheral in the system of Soviet agitprop⁵⁸. It is significant that the monograph "Galician-Volyn Principality" prepared by I. Krypyakevych, director of the Institute of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, was never published during the author's lifetime, but was published after his death in 1984⁵⁹.

After the war, Ukrainian party functionaries showed extreme sensitivity to any scientific works about the "Galicia-Volyn state". In 1951, the censors did not accept the article of the historian F. Shevchenko "On some questions of the history of Ukraine", written for the "Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR", because its author believed that "the beginning of Ukrainian statehood lies in certain South Russian principalities and especially Galicia-Volyn"⁶⁰. A telling

⁵⁷ M. Petrovskyy, *Zakhidna Ukrayina* (Istorychna dovidka) [Western Ukraine (Historical reference)], in "Biblioteka ahitatora", Kyiv, 1945, p. 3-4, 17.

⁵⁸ N. Yusova, *Pohlyady istorykiv URSR 30-kh – pochatku 40-kh rr. na etnichni protsesy v istoriyi shhidnykh slov'yan doby Kyivs'koyi Rusi* [Views of historians of the Ukrainian SSR in the 30s – early 40s on ethnic processes in the history of the Eastern Slavs of the Kyivan Rus period], in *Problemy istoriyi Ukrayiny: Fakty, sudzhennya, poshuky: Mizhvidomchyy zb. nauk. pr.*, Kyiv, 2002, vyp. 6, p.101-111.

⁵⁹ I. Krypyakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke knyazivstvo* [Galicia-Volyn principality], Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 1984, 176 p.

⁶⁰ F. Shevchenko, *Pro deyaki pytannya istoriyi Ukrayiny* [About some questions of the history of Ukraine], in *Istorychni studiyi: Zbirka vybranykh prats' i materialiv (Do 100-*

fact: in the first post-war decade, historian V. Pashuto published the only book about "Galicia-Volyn principality". Reviewers hailed it as "the first independent and serious monograph in Soviet historical literature devoted to the study of the history of Western Ukrainian lands during the period of feudal fragmentation"⁶¹.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the analysis of specific information, it is certain that political influences had a significant impact on Soviet historical research throughout the Stalinist era. A new "Soviet-Marxist" vision of the role of the State of the Romanovychs in history occurred in response to the re-evaluation of M. Hrushevskyi's historical concept from the second half of the 1930s. At the time when Soviet historical science adopted a new position on "Galicia-Volyn Rus" as an integral part of the "three-united Russian people", in 1939-40 the Ukrainian lands were "reunified" as part of the Ukrainian SSR. Demonstrating the historical unity and the unity of Ukrainian people, the history of their struggle for independence, and reunification in a single Ukrainian state, is gaining considerable relevance. During the Second World War, the history of Galicia is examined in connection with its ethnic isolation, highlighting the primordial struggle of the Ukrainian people against invaders and exploiters. With the beginning of the "liberation" of Ukraine after the War, the national factor was condemned. All subsequent studies on the history of the "Galicia-Volyn Principality" were conducted in the context of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for "unification" with the Russians.

The choice against the *Regnum Ruthenorum* state name can be attributed to the potential disruption it would cause to the Soviet grand narrative about the Principality of Moscow as the rightful successor of medieval Rus. The State of the Romanovychs, commonly known as the Kingdom of Rus in historical texts, was the legitimate successor of the Kyivan state and had a considerably superior position. However, kings could not rule over the Ukrainian territories since Moscow territories only had princes, as dictated by the Soviet historical policy. The title "rex" or "regis" in the Latin West contradicted the original "Rus culture" and could give

richchya vid dnya narodzhennya), za red. V. Smoliya ta H. Boryaka; uporyad. i kom.: S. Baturina, S. Blashchuk, I. Korchemna, O. Yas', Kyiv, NAN Ukrayiny. In-t istoriyi Ukrayiny, 2014, p. 367-371.

⁶¹ V. Pashuto, *Ocherki po istorii Galitsko-Volynskoy Rusi* [Essays on the history of Galicia-Volyn Rus'], Moskva, Izd-vo Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1950, 331 p.

birth to an incorrect, "pro-Western" interpretation of the past. This state of historical studies of Danylo's image gave birth to a rather limited and biased historiographical tradition. The military-political and trade-economic relations of the king with the countries of Europe at that time remained forgotten. Through their distorted ways of recalling events, the party leadership attempted to erase the notions of "rex" and "regnum" from the memory of Ukrainian society of the Soviet era.

The Soviet government's vision of the Ukrainian past was completely placed at the service of the regime's ideological needs. Research into the Regnum Ruthenorum as a "Galicia-Volyn principality" under Stalin's time resembled flirting with Ukrainian history. The latter revered and explored their past as long as it complemented, rather than competed with Russian imperial history.

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svitli novykh arkhivnykh dzherel) [The reunification of Ukrainian lands and the actualization of the problem of the origin of the Ukrainian nation in Soviet historiography: 1939-1947 (in the light of new archival sources)], in "Spetsial'ni istorychni dystsypliny: pytannya teorii ta metodyky: zbirka naukovykh prats. NAN Ukrayiny, In-t istoriyi Ukrayiny", Kyiv, 2004, Chysl. 11, ch. 2: Do 10-richchya zasnov. viddilu spets. ist. dystsyplin In-tu istoriyi Ukrayiny NAN Ukrayiny, p. 174-208.

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CONSPIRACY AND POPULIST NARRATIVES IN ROMANIAN-LANGUAGE CONTEXTS: ROMANIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

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Abstract. *This paper investigates the discursive interconnections between conspiracy theories and populism in Romanian-language contexts, encompassing both right-wing and left-wing ideologies. Employing interdiscursive analysis, it explores how these narratives converge to shape and reinforce shared identity discourses from Romanian literary culture to Romanian language mainstream media. While the relationship between right-wing populism and conspiracy theories has been extensively documented, the interplay between left-wing populism and conspiratorial thinking in Romania and the Republic of Moldova remains understudied. This qualitative analysis builds on the concept of cultural populism to examine the long-term synchronisation of literary culture and media discourse, particularly in relation to national self-identification. This case study demonstrates how the dissemination of conspiracy theories and populist narratives in Romanian-speaking cultures perpetuates an ethnocentric collective identity, mainly through right-wing ideological tropes. By giving a glimpse into interdiscursive dynamics, the paper contributes to understanding the use value of literary culture in mainstream political discourse across Romanian-speaking societies.*

Keywords: populism, conspiracism, culture, Romania, the Republic of Moldova.

Rezumat: *Articolul examinează suprapunerea discursivă dintre teoriile conspirației și populismul de limbă română, atât de dreapta, cât și de stânga, oferind o analiză interdiscursivă a exprimării identitare normative. Modul în care populismul de dreapta folosește teoriile conspirației a fost adesea evidențiat în literatura de specialitate recentă, însă relația*

dintre populismul de stânga și gândirea conspirativă în România și Republica Moldova este insuficient cercetată. Analiza mea calitativă utilizează conceptul de populism cultural pentru a aborda procesul prin care discursivitatea publică, asociată politic retoricii de auto-identificare națională, sincronizează pe termen lung cultura literară cu discursul mediatic. Acest studiu de caz indică faptul că, în culturile de limbă română, tropii teoriilor conspirației și populismului memorializează o identitate colectivă etnocentrică, subîntinsă de retorica ideologiilor politice de dreapta.

INTRODUCTION

A comparative focus¹ places Romanian populism in the context of post-communist politics,² or discursive³ and cultural practices.⁴ Yet, the emphasis on Romanian-language populism, rather than on Romanian politics, is somewhat new in that it aims to give insight into the inner workings of populism as a means of political mobilization already embedded in literary cultures. Whereas right-wing populism is known to employ conspiracy theories,⁵ the attempt to bring together varieties of media populism and conspiracism in the Romanian language, rather than

¹ Sergiu Miscoiu, *Balkan Populisms: The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania*, in "Southeastern Europe", vol. 38, 2014, no. 1, pp. 1–24; Sergiu Gherghina, Jean-Benoit Pilet, *Do Populist Parties Support Referendums? A Comparative Analysis of Election Manifestos in Europe*, in "Electoral Studies", 2021, no. 74, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102419>.

² Paul Blokker, *Constitutional Politics and Populist Conservatism: The Contrasting Cases of Poland and Romania*, in "European Politics and Society", vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1–18.

³ Ov Cristian Norocel, *Heteronormative Constructions of Romanianness: A Genealogy of Gendered Metaphors in Romanian Radical-Right Populism 2000–2009*, in "Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe", vol. 19, 2011, no. 1–2, pp. 453–70.

⁴ Radu Cinpoș, Ov Cristian Norocel, *Nostalgic Nationalism, Welfare Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties in Central and Eastern Europe*, in Ov Cristian Norocel, Anders Hellström, Martin Bak Jørgensen (Eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, IMISCOE Research Series, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020, pp. 51–65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2_4; Sorina Soare, Claudiu D. Tufis, *No Populism's Land? Religion and Gender in Romanian Politics*, in "Identities", 2021, pp. 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2021.1953784>; Maria Alina Asavei, *Radical Right Populist Entrepreneurs and the Use of Religious Representations through Popular Culture: George Becali as the 'Saviour of Romania'*, in "European Journal of Cultural Studies", vol. 25, 2022, no. 1 pp. 43–60.

⁵ Ruth Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, London, Sage, 2015, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073>.

politics per se, suggests that the left can also rely on conspiracy-related messages. Building on the argument that conspiracy thinking is often formalized in mainstream Romanian discourses on religious faith⁶ or literary culture,⁷ the longstanding erasure of the left tradition in Romania⁸ reveals the extent to which conspiracism is baked into the very nature of both right and left-wing populism in Romanian-language contexts. The attempted erasure of left-wing political traditions is a key factor in how conspiracism and populism are contextually associated more with right-wing ideologies in both Romania and the Republic of Moldova (RM). Examining the dynamics of Romanian language conspiracism and populism reveals cultural practices stretching beyond party politics. This, in turn, facilitates insights that transcend existing research on the interconnection of conspiracy theorising and populism through low political trust⁹, emotive narratives¹⁰, distrust of elites¹¹, and the use of conspiracy theories to delegitimize opponents and rally support.¹²

In the RM, the distinction between left and right-wing ideologies is obscured by debates on national self-identification and pro-EU versus pro-Kremlin policies. Romanian populism, on the other hand, is influenced by ethno-nationalist narratives and a rejection of pluralism in the appraisal of history. The linguistic heritage and historical experiences of Romania and the RM shape the dynamics between their societies. Further reinforced by the Russian war in Ukraine, a shared cultural landscape that transcends borders reveals the prevalence of the

⁶ Giuseppe Tateo, *When Conspiracy Meets Faith: Making Sense of Tragic Events in Bucharest, Romania*, in Francesco Piraino, Marco Pasi, Egil Asprem (Eds.), *Religious Dimensions of Conspiracy Theories. Comparing and Connecting Old and New Trends*, London, Routledge, 2022, <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003120940-13/conspiracy-meets-faith-giuseppe-tateo> (Accessed on 11.09.2023).

⁷ Onoriu Colăcel, *Romanian-language Conspiracy Narratives: Safeguarding the Nation and the People*, in "Journal of Romanian Studies", vol. 3, 2021, no. 2, pp. 81-110.

⁸ Anca Maria Mândru, 'Nationalism as a National Danger?' *Early Romanian Socialists and the Paradoxes of the National Question (1880-1914)*, in "Nationalities Papers", vol. 43, 2015, no. 2, p. 320.

⁹ Cengiz Erisen et al., *Psychological Correlates of Populist Attitudes*, in "Political Psychology", vol. 42, 2021, no. 1, pp. 149-71, <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12768>.

¹⁰ Thorsten Wojczewski, *Conspiracy Theories, Right-Wing Populism and Foreign Policy: The Case of the Alternative for Germany*, in "Journal of International Relations and Development", vol. 25, 2022, no. 1, pp. 130-58.

¹¹ Jeffrey Friedman, *Populists as Technocrats*, in "Critical Review", vol. 31, 2019, no. 3-4, pp. 315-76, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1788804>.

¹² Andrea LP Pirro, Paul Taggart, *Populists in Power and Conspiracy Theories*, in "Party Politics", vol. 29, 2023, no. 3, pp. 413-23.

Romanian language in both countries, underpinning a common literary tradition. However, while the Moldovan literary culture (for the most part literary, linguistic and historical studies) in the Romanian language is fundamentally derivative, it has increasingly developed distinct characteristics that reflect a standalone regional identity. The perception of a shared history is thus simultaneously reinforced and complicated by evolving Romanian and Moldovan identities that are invested in conspiracy and populist-related discourses leveraging on historical grievances. Lately, Romanian leftist voices have gained some popularity essentially by debunking conspiracy theories (CTs) pushed by right-wing populists. This is the mainstream understanding of populism in Romanian politics that “treats it as a *pathology* inherent to democratic transitions [...]. A second strategy treats populism rather as a *symptom*, that is, a marker for other democratic difficulties and complexity.”¹³ The purpose of this research is to investigate the interdiscursivity between populism and conspiracy theories in Romanian-language contexts, particularly in literary culture narratives and mainstream media. The study examines how these discourses shape representations of national identity and influence political action. The methods used involve analysing texts, news, and opinion pieces that discuss populism and CTs, as well as examining historical and literary narratives that contribute to these discourses. Additionally, the analysis considers the role of language in advancing self-awareness and agency in resisting historical neighbours and elites.

As “contemporary populisms [...] appear to be primarily focused – at least on the face of it – on questions of national sovereignty”,¹⁴ media reporting on and about national self-identification in Romanian-speaking countries is steeped in conspiratorial and populist narratives. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic waves of 2021 and early 2022, Romanian-language media discourses have essentially brought together left and right-wing populism in their use of CTs. Simultaneously, the populist rhetoric exposes the gap between the way they use conspiracy theorising against the backdrop of “a great deal of contemporary political debate [that] consists in attempts by conservatives to portray those on the Left as conspiracy theorists and efforts by those on the Left to refute the charge”.¹⁵

Populist rhetoric and conspiracy theorising intertwine to form a narrative

¹³ Michal Kopeček, Piotr Wciślik (Eds.), *Thinking Through Transition: Liberal Democracy, Authoritarian Pasts, and Intellectual History in East Central Europe After 1989*, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2015, p. 263.

¹⁴ Marie Moran, Jo Littler, *Cultural Populism in New Populist Times*, in “European Journal of Cultural Studies”, vol. 23, 2020, no. 6, p. 863.

¹⁵ David Coady, *Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate*, London, Routledge, 2019, p. 5.

logic manifest across many historical accounts, literary works, and media representations of Romanian distinctiveness. At its core, populism paints a stark conflict between the will of the Romanian people and a conspiring elite.

ROMANIAN-LANGUAGE CONSPIRACISM AND POPULISM: ACTORS AND MOVEMENTS

The ideational approach to populism¹⁶ shows that there is “a common, minimal core [of populism], seeing it as a political discourse that posits a cosmic struggle between a reified ‘will of the people’ and a conspiring elite. Populism [...] exists as part of a larger typology of discursive frameworks, including pluralism (in which people reject a Manichaeian outlook and see the good in their political opponents) and elitism (which inverts populism’s outlook by celebrating the virtues of the elite and the fallibility of the masses)”.¹⁷ As a “thin centred ideology”¹⁸, populism comes across through immediate political action and speech. Yet, key concepts can be used to analyse Romanian-language populism beyond actual party-political practice and more along the lines of cultures as identity structures.¹⁹ From a discursive perspective, they entail identity-making processes through the “appropriation of text-external generic resources across professional genres and professional practices”.²⁰ The Romanian language is invested with the power to safeguard not only identity but also political action. Essentially, it proposes that Romanian is “more than merely a bearer or vehicle: [...] the embodiment or substance of values, itself a form of symbolic meaning stand-

¹⁶ Cas Mudde, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda*, “Comparative Political Studies”, vol. 51, 2018, no. 13, pp. 1667–93; Kirk A. Hawkins, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*, New York, Routledge, 2018.

¹⁷ Kirk A. Hawkins, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *The Ideational Approach to Populism*, in “Latin American Research Review”, vol. 52, 2017, no. 4, p. 514.

¹⁸ Cas Mudde, *The Populist Zeitgeist*, in “Government and Opposition”, vol. 39, 2004, no. 4, p. 543.

¹⁹ Fritjof Capra, Pier Luigi Luisi, *The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Vision*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511895555>.

²⁰ Vijay K. Bhatia, *Interdiscursivity in Professional Communication*, in “Discourse & Communication”, vol. 4, 2010, no. 1, pp. 32–50, p. 35.

ing for all manner of desires, associations, beliefs, conscious and unconscious".²¹ Ultimately, the Romanian language itself is deemed a people's accomplishment that signals evidence of self-awareness and agency. Language is supposed to advance their will to resist historical neighbours and (foreign) elites.²² Against this backdrop, conspiracy theorising is very much bound up in narratives of identity that hinge on betrayal and fighting off enemies. Consequently, notions of agents and movements can delineate an influential storyline that blends the rhetoric of conspiracism and populism.

The conspiratorial dimension of populism is enhanced by the focus on driving forces and individuals taking active steps to frame the narrative representation of one's (and other's) community in history, literature, and media. Bourdieu's concept of habitus defines agency as decision-making and action-taking that arise from "schemes enabling agents to generate an infinity of practices adapted to endlessly changing situations".²³ The outcomes suggest "larger dynamics whereby shared narratives are produced and reproduced [...] touch[ing] on fundamental issues regarding collective identity".²⁴ In Romanian-language contexts, they function as movements bringing together several driving forces across borders and narrative media. These circumstances classify competing actors either into manipulative (self-aware and self-serving) or unquestioning (naïve and eager) agents of Romanian-language populism that push CTs to help audiences make sense of the world they live in. The many grey zones between the two of them are easy to spot against the historical legacies of early nation-building that span modern Romanian history. Most of them come across as smoking guns of populist rhetoric underpinned by conspiracy theorising on and about the nation. The cultural studies perspective on identity-making addresses the (attempted) erasure of mainstream left-wing rhetoric in Romanian-language contexts. Left-wing populism often positions itself as a debunker of conspiracy theories, attempting to revive forgotten leftist traditions while emphasizing anti-capitalist sentiments and social justice issues. It promotes concepts of equality and welfare, centring its discourse on social and economic justice concerns. In

²¹ Patrick Joyce, *Dialect and the Making of Social Identity*, in Patrick Joyce, *Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class, c. 1848–1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 279.

²² Onoriu Colăcel, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

²³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 16.

²⁴ Ann Rigney, *Literature and Cultural Memory*, in Ann Rigney, Kiene Brillenburg Wurth (Eds.), *Life of Texts: An Introduction to Literary Studies*, Amsterdam University Press, 2019, p. 382, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048551903.012>.

contrast, right-wing populism more frequently employs conspiracy theories, presenting a narrow, nationalist interpretation of history. It tends to be exclusionary and anti-pluralist, placing less emphasis on civic equality and welfare. Instead, right-wing populist rhetoric in Romania emphasizes nationalist themes, often incorporating religious elements and conspiratorial narratives. While both forms of populism share a critique of existing power structures, their approaches and core themes differ significantly. Left-wing populism generally adopts a more inclusive stance, advocating for broad social and economic reforms, whereas right-wing populism promotes a more exclusive vision of national identity, frequently intertwining this with conspiracy theories and traditional religious values. This is manifest in news and opinion pieces calling for populism on the left while debunking right-wing populism. The study sample is restricted to notions of correspondence between populist politics and conspiracy thinking in literary culture narratives (i.e., history and literature) and mainstream media. The primary sources were selected because they fulfil two criteria: importance and directness. The scope of sources used in this study may be inherently limited due to the constraints imposed by the academic journal format. The (perceived) prominence of primary sources was critical in assembling the corpus. Chosen sources inevitably reflect the selection process that, in turn, impacts findings and conclusions, ultimately influencing the analysis. This limitation also points to opportunities for future research to explore additional perspectives, particularly those outside the mainstream discourses of literary culture and popular media. Against a conspiracist background, “political strategies [that] interrelate populist rhetoric with memory issues”²⁵ are foundational for identity maintenance in the mainstream of Romanian life.

CONSPIRACIST AND POPULIST INTERDISCURSIVITY IN LITERARY CULTURE NARRATIVES

Literary culture is “a historically situated practice [revealing] how people have done things with texts”.²⁶ Narrative structures of historical and fictional writing become helpful when exploring notions of populist and conspiratorial rhetoric “by drawing on an understanding of narrative theory and narrative fic-

²⁵ Ionut Valentin Chiruta, *Using the Past in Populist Communicational Strategies: How the Memory of Securitate Is Instrumentalised in Romanian Politics?*, in “Populism”, vol. 3, 2020, no. 2, p. 223, <https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-BJA10013>.

²⁶ Sheldon Pollock, *Literary Cultures in History: Reconstructions from South Asia*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003, p. 18.

tion in its historical and cultural context".²⁷ Ultimately, references to conspiracy-related and populist rhetoric are "coherent narratives that shape people's representations of history"²⁸. The interaction between such discursive practices is *interdiscursive*, to be found across various literary genres and media. They help reveal notions of authority, ulterior motives, and grand conflicts, which are commonly presented in influential instances of Romanian literary culture. Together, they paint a narrative landscape populated by essentially benevolent colonizers (for instance at the time of the Roman conquest of the Dacian kingdom) and clandestine organizations (like the freemasonry that facilitated the birth of the Romanian national state), not to mention malevolent close and distant historical neighbours (nearly all). Such culture-specific meanings enable the average Romanian with a public-school education to interpret or construct interdiscursive relationships, to reflect broader meaning-making practices that outline public understandings of being Romanian by leaning towards conspiracy theorising and/or populist conceptualizations of the past. Both are based on and reinterpret concepts akin to notions of scandal, moral outrage, anxiety, and scapegoating. Conspiracy narratives in Romanian-language media and cultures are in a dialectic relation with populist statements pertaining to Romanian distinctiveness.

Narratives of betrayal and enemy-fighting illustrate how populism and conspiracy theories intertwine, depicting an ages-old conflict between the people and a malevolent foreign elite. Interdiscursive markers outline mainstream public discourses, where conspiracy theorising and populist rhetoric intersect to achieve political mobilization, not limited to right-wing populism, but also manifest in left-wing politics as a reaction to and attempt to debunk the claims of the right. Both populist discourses draw on conspiracy theories, presenting the nation as under threat from plotting enemies, be they internal or external. Ultimately, recurring linguistic, rhetorical, or narrative elements serve as interdiscursive markers of conspiracy and populist-related significance. They are sense-making devices, enabling the construction and interpretation of complex socio-political realities through familiar narrative lenses. Such interdiscursivity is conducive to the conspiratorial sense of being that is captured by the rhetoric of national self-identification. The master narrative of the nation is

²⁷ Katharina Rennhak, *Learning from Best Practice. Reality, Truth, and the Novel as a Vehicle of the 'Liberal Narrative'*, in Antonius Weixler, Matei Chihaiia, Matías Martínez et al. (Eds.), *Postfaktisches Erzählen?: Post-Truth – Fake News – Narration*, Berlin – Boston, De Gruyter, 2021, p. 217. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110693065-012>.

²⁸ Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Karen M. Douglas, *Conspiracy Theories as Part of History: The Role of Societal Crisis Situations*, in "Memory Studies", vol. 10, 2017, no. 3, p. 323.

passed on in Romanian public schools as the study of history and language is deemed foundational for identity maintenance in 21st-century Romania. For instance, holding nationwide competitions in other disciplines (while History and Romanian language “school Olympiads” were cancelled in 2022) is deemed proof of “an anti-Romanian conspiracy planned by the government to force the youth into forgetting their national roots”.²⁹ Meant to back up key claims of distinctiveness for nation-building purposes, “primers came to contribute to the construction of national cultural identity”.³⁰ Literature and history textbooks foster national identity through conspiracy narratives, advancing national interests. However, Romanian schoolbooks fail to recognise their own use of conspiratorial rhetoric in constructing national self-images. This other instance of erasure conceals the use such meanings have in interdiscursive overlapping that frames ideas of nationhood as “different discourses ‘within’ a particular heterogeneous product”,³¹ often within literary culture narratives.

HISTORY

“Two centuries of Romanian populism”³² show that the rejection of pluralism has often accompanied modern state and culture building. As far as public opinion is concerned, the kind of nationalism traditionally promoted by Romanian history is univocal in its appraisal of the past. This reading of history is believed to be prevalent in public schools: “most Romanian historians are partial to the nationalist ideology”³³. The sequence of events leading to the current state of affairs is long. Recently, it ties with “the fall of communism [which] was followed

²⁹ “alarme de conspirație antiromânească: guvernul vrea să ne deznaționalizeze forțat tineretul”. Alexandrescu Raluca, *Școală, Naționalism, Isterie Și Niciun Vaccin* [School, Nationalism, Hysteria, and No Vaccine], in “Revista 22”. January 11, 2022, <https://revista22.ro/opinii/raluca-alexandrescu/scoala-nationalism-isterie-si-niciun-vaccin>.

All Romanian-language texts are translated by the author.

³⁰ Wendelin Sroka, Simona Szakacs-Behling, *Introduction: Reading Primers and Political Change in European Countries around 1945*, in “Journal of Educational Media, Memory, and Society”, vol. 11, 2019, no. 1, p. 6.

³¹ Martin Reisigl, Ruth Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Anti-semitism*, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 37.

³² Robert Adam, *Două veacuri de populism românesc* [Two centuries of Romanian Populism], București, Humanitas, 2018.

³³ Sabina Fati, “AUR: dosarul penal ca hârtie de turnesol pentru viitorul României” [AUR: the criminal case as a litmus test for Romania’s future], DW.COM, <https://www.dw.com/ro/aur-dosarul-penal-ca-h%C3%A2rtie-de-turnesol-pentru-viitorul-rom%C3%A2niei/a-60395769> (Accessed on 02.01.2023).

by a rebirth of ethno nationalism".³⁴ Simultaneously, "Western media began to realize that the revolution 'was not really a revolution' (the popular uprising being hijacked by communist decision makers)".³⁵ The challenges of recent history are plain to see in the concern with textbooks now in use across Romanian public schools. The misgivings of the past are central to media debates over the future of the country: "the [1989] Romanian Revolution is either briefly treated or entirely overlooked in history textbooks [...]. The reason has to do with historical controversy".³⁶ While countering the plots of historical neighbours in order to observe, allegedly, the will of the Romanian people only, the local elites are portrayed as totally in tune with national aspirations. The history taught in public schools draws heavily on conceptual frames that promote a teleological purpose. Despite being less innovative than expected³⁷, the post-communist historiography increasingly contests the validity of this unidimensional framing of national identity.³⁸ Basically, it is embracing a more incidental perspective on history.³⁹ Con-

³⁴ Petre Breazu, Göran Eriksson, *Romaphobia in Romanian Press: The Lifting of Work Restrictions for Romanian Migrants in the European Union*, in "Discourse & Communication", vol. 15, 2021, no. 2, p. 141.

³⁵ "mass-media occidentale au început să-și dea seama că revoluția «nu era chiar o revoluție» (peste manifestarea spontană a populației suprapunându-se o suită de acțiuni de cucerire a puterii de către linia a doua a Partidului Comunist)". Anișoara Budici et al., *Istorie: Manual pentru clasa a XI-a* [History: Manual for 11th Grade], București, Sigma, 2006, p. 24.

³⁶ "subiectul Revoluției române este tratat pe scurt sau deloc în manualele de Istorie din România, [...]. Motivul? Controversele istorice legate încă de eveniment". See *Ce învață copiii la ora de istorie despre Revoluția din 1989: În 9 manuale de clasa a IV-a există maximum două paragrafe dedicate subiectului – Analiză Europa Liberă* [What Children Learn in History Class about the 1989 Revolution: In 9th grade textbooks, there are at most two paragraphs dedicated to the subject - Analysis by Europa Liberă], <https://www.g4media.ro/ceata-copiii-la-ora-de-istorie-despre-revolutia-din-1989-in-9-manuale-de-clasa-a-iv-a-exista-maximum-doua-paragrafe-dedicate-subiectului-analiza-europa-libera.html> (Accessed on 09.06.2023).

³⁷ Cristina Petrescu, Dragos Petrescu, *Mastering vs. Coming to Terms with the Past: A Critical Analysis of Post-Communist Romanian Historiography*, in B. Trencsényi, P. Apor, Sorin Antohi (Eds.), *Narratives Unbound: Historical Studies in Post-Communist Eastern Europe*, pp. 311–408, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2007.

³⁸ Răzvan Pârâianu, *National Prejudices, Mass Media and History Textbooks: The Mitu Controversy*, in B. Trencsényi, D. Petrescu, C. Petrescu, C. Iordachi (Eds.), *Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*, Budapest, Regio Books, 2001, pp. 93–117.

³⁹ Anamaria Dutceac Segesten, *Myth, Identity, and Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Romanian and Serbian Textbooks*, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2011.

spiracy theorising and the rhetoric of (right-wing) populism account for influential patterns of national remembrance that read history “in a mythological key with regard to Romanian language, origins and ancestry, continuity over the territory, and Christian Orthodox tradition”.⁴⁰ On the other hand, there is a so-called “European perspective on the past [that] becomes dependent on denying some of the tenets of classic historiography, which have already seeped into the popular culture”.⁴¹ The latter is at odds with the customary profiling of iconic historical figures (ancient kings, medieval princes and the German-born kings of modern Romania) in textbooks. Such heroes of the nation are portrayed in sweeping statements: “The Romanian political elite was working towards improving the political and social climate⁴²; the Romanian authorities were interested in overcoming the consequences of the war, in building a renewed sense of national unity and in resuming development across the country”.⁴³

Secret societies that sought to mobilize the people already had a history in both Wallachia and Moldova: members of the Wallachian elite conceivably pursued “conspiratorial purpose[s] involving links to Italian secret societies”,⁴⁴ while advocating for social critique on behalf of the lower classes. Most of the revolutionaries of 1848 are known for being “progressive boyar conspirators”.⁴⁵ Ultimately, “the fate of the Romanian people was tied to their ability to be skilled conspirators; the ultimate proof of success is pulling off the conspiracy that

⁴⁰ Radu Cinpoș, Ov Cristian Norocel, *Nostalgic Nationalism, Welfare Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties in Central and Eastern Europe*, in Ov Cristian Norocel, Anders Hellström, Martin Bak Jørgensen (Eds.), *Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe*, Cham, Springer International Publishing, 2020, p. 59, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2_4.

⁴¹ Onoriu Colăcel, *A Bandwagon Effect Following the Lead of ‘New’ History in Romanian Textbooks*, in János M. Bak, Robert Maier (eds.), *Mutual Images – Textbook Representations of Historical Neighbours in the East of Europe*, Eckert. Dossiers 10, 2017, p. 66.

⁴² “Elita politică românească era preocupată de îmbunătățirea sistemului politic și progresul societății”. See Magda Stan et al., *Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a XI-a* [History: Manual for 11th Grade], București, Editura Niculescu ABC, 2006, p. 11.

⁴³ “Autoritățile românești erau interesate în lichidarea urmărilor războiului, în consolidarea unității naționale și în reluarea dezvoltării normale”. See Ioan Ciupercă et al., *Istorie: manual pentru clasa a XI-a* [History: Manual for 11th Grade], Corint, 2014, p. 35.

⁴⁴ Wendy Bracewell, Alex Drace-Francis, *Balkan Departures: Travel Writing from South-eastern Europe*, Berghahn Books, 2009, p. 53.

⁴⁵ Andrei Dan Sorescu, *National History as a History of Compacts: Jus Publicum Europaeum and Suzerainty in Romania in the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, in “East Central Europe”, vol. 45, 2018, no. 1, p. 84, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18763308-04501004>.

made possible the union of the Romanian principalities in 1859”.⁴⁶ Alexandru Ioan Cuza, the first prince of Romania (1859-1866), is often presented both as a likely populist responsible⁴⁷ for a coup d’état against the Parliament in 1864 – and the victim of a conspiracy that finally deposed him from the throne. He effectively clashed with the landed gentry on behalf of the people. In response, the former successfully conspired to replace him with the first German-born king of Romania, Carol I, although “Cuza [...] undertook economic and social reforms [...] more than 460000 peasant families gained land rights and personal freedom”.⁴⁸ The political agency of Cuza stems from progressive social policies that can be construed as left-wing.

The interwar period showed that the same issues, “agrarianism and rural transformation in Romania (1918-1947)”⁴⁹, continued to shape political debates. Conforming to the will of the people meant empowering farm labourers. This has always been an emancipatory movement that connected with populist politics: “The Romanian agrarian movement was preceded and influenced by populist ideas [...]. The first [...] was of a literary character—Sămănătorism (from sămănător, or sower)—at the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decade of the twentieth century.”⁵⁰

The national communism of socialist Romania is possibly the best-known example of stifling the voice of left-wing populism in the name of (ethno)nationalism: “Ceașescu introduced major modifications into Marxist-Leninist theorising about the Nation under socialism and the possible place of national values within Romanian socialist society”.⁵¹ Even though Ceașescu refrained from appealing to the people (as much as to the nation) and pointing fingers at corrupt elites, his national communism reflected interwar right-wing populism. He used

⁴⁶ Onoriu Colăcel, *Romanian-language Conspiracy Narratives...*, p. 108.

⁴⁷ Robert Adam, *Doua Veacuri de Populism Romanesc...*

⁴⁸ “Cuza [...] a inițiat reformele economice și sociale [...] erau împroprietărite peste 460000 de familii de țărani”. Brezeanu Stelian et al., *Istoria României* [The History of Romania]. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a [Manual for 12th Grade], București, Rao Educațional, 1999, p. 83.

⁴⁹ Daniel Charles Brett, *Peasants and Politics: Agrarianism and Rural Transformation in Romania 1918–1947*. (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University College London, 2014).

⁵⁰ Roumen Daskalov, *Agrarian Ideologies and Peasant Movements in the Balkans*, in Roumen Daskalov and Diana Mishkova (Eds.), *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, Vol. Two, *Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions*, Leiden, Brill, 2014, p. 308.

⁵¹ Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, p. 118.

populist and conspiratorial rhetoric to portray Romanians as historical victims before the communist takeover of Romania.

The overlap between left and right politics is plain to see in post-communist populism, which, essentially, reveals, “the shared identity representation [of the nation] once Al. I. Cuza set in motion educational reforms that entailed [...] teaching Romanian language and history in public schools”.⁵² With the Orthodox Church in the background, language as proof of identity is placed in various contexts: “numerous archaeological artefacts, the many Dacian martyrs as well as the Christian terminology of the Romanian language, all prove that the church life of the Romanian people has always been developed”.⁵³ By instrumentalizing CTs within a frame of reference that favours nativism, ethnic identity is positioned against Slavic and Finno-Ugric neighbours “the continuously expansionist tendency of their neighbours meant that the Romanian principalities had to resort to both effective diplomacy and bold military manoeuvres”.⁵⁴ The framing of 20th-century events commonly suggests the conspiratorial skills of decision-makers who furthered the Romanian cause. At the same time, it makes sure to pathologize conspiracy thinking. For example, in “a world full of anti-Romanian conspiracies”,⁵⁵ Romanian pupils are asked by history textbooks to answer such questions: “How come it is often more convenient to cry ‘conspiracy theory’ rather than admit your own mistakes?”⁵⁶ Ultimately, conspiracy theorising is deemed both detrimental and beneficial to Romanian nation-building processes.

⁵² “reprezentărilor identitare comune, [...] predarea limbii române și a istoriei naționale în școlile organizate odată cu reformele inițiate de Al. I. Cuza”. See Zoe Petre et al., *Istorie: ma-nual pentru clasa a XII-a* [History: Manual for 12th Grade], București, Corint, 2008, p. 9.

⁵³ “Dovezile arheologice numeroase, marele număr al martirilor dacoromani, precum și terminologia creștină din limba română probează existența unei vieți bisericești dezvoltate”. Alexandru Barnea et al., *Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a XI-a* [History. Manual for 11th Grade], București, Corint Educațional, 2014, p. 122.

⁵⁴ “Tendințele expansioniste manifestate de vecinii Țărilor Române s-au manifestat permanent, ceea ce a determinat o diplomatie eficientă îmbinată cu o luptă îndrăznească din partea conducătorilor acestora.” Maria Mariana Gheorghe et al., *Istorie: manual pentru clasa a VIII-a* [History: Manual for 8th Grade], București, Litera, 2020, p. 57.

⁵⁵ Tom Gallagher, *Modern Romania: The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the Theft of a Nation*, New York, NYU Press, 2008, p. 275.

⁵⁶ “Explicați cum se face că în multe împrejurări ale vieții este mai la îndemână să denunțăm «teoria conspirației» decât să ne recunoaștem propriile erori.” Alexandru Barnea et al., *Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a XI-a...*, p. 99.

LITERATURE

If history textbooks provide plenty of insight into conspiratorial settings and agents, literature has often dramatized such concerns. Although literary historians seldom engage head-on with the topic of conspiracy narratives, notions of “literary form and conspiracy culture”⁵⁷ are inescapably linked with both genre and national questions. They underlie the use that Romanian-language populists make of the conspiratorial rhetoric. Together with the genre of “spy novels in which lies issued by the state are dramatized”,⁵⁸ the conspiratorial stance of authors and narrative voices in other literary plots (i.e., historical novels) is unmistakable. Post-communism even brought about “a revival of celebrated myths (the evil conspiracy, the besieged fortress, the saviour), rather successfully used by Nicolae Ceaușescu as well”.⁵⁹ However, “Romanian fictions tend to propose high conspiracies”,⁶⁰ which are significantly different from the explicit historical underpinnings of the mainstream conspiratorial rhetoric. Even more than other literary discourses, the use value of Romanian national epics points to the way populists instrumentalize conspiracy theorising. “In contrast with the works of literature which are static, stable, closed entities, conspiracy theories can be conceived of [...] as latent invariants producing an open series of manifest variants in different genres and media”.⁶¹ This is the case with *The Ewe Lamb* (Mioritza), the Romanian folk ballad par excellence: the story of a conspiracy to kill an innocent shepherd. “Ballads like Mioritza (“The Ewe Lamb”) and Meșterul Manole (“Manole the Master Builder”), which in fact treat universal folk themes and motifs, have always been touchstones in debates over a Romanian identity, interpreted in the light of Romantic theories of passivity and pastoralism, or, respectively, creativity and sacrifice.”⁶² *The Ewe Lamb* can be read as one of the original conspir-

⁵⁷ Ben Carver et al., *Plots: Literary Form and Conspiracy Culture*, London, Routledge, 2021.

⁵⁸ Luc Boltanski, *Mysteries and Conspiracies: Detective Stories, Spy Novels and the Making of Modern Societies*, Hoboken, John Wiley & Sons, 2014, p. 21.

⁵⁹ Eugen Negrici, *Iluziile literaturii române* [The Illusions of Romanian Literature], București, Cartea Românească, 2016, p. 7.

⁶⁰ Mihai Iovănel, *Teorii ale conspirației în literatura română postcomunistă* [Conspiracy Theories in Post-Communist Romanian Literature], in “Transilvania”, 2015, vol. 8, p. 63.

⁶¹ Todor Hristov, *Introduction*, in Ben Carver, Dana Craciun, Todor Hristov (Eds.), *Plots: Literary Form and Conspiracy Culture*, London, Routledge, 2021, p. 13.

⁶² Alex Drace-Francis, *Alecsandri, Vasile 1818-1890. Romanian poet, dramatist, folklorist, and politician*, in Christopher J. Murray (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Romantic Era, 1760–1850*, London, Routledge, 2013, p. 9.

acy narratives of Romanian language cultures as it spans across Romania and the present-day RM. Its many afterlives in Romanian-language cultures suggest it can reveal conspiracy theorising patterns in both countries.

The one that brought *The Ewe Lamb* to the Romanian reading public was Vasile Alecsandri (1818-1890), the national-minded Moldovan nobleman, whose Romantic writings can be linked with notions of “gender and populism in Romantic fiction [...] as the early exponents of what would later become systematized in the form of crowd psychology”.⁶³ The very currency of the folk ballad across the cultural spectrum of Romanian-speaking communities comes to prove once again that *The Ewe Lamb* functions as a latent invariant, resulting in countless media variants with “an extraordinary impact [...] on the Romanian psyche”.⁶⁴ The very importance attached to *The Ewe Lamb* is nearly conspiratorial. Explicitly, the willingness of the Moldovan victim to play along with the Wallachian and Transylvanian shepherds’ plot has prompted some to cry internalized racism and self-stereotyping: “tying a central piece of Romanian literary culture to some inherently negative traits (cowardice and laziness) does not travel far from racism”.⁶⁵

ACROSS BORDERS: ROMANIAN-LANGUAGE CONSPIRACISM

The empirical exploration of conspiracy theorising in mainstream media suggests that such narratives work together with conspiratorial tropes and trends in Romanian literary culture. Their cultural currency helps conspiratorial discourses cross the border into populist politics by lumping together anti-elitist and conspiratorial themes.⁶⁶ Ultimately, this shows the gap between right- and left-wing populism, with pandemic-related CTs in the background. The conceptual distinction between CTs and their use value in populist rhetoric ties in with

⁶³ James Patrick Carson, *Populism, Gender, and Sympathy in the Romantic Novel*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 17.

⁶⁴ Nicolae Babuts, ‘Miorița’: A Romanian Ballad in a Homeric Perspective, in “Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures”, vol. 54, 2000, no. 1, p. 3.

⁶⁵ Radu Silaghi-Dumitrescu, *Fatalism and Inaction Associations with the Romanian Ballad of the Little Ewe*, in “Venets: The Belogradchik Journal for Local History, Cultural Heritage and Folk Studies”, vol. 7, 2016, no. 3, p. 336, <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3091495>.

Mihnea Simion Stoica, *Populist Political Advertising in Times of Pandemic: Framing Elites as Anti-Religious*, in “Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies”, vol. 20, 2021, no. 60, pp. 115–27. □

known “differences between supposed ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ forms of populism [...], with the former preoccupied with plutocratic elites who are understood to have engineered extreme forms of social inequality in their favour, and the latter by ‘liberal’ and ‘expert’ elites who are positioned as undermining the prosperity of the national people through pro-migrant and other anti-nationalist policies”.⁶⁷

Left-wing populist rhetoric in both Romanian-speaking countries pertains to emancipatory projects commonly interwoven with nation-building processes carried out by Bucharest (in both Romania and the RM) and the Kremlin (in the RM). With national communist or Soviet nostalgia in the background, the notions of anti-capitalism, social justice and pacifism are known to local audiences as cornerstones of political populism with a left-wing agenda. To some extent, local left-wing populism aims to incorporate tropes of the right wing, mostly anti-corruption.⁶⁸ Conspiratorial ideas spoken in Romanian are at home in the so-called “two Moldovas, animated by divergent pro-West and pro-Russia fundamental options”.⁶⁹ They shape most populist ideas, with the left-right political divide mirroring popular (mis)conceptions about the clash between East and West. “Nationalist populism seems to be weakly developed”⁷⁰ and the defeat in the last elections of the former president Igor Dodon, “a Trumpian populist”,⁷¹ suggests that Moldovan voters are not keen on supporting populist, pro-Kremlin, politicians (any more). Most Moldovan political parties resort to populist rhetoric to mobilise support.⁷² Romanian language populism brings a twist to classic distinctions between political ideologies, with disinformation and propaganda in the background. Much like Ukrainian CTs, the framework of Moldovan conspiracy ideation in the media “draw[s] on inherited Soviet political culture and political technology imported

⁶⁷ Marie Moran, Jo Littler, *Cultural Populism in New Populist Times...* p. 864.

⁶⁸ Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, *Romania’s Italian-Style Anticorruption Populism*, in “Journal of Democracy”, 2018, no. 29(3), pp. 104–16. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0048>.

⁶⁹ Valentin Naumescu, *The ‘New Eastern Europe’: Between the Deepening Crisis of the European Union and the Growing Tensions with Russia*, in “Romanian Journal of Society and Politics”, vol. 11, 2016, no. 2, p. 86.

⁷⁰ Denis Cenuşa et al., *Right-wing populism in Associated countries: A Challenge for Democracy*, in “Policy Paper”, 2021, no. 24, Georgian Institute of Politics, p. 5.

⁷¹ Borzou Daragahi, *Defeat for ‘Trumpian’ Populist as Moldova Leader Loses Election*, in “The Independent”, November 16, 2020, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/moldova-election-result-trump-maia-sandu-b1723657.html>.

⁷² Kamil Całus, *The Unfinished State. 25 Years of Independent Moldova*, in “OSW Centre for Eastern Studies”, December 14, 2016, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2016-12-14/unfinished-state-25-years-independent-moldova>.

from Russia".⁷³ Conversely, the Romanian media (and literary culture) and English-language news are a counterpart to Russian influence.

Historically, the division between left and right on the political spectrum in the RM is very muddy. It has never actually worked throughout the 30 years of Moldovan independence. Instead, questions of national self-identification and geopolitical rivalries have shaped the political landscape, with heated debates on language and ethnic identity at the forefront of public consciousness. Broadly speaking, right-wing ideologies are associated with pro-EU parties that often advocate the re-union with Romania, while the left argues for pro-Kremlin policies and the place of the RM in the Russian World (Russkiy Mir). The Romanian-language culture of the RM has a complex dynamic with its origin point, Romanian culture. While fundamentally rooted in Romanian traditions, it has increasingly developed distinct regional characteristics that reflect a Moldovan identity and has created a nuanced interdiscursivity between Moldovan and Romanian contexts as well. However, analysing Romanian language Moldovan primary sources in isolation from the broader Romanian context is problematic.

Romanian populism itself has been consistently perceived as deficient in relation to other Western or Eastern European varieties. As a matter of fact, it used to be branded as populism "without teeth".⁷⁴ There is consensus that the newcomer in Romanian mainstream politics, the right-wing Populist Party, the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), gained their seats in the Romanian parliament because of online political marketing, while the Romanian social democrats, often labelled populists and a self-proclaimed left-wing party, have long made use of it.⁷⁵ Among the forerunners of Romanian-language populism with a focus on left-wing ideologies, two refugees from the Tsarist Empire⁷⁶ – from the present-day RM, Constantin Stere (1865-1936), and Ukraine, Constantin Dobrogeanu Gherea (1855-1920) – rank prominently. Stere, who coined the name 'poporanism' (likely having in mind the Russian counterpart 'narodnik') was "one of the

⁷³ Taras Kuzio, *Soviet Conspiracy Theories and Political Culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions*, in "Communist and Post-Communist Studies", vol. 44, 2011, no. 3, p. 221, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.07.006>.

⁷⁴ Nicoleta Corbu et al., *Romania: Populist Ideology Without Teeth*, in Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann et al. (Eds.), *Populist Political Communication in Europe*, London, Routledge, 2017, pp. 326-338.

⁷⁵ Marius Grad, Claudiu Marian, *Explaining Change: The Online Political Marketing of the Romanian Social Democrats*, in "European Review", vol. 28, 2020, no. 5, pp. 778-92, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S106279872000023X>.

⁷⁶ Ghița Ionescu, *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, London, Macmillan, 1969, p. 101.

first theoreticians of agrarian populism that took by storm eastern and central Europe in the interwar".⁷⁷ Although familiar to most Romanians, 'poporanism', much like the Russian "narodnichestvo", and 'sămănătorism' is increasingly equated with the beginnings of left-wing populism in the Romanian language.⁷⁸ Both of them are a case in point of the political and aesthetic sense that the representation of the lower classes has always had in Romanian culture. Stere and Dobrogeanu Gherea come across as a tried standard for left-wing popular and nationalist fervour. Their lack of interest (to say the least) in conservative institutions (such as the Orthodox Church) and, importantly, their focus on literary aesthetics meant that left-wing populism was essentially marginalized to begin with. Often, the Romanian mainstream media paints the picture of real and imaginary plots essentially unfavourable to the political left, which is commonly associated with the pejoratively connoted term of 'communism': "the anti-communist propaganda over the last decades [...] attempts to portray the communists as fanatics of class struggle".⁷⁹

On the one hand, the right-wing variants of exclusionary populism are being pushed mostly by political actors. On the other hand, certain experts and journalists assign responsibility to and blame the political/economic elites for social violence against the people in ways that can be construed as inclusionary left-wing populism. The populist rhetoric essentially juxtaposes itself to host-ideologies⁸⁰ that should add to the popular appeal of political parties. In the mainstream of Romanian and Moldovan politics, "populists [...] are also necessarily anti-pluralist".⁸¹ "The vilifying of the left"⁸² resulted in rebuffs from left-leaning journalists. They argue for a more welfare-oriented state and state interventionism. Ques-

⁷⁷ Robert Adam, *Doua Veacuri de Populism ...* p. 64.

⁷⁸ Ghița Ionescu, *Populism: Its Meaning ...* p. 100.

⁷⁹ Ion Cristoiu, *Comuniștii erau și ei niște politicieni. Dovada: Nu-și țineau făgăduielile!* [The Communists Were Also Politicians. Proof: They Didn't Keep Their Promises!], in "Mediafax.ro", <https://www.mediafax.ro/editorialistii/ion-cristoiu-comunistii-erai-si-ei-niste-politicieni-dovada-nu-si-tineau-fagaduielile-20437693>. (Accessed 29 Sept. 2023).

⁸⁰ Kirk A. Hawkins, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can't*, in "Swiss Political Science Review", vol. 23, 2017, no. 4, pp. 526–42, <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12281>.

⁸¹ Jan-Werner Müller, *What Is Populism?*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, p. 85.

⁸² Costi Rogozanu, *Altfel despre AUR. Sau ce se întâmplă când explodează facturile, demonizezi ani în șir stânga și presari niște BOR tip vechi* [Different Perspectives on AUR. Or What Happens When Bills Explode, You Demonize Left for Years, and Sprinkle Some Old-Type Church], in "Libertatea", 8 februarie 2022, <https://www.libertatea.ro/opinii/altfel-despre-aur-sau-ce-se-intampla-cand-explodeaza-facturile-demonizezi-ani-in-sir-stanga-si-presari-niste-bor-de-tip-vechi-3965589>.

tions like “Why are the liberal left intellectuals trading on barefaced lies?”⁸³ generate responses showing the nationalist undertones of Romanian-language leftism, which regards the well-being of the nation as central to the welfare of individuals and social classes. Among the above-mentioned intellectuals, Costi Rogozanu, Vasile Ernu, Dragoș Pătraru or Mihai Radu are the most prominent voices that argue for progressive policies. Their media populism based on left-wing ideologies can be construed as “civic populism”⁸⁴, i.e., “the combination of the populist impetus of expanding representation (through the appeal to ‘the people’ against the elites) and higher participation of the left’s tradition to promote equality and social justice”.⁸⁵

The many strands of left-wing ideologies within the complexity of media discourses show the very weaknesses of the Romanian left as it struggles with the legacy of the past (mostly, Ceaușescu’s national communism). However, notions of people’s mobilization, solidarity, welfare, and inclusiveness are their main concerns. Most of the progressive left activists often engage with the so-called conspiracies of the Romanian political elites, who either self-identify as (centre-) right politicians or share the kind of anti-globalist opinions peculiar to far-right nationalists. Furthermore, the social democrats have repeatedly been labelled the “liberal-conservative left”⁸⁶ of Romania, a far cry from the socialist credentials they insistently claim for themselves by constantly failing to “tax big business”.⁸⁷ Pre-empting criticism of their historical background is of great concern to left-wing politicians as the denial of the left tradition has come with the

⁸³ Petre M. Iancu, *Iarna dictatorilor și tăcerea intelectualilor de stânga* [Winter of the Dictators and the Silence of the Left-Wing Intellectuals], in “Adevărul”, 21 februarie 2022, <https://adevarul/blogurile-adevarul/iarna-dictatorilor-si-tacerea-intelectualilor-de-2151050.html>.

⁸⁴ Sorin Ionița, *În numele poporului. Scurtă analiză a populismului, ieri și azi* [In the Name of the People. A Brief Analysis of Populism, Past and Present], in Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (ed.), *Doctrine politice: Concepte universale și realități românești* [Political Doctrines: Universal Concepts and Romanian Realities], Iași, Polirom, 1998, p. 206.

⁸⁵ Óscar García Agustín, *Left-Wing Populism: The Politics of the People*, Bingley, Emerald Group Publishing, 2020, p. 10.

⁸⁶ Alexis Vannier, *In Romania, the Liberal-Conservative Right Unseats the Liberal-Conservative Left*, in “The New Federalist”, 2020, <https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/in-romania-the-liberal-conservative-right-unseats-the-liberal-conservative> (Accessed on 07.09.2023).

⁸⁷ Radu Mihai, *Flacăra speranței și-un pipi-n grup* [The Flame of Hope and Urinating Together], in “Cațavencii.ro”, February 9, 2022. <https://www.catavencii.ro/flacara-sperantei-si-un-pipi-n-grup/> (Accessed on 14.11.2023).

territory of post-communist politics. The same concern for the well-being of the nation led to charges of leftist populism against whoever demanded “the rise of the minimum wage and capital taxation”.⁸⁸ Their answer is that decision-makers must face growing social inequality.

Imports from English language media have found their way into Romanian language news throughout the post-communist era and increasingly so today.⁸⁹ The translation and adaptation into Romanian effectively helped legitimate media discourses based on both right and, as a backlash, left-wing ideologies. “Distrust in the official history of textbooks”⁹⁰ is what drives forward the plot of right-wing populism, while most leftist political stands in the media draw on the conspiratorial elements of rightist politics; they are mentioned by the left-leaning commentariat to debunk the claims of the right. While at it, history textbooks are deemed proof of a conspiracy since the Romanian elites have allegedly used history against the people. The conspiracist rhetoric is shared by some of the left-leaning commentators who blame the spike in energy prices on “the short-sightedness of neoliberal governments and particularly the European Commission [...] that favoured private interests at odds with the greater good of society”.⁹¹ Somewhat paradoxically, journalists who acknowledge their leftist bias suggest that the European Union (EU) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

⁸⁸ Costi Rogozanu, *Cum au ajuns Renate Weber și George Simion la aceleași concluzii în lupta cu statul și de ce amândoi greșesc* [How Renate Weber and George Simion Reached the Same Conclusions in the Fight Against the State. Why They Both Are Wrong], in “Libertatea”, January 7, 2022, <https://www.libertatea.ro/opinii/cum-au-ajuns-renate-weber-si-george-simion-la-aceleasi-concluzii-in-lupta-cu-statul-si-de-ce-amandoi-gresesc-3915536> (Accessed on 28.10.2023).

⁸⁹ Răzvan Filip, *Cu ce se mai ocupă zilele astea liderii Coaliției pentru familie* [What the Leaders of the Coalition for the Family Are Occupying Themselves with These Days], in “PressOne”, 13 februarie 2022, <https://pressone.ro/cu-ce-se-mai-ocupa-zilele-astea-liderii-coalitiei-pentru-familie> (Accessed on 01.12.2023).

⁹⁰ Ioana Ene Dogioiu, *Butoiul cu pulbere. A fost dat semnalul pentru un filon subteran filolegionar?* [The Powder Keg. Has the Signal Been Given for an Underground Filolegionary Vein?], in “Spotmedia.ro”, February 3, 2022, <https://spotmedia.ro/stiri/opinii-si-analize/butoiul-cu-pulbere-a-fost-dat-semnalul-pentru-un-filon-subteran-filolegionar> (Accessed on 05.03.2024).

⁹¹ Andrei Mocearov, *Ideologia bate mintea. De ce prețurile la electricitate și gaz au crescut așa de mult?* [Ideology Trumps Reasoning. Why have Electricity and Gas Prices Increased so Much?], in “CriticAtac.ro”, 2021, <https://www.criticatac.ro/ideologia-bate-mintea-de-ce-preturile-la-electricitate-si-gaz-au-crescut-asa-de-mult/> (Accessed on 26.09.2023).

are conspiracies that have worked towards increasing social inequality in post-communist Romania.

CONCLUSIONS

As the national idea permeates the Romanian public sphere, the left-leaning commentariat strives to meet widespread nation-centric expectations. Commonly, they engage in a campaign for the re-conceptualization of the national rhetoric. As such, the local tropes of left-wing populism argue for 1) a break from the communist/soviet past and 2) emancipatory projects hindered by conservative power elites and rightist populism.

The interplay between conspiracy theorising and populism in the Romanian language spoken by the people of Romania and the RM is easy to spot, although a distinct Moldovan dynamic is manifest. The RM, while complex and significant within the broader Romanian-language conspiratorial populism, is largely following the lead of Romanian literary culture as the paradigm for Romanian nationalism. For instance, the reading of national identity in Romanian public-school textbooks is exclusionary and univocal, with a focus on countering the plots of historical neighbours and portraying the local elites as in tune with millennia-old national aspirations. The portrayal of national identity in Romanian-language Moldovan history textbooks is virtually identical: the very same literary culture provides examples of a populist rhetoric that operationalises conspiracy narratives to bolster Romanian mobilisation during historical upheavals. Essentially, such interdiscursivity patterns largely appropriate influential tropes circulated by mainstream Romanian narratives of self-identification, which are historically positioned as a counterweight to the Russian presence in the RM. The debate concerning Moldovan and/or Romanian national self-identification consistently underpins mainstream politics in the RM. The focus on the Romanian-language interdiscursivity between conspiracism and populism provides an incomplete picture, as it fails to adequately examine the role of the Russian language and culture in shaping Moldovan self-identification. The interplay between populist and conspiratorial rhetoric in the Russian language likely plays a significant role in this respect. Further research that considers the multilingual/cultural dynamics at play in the RM is needed. Ultimately, the Romanian-language interdiscursivity between conspiracism and populism provides a framework for the Romanian nation-(re-)building processes in the RM, even as the Moldovan context is shaped by its increasingly distinct historical experience caused by Russian rule.

Nevertheless, parallels likely stemming from shared Romanian literary culture persist: notably, during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, both countries' mainstream political landscapes lacked robust left-wing populist narratives, despite the complaints from the left regarding the perceived and actual conspiratorial nature of right-wing populism. Consequently, denying left-wing populism in Romanian-language contexts aligns with minimising conspiracism, reinforcing a normative sense of national identity by linking conspiracy theorising mainly to right-wing ideologies.

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FROM AKYAR TO SEVASTOPOL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORT CITY UNTIL WORLD WAR I

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Abstract: *Akyar is a fortified port city located on the southern tip of the Crimean Peninsula. Originally a small Tatar settlement, this area was annexed by the Russians in 1783 and the city was renamed Sevastopol. While this port was once used as a trading port, the city's true importance stems from its being the centre of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. As is well known, a key factor shaping Russian foreign policy for long had been their quest for access to warm waters. When considering Russian geography, the rationale behind this endeavour becomes clear. In pursuit of this ambition, the Straits played a crucial role. To reach the Straits, it was necessary to first establish naval superiority in the Black Sea with a strong fleet. Prioritizing the Black Sea Fleet was not the only reason for the Russians, but they saw it as a defensive necessity. In this context, following the annexation of Crimea in 1783, this port city under Russian rule gradually became the centre of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Although it continued to be used as a trading port for a long time, especially in the last quarter of the 19th century, the necessity of turning it into a naval base started to be discussed, and ultimately the port of Sevastopol was transformed into a naval base. This study examines the transformation of Sevastopol from a small Tatar settlement into the centre of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.*

Keywords: Sevastopol, Crimea, Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire, Black Sea

Rezumat: *De la Akyar la Sevastopol: dezvoltarea oraşului-port până la Primul Război Mondial. Akyar este un oraş portuar fortificat situat în extremitatea sudică a Peninsulei Crimeea. Inițial, o mică așezare tătarască, zona a fost anexată de ruși în anul 1783, iar*

orașul propriu zis a fost redenumit Sevastopol. Folosit cândva în calitate de port comercial, adevărata importanță a orașului rezidă în faptul că a fost și rămâne principala bază navală a flotei ruse de la Marea Neagră. Este cunoscut faptul că un factor cheie care a modelat politica externă a Rusiei pentru mult timp a fost obținerea accesului la ape calde. Când luăm în considerare geografia rusă, rațiunea din spatele acestui efort devine clară. În urmărirea acestei ambiții, Strâmtoarele Bosfor și Dardanele au jucat un rol crucial. Pentru a ajunge în Strâmtoare a fost necesară, întâi, instituirea superiorității navale ruse în Marea Neagră, prin intermediul unei flote puternice. Prioritizarea Flotei Mării Negre nu a fost o ratio ultima pentru ruși, dar ei au considerat-o drept necesitate defensivă de primă mână. În acest context, în urma anexării Crimeii în anul 1783, acest oraș-port a devenit treptat, sub stăpânire rusă, centrul Flotei Ruse de la Marea Neagră. Deși a continuat să fie folosit în calitate de port comercial pentru o lungă perioadă de timp, mai ales în ultimul sfert al secolului al XIX-lea, cercurile oficiale ruse au început să discute despre necesitatea transformării sale într-o bază navală. În cele din urmă, Sevastopolul a fost transformat într-un port naval. baza. Acest studiu examinează succint transformarea Sevastopolului dintr-o mică așezare tătară în centrul flotei ruse de la Marea Neagră.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, Russians have always faced difficulties in accessing the seas due to geographical constraints. While they have access to four different seas – the Arctic Ocean to the north, the Pacific Ocean in Far East Asia, the Baltic Sea to the west, and the Black Sea to the south – the Arctic Ocean is impassable due to its climate, and the port opening to the Pacific, Vladivostok, is surrounded by Japanese territory. Additionally, although Russians held significant positions along the northern and eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, they had to overcome German and British threats to access the oceans through the Baltic Sea. Finally, there is the Black Sea, which connects to the Mediterranean via the Istanbul and Çanakkale Straits, providing access to the oceans.¹ These geographical constraints undoubtedly influenced the empire's economy but considering the tumultuous political environment of the 19th century, it further emphasized Russia's need for a strong navy.

Efforts to develop the Russian navy began during the reign of Tsar Peter the Great, who recognized the necessity of a strong navy for a powerful empire. To expand Russia's access to warm waters, Tsar Peter initiated preparations to capture the fortress of Azov. The first campaign on Azov took place in 1695, but it

¹ M. A. Petrov, *Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoy voyne na more* [Russia's Preparation for World War at Sea], Moscow, Voennoye Izdatelstvo, 1926, p. 7-8.

failed due to the arrival of Turkish reinforcements via the Sea of Azov.² Understanding the imperative of a navy following this setback, Tsar Peter immediately ordered the construction of naval fleets on rivers and seas, with the city of Voronezh being the first place to commence naval construction activities. By the spring of 1696, 30 large ships and approximately 1000 flat-bottomed boats (known as “barkas”) had been built. In May, this fleet was transported down the Don River, besieging Azov and capturing it on July 19, 1696.³ With Azov secured, Russia’s main objective was to control the Kerch Strait and gain access to the Black Sea. To this end, construction began on a naval base and port in Taganrog. The next goal for the Russians, having reached the sea, was to create a large navy. For this, Russia launched a massive mobilization effort and invited shipbuilding experts from other countries.⁴

During the period when the Black Sea was under full Ottoman control, to such an extent that it was referred to as the “Turkish Lake,” Russian merchant ships and battleships had no permission to enter these waters. The first Russian battleships in the Black Sea were sighted on August 5, 1771, during the ongoing Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, under the command of Prince Dolgorukiy. Initially, Prince Dolgorukiy had ordered Admiral Aleksey Naumovich Senyavin, commander of the Don and Azov fleets, to survey the southern shores of the Crimean Peninsula from Feodosiya to Balaklava. However, upon receiving reports of approximately 40 ships near Yalta, making the task difficult, Prince Dolgorukiy ordered artillery and military supplies to be brought to Sudak and Yalta to search for these ships. On August 5, under the command of Admiral Sukhotin (Yakov Filippovich), four Russian battleships from Yenikale arrived at the southern shores of Crimea.⁵

Settlement attempts along the Black Sea coast began during Peter the Great’s reign but could only be realized after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. Ships from the Azov fleet played a significant role in establishing the Black Sea fleet. However, the construction of new and stronger ships necessitated a new centre, which became the city of Kherson. Additionally, ships were reinforced from

² Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Rusya Tarihi Başlangıçtan 1917’ye Kadar* [The History of Russia from the Beginning to 1917], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014, p. 272-273.

³ P. M. Andrianov, *Epokha Petra Velikogo* [The Era of Peter the Great], in A. S. Grishinsky, V. P. Nikolski (Eds.), *Istoriya Russkoy armii i flota* [The History of the Russian Army and Navy], Ch. I, Moscow, Obrazovaniye, 1911, p. 84-85.

⁴ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

⁵ V. F. Golovachov, *Istoriya Sevastopolya kak russkogo porta* [The History of Sevastopol as a Russian Port], St. Petersburg, Izdaniye Sevastopolskovo otdela na Politehnicheskoy Vystavke, 1872, p. 24.

the Baltic fleet to support the growing Black Sea fleet. In this context, six frigates were sent from Europe to the Black Sea, but when the Ottoman Empire only allowed four of them to pass through the Dardanelles, the other two returned to Baltic ports. Although both Kherson and Taganrog were turned into fleet bases, they lacked sufficient depth for large ships to dock. Hence, following the annexation of Crimea in 1783, Akyar Bay gained prominence, leading to the decision to designate Sevastopol as the main port.⁶

AKYAR (SEVASTOPOL)

The first known inhabitants of the region where this port city is located in the southwest of Crimea were the Taurians. The city of Chersonesus was founded in the region in the 5th century BC.⁷ The area remained under the control of the Roman Empire and later the Byzantine Empire. The city was renamed to Kherson during the Byzantine period, referring to its old Russian name during the Byzantine era, Korsun, not to be confused with the city of Herson, located on the banks of the Özi (Dnieper) river in southern Ukraine today. After the Byzantine era, the city remained under the control of the Genoese until it was conquered by the Ottomans in 1475. From 1475 to 1781, the city was ruled by the Crimean Khans, and in 1783, it was seized by the Russian Empire.

The name Akyar first appears in Ottoman tahrir registers from the 1680s, which show landowners in southern Crimea. According to these records, in 1686, the village of Akyar was a small settlement in the Mankub kaza of the Kefe province, inhabited entirely by 23 Muslim landowners. After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was signed in 1774, it came under the administration of the Mankub kaza, which was part of the Bakhchisaray kaymakamlık of the Crimean Khanate.⁸ The fate of Akyar, a small Tatar village in the 17th century, took a turn when an

⁶ V. A. Zolotarev, *Rossisiyskiy voyenny flot na Chernom more i vostochnom Sredizemnomorie* [The Russian Navy on the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean], Moscow, Nauka, 1988, p. 33-35.

⁷ S. Yu. Saprykin, *Predposylki osnavaniya Hersonesa Tavricheskogo* [The Background of the Foundation of Tauric Chersonesus], in "Antichnyie drevnosti i Sredniye veka" [Ancient Antiquity and the Middle Ages], Sverdlovsk, Izdaniye Sverdlovskovo universiteta, 1981, Vol. 18, pp. 35-49.

⁸ A. V. Efimov (Ed.), *Osmanskiy reestr zemelnykh vladeny yuzhnogo Kryma 1680-h godov* [The Ottoman Register of Land Holdings in Southern Crimea in the 1680s], Ch. 3, Moscow, Institut Naslediya, 2021, p. 148-149.

unnamed French traveller arrived in Crimea. Impressed by the location and advantages of the port, the observations of this traveller reached the ears of Empress Catherine II. Engineers were dispatched to the region, and when the traveller's observations were confirmed, work immediately began.⁹ Indeed, the geopolitical location of Akyar made it an ideal candidate for a naval port. The port had a central location in the Black Sea, giving it a perfect advantage for both defence and offensive. The Akyar port was large enough to accommodate a large fleet, making it one of the best bays in the world in this regard. The bay, divided into 5 different coves, was approximately 6 verst (about 6.4008 km) long, 500–850 meters wide and 10–25 meters deep.¹⁰ Additionally, the Sevastopol Bay, which extends east–west, is surrounded by the Crimean Mountains to the north and the Balaklava hills to the south. These mountains protect the Sevastopol harbour from the winds. Not freezing in winter and being sheltered from winds, the Sevastopol harbour was in a more advantageous position for the navy compared to other Russian ports. The port offered many strategic and physical advantages for use as a naval base. In 1773, before the annexation of Crimea, a group led by sailor Ivan Baturin came to the area to collect detailed information about the cove and port of Akyar and they drew up a map of the port. It was in 1778 that A. V. Suvorov, who first came here with his fleet, pointed out the strategic importance of Akyar Bay, stating: “A port as suitable as this for protecting the fleet cannot be found in Crimea if not the entire Black Sea area.”¹¹

The founding date of the city known as Sevastopol is June 14, 1783, when the Dutch-born Russian Admiral Thomas MacKenzie laid the first foundation stones. On February 21, 1784, Empress Catherine II ordered Prince Potemkin to build a large fortress, a shipyard, a port, and a military village.¹² After the annexation of Crimea, Grigoriy Potemkin, a famous commander of the time, proposed that the Tatar village of Ahtar/Akyar be renamed Sevastopol, meaning “venerable, famous, glorious, sacred city” in Greek. The renaming was officially accepted in early 1784.¹³ After Crimea came under Russian rule, efforts were made to erase the

⁹ Edmund Spencer, *Turkey, Russia and Black Sea and Circassia*, London, Routledge, 1855, p. 253.

¹⁰ I. Protopopov, *Ocherk osady i oborony Sevastopolya* [An Essay on the Siege and Defense of Sevastopol], Odesa, tipografiya Okr. Shtaba Odesskogo voennogo okruga, 1885, p. 9.

¹¹ C. F. Nayda (Ed.), *Istoriya Goroda-Geroya Sevastopolya* [The History of the Hero City Sevastopol], Kiev, Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk USSR, 1960, p. 27.

¹² *Polnoye Sobraniye Zakonov Rossiskoy Imperii 1784-1788* [The Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire 1784–1788], Vol. XXII, № 15.929, St. Petersburg, 1830, p. 21–22.

¹³ F. V. Livanov, *Sevastopol do Krymskoy voyny i posle onoy: Istoricheskoye opisaniye* [Sevastopol before and after the Crimean War: A Historical Description], Moscow, Tipografiya

Turkish-Muslim elements. Following the orders of Catherine II, who referred to the peninsula by its Greek name Tavrída instead of its Tatar name Crimea, new plans were implemented. According to these plans, while old Tatar settlements were reorganized, newly established cities such as Sevastopol, which would serve as a Russian naval base, were built entirely in a neo-classical style.¹⁴




Figure 1. Map of Sevastopol Surroundings¹⁵

By the end of the 1784, the port of Sevastopol was housing a total of 26 ships, including 5 battleships, 12 frigates, 5 sailboats, and 4 boats. These ships had 4080 soldiers on board, and 607,049 rubles and 20 kopecks were allocated for their

Sovremennoy Izvestii, 1874, s. 10.

¹⁴ Kelly O'Neill, *Constructing Russian Identity in the Imperial Borderland: Architecture, Islam, and the Transformation of the Crimean Landscape*, in "Ab Imperio", 2/2006, pp. 163-192.

¹⁵ V. F. Golovachov, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

maintenance.¹⁶ In 1787, the fleet in Sevastopol had grown to comprise a total of 30 battleships, including three ships in Kerch and Feodosia. These ships were equipped with approximately 860 firearms.¹⁷ Designed as a naval base due to Russia's regional position, Sevastopol played a crucial role in the 1787–1792 Russo-Turkish War, rendering the Ottoman fleet in Özi ineffective.¹⁸ In 1797, during the reign of Tsar Paul I, the city's name was changed back to Akyar, but it was renamed Sevastopol again after 1826.¹⁹

According to commercial records from 1803, the number of merchant ships arriving at the port of Sevastopol was as follows: 21 Russian, 1 British, 1 French, 28 Turkish, and a total of 57 ships from other countries.²⁰ However, on February 23, 1804, merchant ships were banned from entering the port for security reasons. This caused the city to meet difficulties in accessing raw materials, in the face of which leading figures of the city asked the government to allow merchant ships to bring goods to Sevastopol. However, due to security reasons, this request was rejected, and instead, the government proposed to build a trading port in Balaklava, which would also serve the city of Sevastopol.²¹ In 1806, English poet and traveller Reginald Heber, who visited Crimea, wrote about this trade ban, stating that it negatively affected the city's prosperity and increased the prices of imported goods.²² Trade permit for the port of Sevastopol was obtained in 1808 upon an application filed by Ivan Ivanovich de Traverse, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.²³ However, merchant ships trading in Sevastopol were required to dock not at the main harbour but at one of the city's five coves, particularly Artillery Cove.²⁴

¹⁶ F. V. Livaonov, *op. cit.*, p. 10-11.

¹⁷ V. F. Golovachov, *op. cit.*, p. 101-103.

¹⁸ Constantin Ardeleanu, *The Opening and Development of the Black Sea for International Trade and Shipping (1774-1853)*, in "Euxeinos", 14 (2014), s. 32-32.

¹⁹ S. R. Grinevetskiy, I. S. Zonn, S. S. Zhiltsov, *Sevastopol*, in A. N. Kosareva (Ed.), *Chernomorskaya entsyklopediya* [The Black Sea Encyclopedia], Moscow, Mejdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2006, p. 457.

²⁰ John MacGregor, *Commercial Statistics: A Digest of the Productive Resources, Commercial Legislation, Costume Tariffs*, Vol. II, London, Whittaker and Co. Ave-Maria Lane, 1850, p. 493.

²¹ *Istoriya Goroda-Geroya*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

²² N. I. Hrapunov, *Vzglyad izvne: Britanskiy poet i puteshestvennik Reginald Heber o sostoyaniyi Kryma v 1806 g.* [A View from the Outside: British Poet and Traveler Reginald Heber on the Bad Condition of Crimea in 1806], in "Krymskoye istoricheskoye obozreniye" [Crimean Historical Review], Vol. 3, 2015, p. 263.

²³ F. V. Livanov, *op. cit.*, p. 10-11.

²⁴ H.D. Seymour, *Russia on the Black Sea of Azof: Being a Narrative of Travels in the Crimea and Bordering Provinces; with Notices of Naval, Military, and Commercial Resources of*

During the Crimean War, with Sevastopol being the focal point of the Allied powers, the fate of the city and its port took another turn. During the Crimean War, the Sevastopol harbour was an important location for the Black Sea fleet. This is evidenced by the fact that the first target of the Allied forces was Sevastopol. British First Lord of the Admiralty Sir James Graham's remarks in December 1853, following the Battle of Sinop, illustrate this: "The security of Istanbul and the peace of Europe cannot be ensured unless the Russian fleet and naval arsenal in the Black Sea are destroyed. The eye tooth of the Bear must be drawn." This statement reflects the importance of the Crimean plan.²⁵ According to the general view of the Allied forces, capturing Sevastopol was the best way to punish the Russians. Furthermore, the fall of Sevastopol, where the Russian Black Sea fleet was based, would bring Russia to its knees. Therefore, they thought that the best plan would be to capture Sevastopol and destroy its military installations and Black Sea fleet.²⁶

As a result of the changing conditions with the signing of the Paris Treaty in 1856, the Russian Empire needed a stronger navy in the Black Sea.²⁷ However, immediate action could not be taken in this regard and, by the 1880s, with the industrial boom in Russia, the port of Sevastopol became one of the country's largest trading ports of the time.²⁸ The export figures of the port, which amounted to 556,000 rubles in 1875, increased to 10,360,000 rubles in 1886 and 25,821,000 rubles in 1888.²⁹ This vibrant trade volume had wide press coverage in the Russian press. While debates continued about the location of the new port, international trade persisted at the port of Sevastopol. Large quantities of Russian grain were being brought to Sevastopol and loaded onto foreign ships for export.³⁰ The significant increase in trade figures and the importance of the Sevastopol port among the country's other ports undoubtedly owed much to the Lozovo-Sevastopol railway, built between 1872 and 1875.³¹

those Countries, London, Murray, 1855, s. 65.

²⁵ Andrew Lambert, *The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against Russia, 1853-56*, 2nd ed., Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011, p. 114.

²⁶ Orlando Figes, *Crimea. The Last Crusade*, London, Penguin Books, 2011, p. 196-197.

²⁷ F. N. Erantsov, *Po voprosu o Sevastopolskom porte* [On the Issue of the Sevastopol Port], St. Petersburg, Tipografiya M.D. Lomkovskovo, 1889, p. 2.

²⁸ *Istoriya Goroda-Geroya*, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

²⁹ F. N. Erantsov, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

³⁰ "Novosti" [News], 9 May 1895, № 126, p. 4.

³¹ Yunus Emre Aydın, *Lozovo-Sevastopolskaya zheleznaya doroga: ot zamysla k voploshcheniyu* [Lozovo-Sevastopol Railway: from Concept to Implementation], in "Prepodavaniye istorii v shkole" [Teaching History at School], Moscow, № 5, 2022, p. 77-80.

With the Russian Ministry of Defence deciding on the modernization of the naval base in the Black Sea in 1882, efforts began to relocate the trading port in Sevastopol.³² In this regard, a commission was established under the chairmanship of Prince Alexey Aleksandrovich in 1885. After elaborating studies, the commission decided that the Sevastopol port would meet all needs of the navy, thus being suitable for use as a naval port, and that the trading port had to be relocated elsewhere in the city. Thereupon, Alexei Alexeyevich Peshurov was assigned to research a suitable port location.³³ The same year, a communication from the Russian Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Transportation urged the city administration of Sevastopol to take action for the relocation of the trading port.³⁴ Studies suggested potential relocation sites, such as Strilets'ka Bay, Inkerman Bay, and Balaklava Port, which were closer to Sevastopol.³⁵ Considering that the new port would require a railway network, the Ministry of Transportation also researched the location of the new port and evaluated numerous alternatives. Based on these evaluations, the cost of building a railway to Holland Bay in Crimea was estimated at 3.41 million rubles, and 3.1 million rubles for Kilen Bay. It was noted that if the railway to Kilen Bay were constructed from the east, the cost would decrease to 2.52 million rubles.³⁶ However, both projects were rejected on the grounds of their long distance to the military port and the marshy terrain near Inkerman, rendering it unfeasible. While the commission recommended the relocation of the trading port to Strilets'ka Bay, Alexander Mavrikievich Berh's studies highlighted the advantages of Inkerman Bay, arguing for the construction of a new trading port in Inkerman.³⁷

To establish the Sevastopol port as a naval port and relocate the trading port elsewhere, a new commission was formed under the leadership of A. A. Peshurov, Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet. Besides Peshurov, the commission included General Engineer A. M. Berh, Commander of Sevastopol Port Mihail Nikolaevich Kumani, Major General Masolov, engineers from the Ministry of Transportation, Gusin, city administrator and Lieutenant Colonel-Engineer Fedor Nikolaevich Erantsov, and Major General A. N. Chikalev.³⁸ Most members of the commission expressed their opinion in favour of locating the new port in Strilets'ka

³² *Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskiy Arkhiv* [The Russian State Historical Archive], F. 268, Op. 3, D. 111, p. 35.

³³ F. N. Erantsov, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

³⁴ "Novosti" [News], 20 October 1895, № 289, p. 5.

³⁵ *Istoriya Goroda-Geroya*, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

³⁶ *Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskiy Arkhiv*, F. 95, Op. 8a, D. 275, p. 25-26.

³⁷ F. N. Erantsov, *op. cit.*, p. 4-5.

³⁸ *Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskiy Arkhiv*, F. 268, Op. 3, D. 111, p. 2.

Bay. The commission also brought forth the idea of connecting this bay to the Lozovo–Sevastopol railway with an additional railway line. The studies that were carried out predicted that the cost of building an 8-verst-long line would range between 2,050,000 rubles and 2,300,000 rubles.³⁹

All previous meetings had remained inconclusive but, in the commission meeting of April 24, 1890, it was decided to relocate the trading port to Feodosiya (Kefe).⁴⁰ This decision was confirmed on June 14, 1890.⁴¹ As part of the same decision, it was announced that a railway would be constructed to connect the Can-köy station of the Lozovo–Sevastopol railway line with the port of Feodosiya. Despite being further away from Sevastopol compared to other ports under consideration, the Feodosiya port was chosen as a trading port owing to its wide and deep bay and its being sheltered from winds.⁴² While debates continued over the location of the new trading port, the Sevastopol port maintained its commercial character until 1899, allowing the city's needs to be met.⁴³

According to a pronouncement by the Russian Ministry of Maritime Affairs, while Sevastopol would be used as a naval port from then on, it was stated that a coastal port would be built there to meet the city's supply needs. According to news published in local Crimean press, plans for the port had been prepared, and work was nearing completion.⁴⁴ On May 26, 1895, during a meeting with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the naval command, it was decided to gradually close the Sevastopol port to trade and shift all commercial activities to the Feodosiya port.⁴⁵ However, despite all this information, the port maintained its commercial character to some extent in addition to being the centre of the Russian navy, as in the early 1900s, along with other ports on the Crimean Peninsula, the Sevastopol port was used as the starting point for trips to Southern Europe. Russian Trading

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 7; *ibidem*, F. 268, Op. 3, D. 2, p. 45.

⁴⁰ *Obzor deyatelnosti Ministerstva putey soobshcheniya za vremya tsarstvovaniya Imperatora Aleksandra III* [Overview of the Activities of the Ministry of Railways during the Reign of Aleksandr III], St. Petersburg, 1902, p. 198.

⁴¹ *Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskiy Arkhiv*, F. 446, Op. 2, D. 3, p. 34.; *Polnoye sobraniye zakonov Rossiskoy imperii 1784-1788* [The Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire 1784–1788], Vol. X, № 6.966, St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 564.

⁴² *Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskiy Arkhiv*, F. 268, Op. 1, D. 1495, p. 7-8.

⁴³ S. A. Knushevitsky, *Obzor kommercheskoy deyatelnosti yuzhno-russkikh portov* [Overview of Commercial Activities of South Russian Ports], Kharkov, 1910, p. 118.

⁴⁴ "Krym" [Crimea], 29 November 1891, № 141, p. 3.

⁴⁵ *Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskiy Arkhiv*, F. 229, Op. 3, D. 555, p. 2-3.

and Shipping Company steamers were used on these trips.⁴⁶



Figure 2. Sevastopol Port (1842)⁴⁷

In 1907, an article was published in a local Crimean newspaper, reporting that Sevastopol could possibly become a trading port again. Given that other ports on the southern coast of Russia were freezing up during the winter months, adversely affecting trade as ships could not dock, it was proposed that Sevastopol, being a non-freezing port most suitable for trade, should regain its commercial status. Based on this, reinstatement of the city's commercial privileges was requested, yet to no avail.⁴⁸ Due to the city's commercial needs, this issue continued

⁴⁶ D. S. Dokuchev, N. A. Dokucheva, *Puteshestviye kak osvoeniye prostranstva: kanikulyarnye poezdki v Krym na rubezhe XIX-XX vekov* [Journey as an Opening of Space: The Crimean Vacations of the late 19th–early 20th centuries], in "Sovremenniy problemy servisa i turizma" [Modern Problems of Service and Tourism], Vol. 1, № 9, 2015, p. 16.

⁴⁷ K. Bassoli, *Vidy Kryma* [View of Crimea], Odesa, Litografiya D. Klenova, 1842, p. 3.

⁴⁸ "Krymskiy Vestnik" [Crimean Bulletin], 10 March 1907, № 56, p. 2.

to be repeatedly brought up by the Crimean press. A news report from 1910 suggested that Strelets Bay in Sevastopol be opened for maritime trade, but this suggestion was also rejected.⁴⁹

Documents found in Ottoman archives⁵⁰ regarding the transformation of the port into a naval base are also important as they provide evidence of the shift that the port underwent and the value that states attached to their navies prior to World War I. Documents sent by Ottoman diplomats in Russia convey how Sevastopol transitioned into a naval port. Indeed, the fact that before World War I, the primary target of the German battleships Goeben and Breslau, seeking refuge in the Ottoman Empire, was the Sevastopol port signifies the critical importance it had at the time.⁵¹

At the beginning of the 20th century, in 1905, Russia suffered both a significant loss of prestige and nearly complete decimation of its navy, except for the Baltic Fleet, due to the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War.⁵² Of the 15 armoured battleships sent to Japan, Russia lost 14, along with 10 out of 19 cruisers, all three coastal defence ships, and two minesweepers.⁵³ Wanting to enhance its navy before a potential war, Russia found itself torn between prioritizing the Baltic Fleet or the Black Sea Fleet. However, due to the threat from Germany and the need to protect the capital, St. Petersburg, priority was given to the development of the Baltic Fleet. Nevertheless, with the Ottoman Empire initiating modernization efforts for its navy starting from 1909, and particularly with the order placed in 1911 to acquire dreadnoughts from England, Russia began to pay more attention to the Black Sea Fleet.⁵⁴

Before World War I, the Russian Ministry of Maritime Affairs presented a bill to the State Duma in November 1913 for the renewal and strengthening of military

⁴⁹ "Krymskiy Vestnik" [Crimean Bulletin], 13 April 1910, № 97, p. 3.

⁵⁰ Yunus Emre Aydın, *Sevastopolskiy port v kontse XIX – nachale XX veka po materialam turetskikh arkhivov* [Sevastopol Port in the late 19th–early 20th centuries based on the materials of the Turkish Archives], in "Chelevocheskiy kapital" [Human Capital], № 11(143), 2020, p. 131-138.

⁵¹ *The Times Documentary History of War, "Operations of Goeben and Breslau"*, Volume III, Naval I, London, Printing House Square, 1917, s. 51-54.

⁵² Burak Gülboy, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Öncesinde Rusya ve Osmanlı Donanmaları Arasındaki Silahlanma Yarışı* [The Arms Race between the Russian and Ottoman Navies before the First World War], in *Türk-Rus İlişkiler Üzerine Makaleler* [Articles on Turkish–Russian Relations], ed. Yeliz Okay, İstanbul, Doğu Kitabevi, 2012, p. 51.

⁵³ M. A. Petrov, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁵⁴ Burak Gülboy, *op. cit.*, p. 54-56.

ports, naval radio stations, and observation points, including those in Sevastopol and other ports. According to this bill, the total cost required for the renewal of all military ports was estimated at 17,967,511 rubles. For the specific renewal and strengthening works at the Sevastopol port, such as reinforcing coastal lines, constructing mine depots, and shipbuilding, the cost was indicated as 1,429,690 rubles.⁵⁵

CONCLUSIONS

Akyar, a small Tatar village situated on the southern tip of the Crimean Peninsula, stands out due to its strategic location. Positioned dominantly overlooking the Black Sea, Akyar drew attention following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire in 1783.

With the initiatives of Empress Catherine II and Prince Potemkin, it was developed into the focal point of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In 1784, a port was constructed in Akyar, renamed Sevastopol as part of Catherine II's Greek Project. Although commercial activities were conducted in the port city for a considerable period to meet the region's trade demands, particularly during the Crimean War of 1853–1856 and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, these conflicts underscored the necessity of a naval presence in the Black Sea, prompting the Russians to prioritize the Black Sea Fleet thereafter. In order to meet the commercial needs of the Crimean Peninsula, the trade port was relocated to the city of Feodosiya, and Sevastopol emerged as the centre of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

Consequently, Akyar, once a small and inconsequential Tatar village, evolved into a significant naval centre within the scope of Russian Black Sea policy. The strategic importance of Sevastopol persists to this day.

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EVOLUTION OF THE BORDER GUARD OF UKRAINE AND ADJACENT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE

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Abstract: *The Russian armed aggression in 2014 created a strong necessity for Ukrainian border police to secure the state border, prevent the infiltration of armed terrorists and defend the country against a possible invasion by Russian armed forces. However, at the time, Ukraine's State Border Guard Service was a law enforcement agency with control and police functions while the military component was not considered primary. Some contemporary researchers believe that was one of the main reasons for the vulnerability of Ukraine's state border in 2014, and that the premature reduction of the military capabilities of border guards in favour of law enforcement control contributed to it. This retrospective analysis explains why the transformation of Ukraine's military border guard institution into a law enforcement agency following the European model, which took place within the framework of Ukraine's European integration aspirations, was a logical necessity in the absence of territorial claims from adjacent states and a real military threat to Ukraine. At the same time, the reform of the border guard institution in Ukraine took place in close cooperation with neighbouring countries and the European community, aiming to improve the entire border security system. Currently, the border guard institutions of the European Union are responsible for guarding a significant external section of the state border with Ukraine. Therefore, comprehensive knowledge of the history of these structures' development will be of use to the personnel of the Ukrainian specialized state institutions operating at the border and to the citizens of the EU member states.*

Keywords: history of border security, external borders of the European Union, border guard institution, law enforcement agencies, armed aggression, state border.

Rezumat: Evoluția pazei de frontieră a Ucrainei și a țărilor europene adiacente: retrospectivă istorică. În anul 2014, agresiunea armată a Rusiei a impus o cerință strictă instituției poliției de frontieră a Ucrainei, relativă la protecția frontierei de stat împotriva infiltrării teroriștilor înarmați și apărarea acesteia împotriva unei posibile invazii a forțelor armate rusești. Cu toate acestea, pe atunci, Serviciul de pază a frontierei de stat a Ucrainei avea statutul unei agenții de aplicare a legii, cu funcții de control și poliție, în care componenta militară nu era considerată ca având o deosebită relevanță. Unii cercetători contemporani consideră că acesta a fost unul dintre principalele motive ale vulnerabilității frontierei de stat a Ucrainei în anul 2014 care a contribuit la slăbirea prematură a capacității militare a polițiștilor de frontieră în favoarea funcțiilor de control al aplicării legii. Această analiză retrospectivă explică de ce transformarea instituției militare de pază a frontierei ucrainene într-o agenție de aplicare a legii după modelul european, care a avut loc în cadrul aspirațiilor de integrare europeană ale Ucrainei, a fost o necesitate logică în absența unor pretenții teritoriale din partea statelor adiacente și a unei amenințări militare reale la adresa Ucrainei. În același timp, reforma instituției poliției de frontieră din Ucraina s-a făcut în strânsă cooperare cu țările vecine și cu comunitatea europeană, cu scopul îmbunătățirii întregului sistem de securitate a frontierelor. În prezent, instituțiile poliției de frontieră ale Uniunii Europene sunt responsabile de paza unei secțiuni semnificative a frontierei de stat cu Ucraina. Prin urmare, o cunoaștere cuprinzătoare a istoriei dezvoltării acestor structuri va fi utilă atât pentru personalul instituțiilor specializate ale statului ucrainean care operează la frontieră, cât și pentru cetățenii statelor membre ale UE.

INTRODUCTION

The Russian armed aggression in 2014 imposed stringent constraints on Ukraine's Border Guard Service in terms of national border protection, preventing armed terrorist infiltration, and defending the country against a potential Russian military invasion. However, as of 2014, the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service was already a law enforcement body with police and control duties, but the military component was not considered the most important. Since 1991, Ukraine has worked to restructure its border security system, shifting from military border protection toward law enforcement functions. This shift, according to contemporary researchers, is one of the primary causes of 2014's lack of state border protection against military threats. They suggest that the premature decrease of border guard military capabilities in favour of law enforcement controlling functions was a contributing factor.

In the specified context, historical retrospectives help explain that the transformation of the Ukrainian military border guard institution into a law enforcement agency following the European model, which took place within the framework of Ukraine's European integration aspirations, was a logical necessity. This transformation occurred in the absence of territorial claims from adjacent states and a real military threat to Ukraine. Furthermore, the reform of the border guard institution in Ukraine took place in close cooperation with neighbouring countries and the European community, intending to improve the entire border security system.

Thus, this research undoubtedly has a scientific character for scholars and experts whose task is to continuously deepen their knowledge of the European community's external border defence. This research is relevant for border guards who work to improve border cooperation and security.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ISSUE

Analysis of recent publications shows that contemporary scholars and experts have rarely addressed the specific topic¹, although significant improvements have been made in this regard². In Ukraine, V. Baratiuk, T. Filipenko, E. Suslin and M. Palahniuk have researched the history of border structures of EU countries³. The legal foundations of their operational and service activities were of interest to K. Yemelianova⁴. While issues related to border

¹ G. Cornelisse, *What's Wrong with Schengen? Border Disputes and the Nature of Integration in the Area Without Internal Borders*, in "Common Market Law Review", Vol. 51, 2014, No. 3, in <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2451038> (Accessed on 20.05.2023).

² O. Marenin, *Challenges for Integrated Border Management in the European Union*, in https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242634998_Challenges_for_Integrated_Border_Management_in_the_European_Union (Accessed on 20.05.2023).

³ V. I. Baratiuk, O. M. Stavytskyi, O. V. Zhabenko, A. I. Voitovych, *Okhorona derzhavnoho kordonu sumizhnymy derzhavamy* [The State Border Protection by Adjacent States]: Training Manual, Khmelnytsky, Publishing House of the National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, 2004, pp. 31-33; T. Filipenko, *Prykordonna politsiia Rumunii – rinvopravnyi chlen Yevropeiskoho soiuzu* [Border Police of Romania – Equal Member of the European Union], in "Kordon", 2003, № 3, pp. 40-41; E. V. Suslin, M. G. Palahniuk *Linhvokrainoznavstvo Rumunii* [Linguistic and Country Studies of Romania]: Training Manual, Khmelnytskyi, Publishing House of the National Academy of the Border Troops of Ukraine, 2003, 152 p.

⁴ K. Yu. Yemelianova, *Pravovi osnovy operatyvno-sluzhbovoi diialnosti partneriv Prykordonnykh viisk Ukrainy iz sumizhnykh krain* [Legal Foundations of Operational and

arrangements have been covered in the departmental press⁵, it is still premature to claim that these studies are comprehensive and well grounded. Therefore, further in-depth research is needed to reconstruct the complete historical trajectory of border guard institutions in Ukraine's bordering states. The authors' study can contribute to this endeavour and serve as one of the sources for a more comprehensive understanding.

The purpose of the article is to examine, in a historical retrospective, the evolution of the transition from military formations to law enforcement agencies in the border guard institutions of Ukraine's neighbours, currently full members (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania) or candidates (Moldova) for EU accession.

UKRAINE: FROM BORDER TROOPS TO BORDER GUARD SERVICE

The declaration of Ukraine's sovereignty as well as the change in the country's political system required a new structure for border protection. Several variables made this attempt a challenge in Ukraine. Specifically, due to the conditional nature of the territorial delineation among former Soviet Union republics, Ukraine found itself without technically equipped and legally established state borders.

Ukraine's lack of defined state borders and low economic resources for its defence led to an actual vulnerability to trans-border criminal activities such as illegal migration, terrorism, smuggling, and more. At the same time, Western European countries advocated for the introduction of new democratic values, which stated that state borders should transform from dividing lines between European nations into frontiers of mutually beneficial intergovernmental

Service Activities of the Partners of the Border Guard Troops of Ukraine with Adjacent Countries], Bulletin of the Academy of Customs Service of Ukraine. Series: Law. № 2 (11), 2013, pp. 109-110.

⁵ V. Peleh, *Hromadskist Bukovyny zanepokoiena diiamy Rumunii shchodo vydachi pasportiv tsiiei derzhavy meshkantsiam kraiu* [Bukovina Public Opinion are Concerned about Romania's Actions Regarding the Issuance of Passports of this State to the Residents of the Region], "Prykordonnyk Ukrainy", December 21, 2002, p. 3; *Suttievykh zmin u perehovorakh ne vidbulosia* [No Significant Changes Occurred in the Negotiations], "Prykordonnyk Ukrainy", December 21, 2002, p. 2; *Uzghodzheno spilni zakhody z protydii kontrabandnii diialnosti ta nelehalnii mihratsii na ukraïnsko-rumunskomu kordoni* [Joint Measures to Counter Smuggling Activities and Illegal Migration at the Ukrainian–Romanian Border Have Been Agreed], "Prykordonnyk Ukrainy", July 6, 2002, p. 2.

cooperation in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. Under these circumstances, the border agencies of neighbouring countries were expected to actively contribute to comprehensive cooperation and peaceful coexistence among their peoples. During this time, similar slogans appeared in Ukraine's socio-political life. In the new political and socio-economic conditions, the Ukrainian government had to urgently seek new ways to protect the state border, as previous approaches based on Soviet Union methods had proven ineffective.

The European Union (EU) was expanding in the early 2000s, causing the reform of national border guard institutions and the demilitarization of borders. At the same time, in Ukraine, the Border Troops remained a military institution that employed military border defence measures.

A political challenge arose once Ukraine started its path towards European integration: conforming all state activity fields to European legislation. One of these tasks was to ensure that the system of border protection met European standards. According to these standards, the Ukrainian Border Troops, as a military formation, needed to be transformed into a law enforcement agency following the European model.

Thus, considering the socio-economic changes in European countries at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, the reform of the border guard institution became a logical necessity. Moreover, the philosophy of safeguarding the state border itself has changed. The border violator was now considered a citizen of Ukraine (or another country) who had breached the border legislation, and therefore, needed to be held accountable under the law. In such circumstances, the use of military formations safeguarding the state border of Ukraine, such as the Border Guard Troops, contradicted the Constitution and violated the state's fundamental laws governing human rights and citizenship.

During Ukraine's first decade of independence, there were changes in the balance of political and military forces on the international stage, as well as efforts towards disarmament. In the early 2000s, Ukraine established itself as a full member of European society, obtaining international security guarantees, signing cooperation agreements with all neighbouring countries, and taking an active role in guaranteeing Europe's stability.

Meanwhile, neighbouring countries of Ukraine, such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova, actively reformed their border guard institutions into law enforcement agencies, with a corresponding change in their assigned functions. Consistent efforts were made to improve the effectiveness of their service activities, particularly in combatting economic crime, illegal

migration, and terrorism. In turn, Ukraine decided to apply these countries' experience to reform its own border guard institution.

On April 3, 2003, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Laws "On the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine."⁶ Since then, the entire system of state border protection has undergone fundamental changes. A comprehensive law enforcement cycle was established to prevent law violations at the state border. A fundamentally new model of state border protection was introduced, unprecedented for Ukraine. In practice, this meant a definitive break from the military structure of border protection, with border posts located along the border. The transformation of the Border Guard Troops into the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine aimed to enhance the quality of border security. The overall reform of Ukraine's border guard agency, transitioning it from a military structure to a law enforcement body and changing the approaches to organising the entire border protection system, was aimed at aligning with the standards of the EU countries. It fully corresponded to Ukraine's strategic course towards European integration and its aspirations for NATO membership.

Thus, within the Ukrainian border institution, the military component with defence tasks took an ultimately secondary place in favour of law enforcement methods for border security.

The reform of the Ukrainian border guard institution was going on in close cooperation with neighbouring countries, particularly with Poland (542.39 km of shared border), Slovakia (98.5 km of shared border), Hungary (136.7 km of shared border), Romania (613.8 km of shared border), and Moldova (1222 km of shared border)⁷. The evolution of the border institutions in the abovementioned countries is further explored.

THE BORDER GUARD OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

Since 1990, the Border Guard of the Republic of Poland (BG RP), which succeeded the Border Defence Forces (BDF) that protected the borders from 1945 to 1990, has guarded the border of the Polish neighbours.

The Border Guard of the Republic of Poland, with the status of a self-

⁶ On the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. The Laws of Ukraine, in <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/661-15#Text> (Accessed on 21.05.2023).

⁷ *Derzhavna prykordonna sluzhba Ukrainy: Zavdannia, orhanizatsiia, perspektyvy* [State Border Guard Service of Ukraine: Tasks, Organization, Perspectives], Kyiv, Derzhcomkordon, 2004, p. 4.

governing entity, became part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration of the Republic of Poland, which determined its organizational and staffing structure.⁸ The BG RP had central and regional bodies. The main headquarters of the BG RP, located in Warsaw and led by a Chief Commander, served as the central administrative body responsible for border security. The Main Command coordinated the work of departmental regional divisions, which, in turn, were responsible for the operations of border guard posts, checkpoints, and battalions. The border guard units consisted of enlisted personnel initially, but during the 1990s and early 2000s, there was a transition to a professional basis of recruitment.

Before Poland's official accession to the European Union in 2004, its border guard agency implemented a program to strengthen the eastern border and build infrastructure along the border with Germany and the Czech Republic. It modernized existing border crossing points, improved personnel resources, amended the powers of legal acts governing foreigners, and finalized the principles of the state migration policy by EU standards. The Polish Border Guard's Bieszczady (Przemysl) and Bug (Chełm) divisions, as well as separate intercity (regional) operational border guard units, controlled the border with Ukraine. Special rapid response units were created within these divisions, stationed in the cities of Sanok and Przemysl. There were fourteen border guard stations, seven international checkpoints, and seven simplified checkpoints along the border with Ukraine. Since 2000, there has been an increase in the number of personnel on the border with Ukraine, with more active use of radio-technical equipment and nearly doubling the frequency of border patrol aviation flights. As for the border protection system of the Polish Border Guard with Ukraine, its organization was based on a layered system of operational, investigative, reconnaissance, and regulatory measures carried out by personnel from border guard stations, special units, operational units, and separate intercity (regional) operational border guard units under the Main Command.

Currently, there is an effective international cooperation between the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and Border Guards of Poland. Cooperation takes place in the field of border protection, exchange of information on the situation at the state border, and joint risk analysis⁹. According to the official information of

⁸ Strazgraniczna.pl. [Border Guards], in <https://www.strazgraniczna.pl/pl/straz-graniczna/struktura-sg> (Accessed on 21.05.2023).

⁹ *Respublika Polshcha* [The Republic of Poland], in <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/1590393158-Respublika-Polshcha/> (Accessed on 03.11.2023).

the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, in 2020, 264 illegal migrants were detained at the state border between Ukraine and Poland. They found 282 weapons and 1300 pieces of ammunition. Seized: 53.1 kg of drugs and goods worth UAH 186.1 million; 597,000 packs of cigarettes; 10,000 litres of alcohol¹⁰.

THE SLOVAKIAN STATE BORDER PROTECTION SYSTEM

The Border Police and the Police for Foreigners, which operated as a separate division under the Police Corps of the Ministry of Interior, carried out the protection of the state border in Slovakia¹¹. Regional divisions of the Border Police and the Police for Foreigners were incorporated into the territorial police groups of the border districts. As of July 2000, the Border Police and Police for Foreigners Bureau of the Police Corps of the Ministry of Interior became the central apparatus. By 2003, the Border Police had undergone complete professionalization. The protection of the state border with Ukraine was carried out by two divisions stationed in the administrative centres of regions – the cities of Prešov and Kosice. The divisions of the Border Police and the Police for Foreigners for direct border protection deployed Border Police detachments. Additionally, international checkpoints were operational for border control along the Slovak–Ukrainian border crossing section. In total, nine Border Police detachments and four international checkpoints were established on the Slovak side of the border with Ukraine. In 2003, a special unit combatting illegal migration began operating on the Slovak–Ukrainian border. The core of the border protection system with Ukraine consisted of operational, investigative, reconnaissance, and regulatory measures carried out by personnel from the Border Police detachments, reserve border special units, and operational units with the involvement of the local population.

Currently, there is effective international cooperation between the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and Slovakia. Current problems on the adjacent state border include illegal migrants, smuggling of goods, and ensuring the passage of Ukrainian citizens in need of temporary protection (asylum)¹². According to the official information of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine,

¹⁰ *Derzhavna prykordonna sluzhba Ukrainy*. [The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine], in https://old.dpsu.gov.ua/upload/file/4_rozdil2020.pdf (Accessed on 03.11.2023).

¹¹ V. I. Baratiuk, O. M. Stavytskyi, O. V. Zhabenko, A. I. Voitovych, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹² *Slovakia* [The Slovakia], in <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/Slovacka-Respublika/> (Accessed on 03.11.2023).

in 2020, the Ukrainian border guards at the state border between Ukraine and Slovakia detained 217 illegal migrants. They found 14 weapons and 110 pieces of ammunition. Seized: 0.61 kg of drugs and goods worth UAH 12.6 million; 8000 packs of cigarettes; 1200 litres of alcohol¹³.

THE PECULIARITIES OF THE HUNGARIAN STATE BORDER PROTECTION SYSTEM

The Border Guard (BG) carried out the protection of the state border of Hungary. In 1990, a reform of the entire border guard system began in Hungary. In particular, the detachments were reformed into border directorates, and specialized educational institutions were opened to train professional border guards. By 1998, the Hungarian Border Guard had fully transitioned to a professional basis¹⁴. The BG of Hungary, operating as the Main Directorate, was a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The protection of the state border was entrusted to ten border directorates. Under the direct supervision of the directorates, there were seventy-one representations of border checks, fifty-three for border security/border surveillance, twenty-six criminal intelligence services, ten special operations divisions, and eight foreigners' affairs centres. In preparation for EU accession, Hungarian border guards continuously improved the effectiveness of border protection measures and worked on enhancing border security efficiency. This was done by increasing the border agency's staff to 11,760 people and modernising its technology.

Nyírbátor¹⁵ Border Directorate (located in Nyírbátor, Hungary) was responsible for guarding the state border with Ukraine. To directly protect the border, the Border Guard established five representations¹⁶. In 2001, the Main Directorate of the Border Guard arranged for the establishment of five new representations within the territory of the Nyírbátor Border Directorate. To carry out border control in this area, the following checkpoints were set up: "Záhony", "Tiszabecs", "Beregsurány", "Eperjeske", as well as simplified checkpoints:

¹³ *Derzhavna prykordonna sluzhba Ukrainy* [The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine], in https://old.dpsu.gov.ua/upload/file/4_rozdil2020.pdf (Accessed on 03.11.2023).

¹⁴ Y. Deak, *Znaiomtesia: Prykordonna okhorona Uhorshchyny* [Meet: Border Guard of Hungary], in "Kordon", 2003, № 2, p. 32.

¹⁵ L. Petrényi, *A Határőrség és a Nyírbátori Határőr Igazgatóság története 1945-től az integrációig* [History of the Border Guard and the Nyírbátor Border Guard Directorate from 1945 to integration], Debreceni Egyetem, 2009, 57 p.

¹⁶ V. I. Baratiuk, O. M. Stavyskyi, O. V. Zhabenko, A. I. Voitovych, *op. cit.*, p. 24-26.

“Barabás” and “Lónya”¹⁷. Thus, there were ten representations of the Border Guard (posts), four border-crossing points, and two simplified checkpoints functioning on the border with Ukraine. The criminal intelligence department of the directorate and its two subordinate criminal intelligence services in the towns of Záhony and Beregsurány carried out operational work. Two units of “border hunters” also operated in the Hungarian-Ukrainian border area: “Szabolcs” Company (in Záhony) and “Bereg” Company (in Csenger). Considering the existing organizational and staffing structure on the border with Ukraine, approximately 1000 Hungarian border guards were on duty. The basis of border protection with Ukraine consisted of operational search, intelligence, and regulatory measures carried out by the personnel of border representations, rapid response units, the operational staff of Nyírbátor Border Directorate, criminal intelligence services, and separate border operational agencies.

Currently, there is effective international cooperation between the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and Hungary. Current issues on the adjacent state border are combating the smuggling of goods and ensuring the passage of Ukrainian citizens in need of temporary protection (asylum)¹⁸. According to the official information of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, in 2020, the Border Guard Service of Ukraine on the state border between Ukraine and Hungary detained 80 illegal migrants. They found 13 weapons and 27 pieces of ammunition. Seized: 0.71 kg of drugs and goods worth UAH 20.2 million; 342,000 packs of cigarettes; 614 litres of alcohol¹⁹.

THE ROMANIAN BORDER POLICE

Until 1999, the protection of the state border on land and sea in Romania was entrusted to the National Border Guards Command (Border Guard), while control at the border crossing points was under the responsibility of the Main Directorate of Border Police. These two bodies of border guard organizations were structurally incorporated as independent directorates within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁸ *Uhorshchyna* [The Hungary], in <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/1590396613-Ugorshchina/> (Accessed on 03.11.2023).

¹⁹ *Derzhavna prykordonna sluzhba Ukrainy* [The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine], in https://old.dpsu.gov.ua/upload/file/4_rozdil2020.pdf

https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/upload/%D0%91ila_kniga/4_rozdil2020.pdf (Accessed on 03.11.2023).

The Border Guard organization consisted of border brigades, regiments, and battalions, from which detachments and posts were deployed. The main form of border protection was military-operational, while the Border Police focused on operational border control at the border crossing points²⁰.

As a result of the law enforcement reform, starting from July 1, 1999, the Border Police (under the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the Coast Guard were tasked with guarding Romania's state borders on land and at sea, as well as protecting the continental shelf and the exclusive (maritime) economic zone. Based on the nine brigades of the Border Guard, nine divisions of the Border Police were established²¹.

The General Inspectorate of the Border Police, established within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, carried out the overall management of border security in all directions, including the maritime border.

The Romanian Border Police had a widely branched structure. The Inspectorate had authority over all units of the Border Police, twenty inspections, eight training centres for sergeant preparation, personnel retraining school, and a school for training personnel to work on border patrols. The local offices of the Border Police were subordinate to the respective county inspections. At this level, groups and sectors of the Border Police were formed. Each border region had its own territorial administration²².

The jurisdiction of each local Border Police extended to a border area within a radius of 30 km from the state borderline and the coast of the Black Sea, as well as within 10 km of the navigable waters of the Danube, which is open for international navigation.

The following units of the General Inspectorate of the Border Police were responsible for protecting national interests along the section of the state border with Ukraine: the "Satu Mare" Territorial Service of the Border Police (Satu Mare City), with nine border police sectors and five border checkpoints; the "Maramureş" Territorial Service of the Border Police (Sighet City), with five border police sectors and two checkpoints; the "Suceava" Territorial Service of the Border Police (Rădăuţi City), with four border police sectors and six checkpoints;

²⁰ *Skhovyshche dokumentiv Administratsii derzhavnoi prykordonnoi sluzhby Ukrainy* [Storage of Documents of the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine], Inv. 8265, Case 79, Vol. 2, s. 365.

²¹ *Ibid.*, s. 331.

²² *Prykordonna okhorona sumizhnykh krain (dovidkovi dani)* [Border Guard of Adjacent Countries (reference data)], Kyiv, Derzhcomkordon, 2002, 51 p.

the “Botoșani” Territorial Service, which had four border police sectors (eight in total) and one checkpoint.²³

The Coast Guard (located in Constanța) guarded the river (Danube) and maritime sections of the state border. The Border Police conducted county inspections on the Romanian-Ukrainian border under its supervision. Specifically, the “Tulcea” (Tulcea City) county inspection had six border police sectors, and the “Braila” (Brăila City) county inspection had a border police sector called “Văcăreni” that was in charge of the border with Ukraine.

In addition, the units of the Coast Guard included the following: the fourth Maritime Brigade (Constanța City), a separate Maritime Division (Constanța City), a separate Maritime Division (Mangalia City), and a separate River Brigade (Brăila City). The fleet of the Coast Guard consisted of twenty-one “Shanghai” type cutters and a significant number of small patrol boats²⁴.

Starting in 2001, Border Police units implemented a professional recruitment system for staff.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Romania has been rapidly integrating into Euro-Atlantic security structures, and in 2004, it became a member of NATO, followed by its accession to the EU in 2007. During this period, the protection of the state border with Ukraine relied on a system of operational, investigative, military, regulatory, and intelligence measures carried out by the personnel of the border police sectors and the operational staff of regional administrations of the Border Police.

Ukraine and Romania signed the agreement “On the Regime of the Ukrainian–Romanian State Border, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in Border Matters” on June 17, 2003 (ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on May 12, 2004, and by the Parliament of Romania on April 5, 2004)²⁵, and have been

²³ For a minute presentation of the situation, please see

<https://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/en/main/pg-teritorial-structures-19.html> and
<https://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/en/main/pg-border-crossing-points-88.html>
(Accessed on 28.10.23)

²⁴ *Skhovyshche dokumentiv Administratsii derzhavnoi prykordonnoi sluzhby Ukrainy* [Storage of Documents of the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine], Inv. 8166, Case 46, Vol. 1, s. 256.

²⁵ *Dohovir mizh Ukrainoiu ta Rumuniieiu pro rezhym ukrainsko-rumunskoho derzhavnogo kordonu, spivrobitnytstvo ta vzaiemnu dopomohu z prykordonnykh pytan vid 17 chervnia 2003 r.* [Agreement between Ukraine and Romania on the Regime of the Ukrainian–Romanian State Border, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in Border Issues of June 17, 2003.], in <https://romania.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobitnictvo/180->

continuously developing their border interaction and cooperation.²⁶

Currently, there is effective international cooperation between the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and Romania. The main area of cooperation is the organization of joint patrolling on the adjacent state border.²⁷ According to the official information of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, in 2020, the Border Guard Service of Ukraine on the state border between Ukraine and Romania detained 131 illegal migrants. They found 171 weapons and 139 pieces of ammunition. Seized: 14.1 kg of drugs and goods worth UAH 28.5 million; 1.3 million packs of cigarettes; 3,700 litres of alcohol.²⁸

THE BORDER PROTECTION SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

In Moldova, the formation of the state border and border protection took place under extremely challenging conditions. Presidential Decree No. 190 of the Republic of Moldova dated September 3, 1991, placed the section of the Western border of the former Soviet Union that passed through Moldova's territory under the new and exclusive jurisdiction of the state of Moldova. The Ministry of National Security was entrusted with the task of guarding the state border.

By Presidential Decree No. 139 of the Republic of Moldova dated June 10, 1992, the Ministry of National Security was proposed to initiate the establishment of its own border institution. Following this decree, on June 15, 1992, Government Resolution No. 400 was adopted, which contributed to the creation of the Border Guard Troops of the Republic of Moldova²⁹. In 1999, through the Law of December 23, the Border Guard Troops of the Republic of Moldova were reformed into the Department of Border Guard Troops of the Republic of Moldova. In 2000, the

dogovirno-pravova-baza-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-rumunijeju (Accessed on 06.04.2023).

²⁶ *Plan rozvytku spivrobitnytstva prykordonnykh vidomstv Ukrainy i Rumunii na 2019 rik pidpysaly holovy sluzhb dvokh krain* [Development Plan for Cooperation between the Border Guard Services of Ukraine and Romania for 2019 was signed by the Heads of the Services of the two countries], in <https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/political/550883.html> (Accessed on 06.04.2023).

²⁷ *Rumuniia* [The Romania], in <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/Rumuniya/> (Accessed on 03.11.2023).

²⁸ *Derzhavna prykordonna sluzhba Ukrainy* [The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine], in https://old.dpsu.gov.ua/upload/file/4_rozdil2020.pdf (Accessed on 03.11.2023).

²⁹ I. Nykytiuk, *Departament Prykordonnykh viisk Respubliky Moldova: istoriia ta sohodennia* [Department of the Border Guard Troops of the Republic of Moldova: History and Contemporaneity], "Kordon", 2004, № 4, p. 22-23.

Department of Border Troops was separated from the Ministry of National Security and reorganized into an independent state institution.

The development of the Ukrainian border protection was marked by significant difficulties, primarily related to locating the border units and creating connections with the local population³⁰.

The organization of border security with Ukraine was based on a system of operational, search, regulatory, and military measures carried out by personnel of border checkpoints, border commandants, the operational staff of directorates and the Border Guard Department.

According to Government Resolution No. 357 dated April 23, 2005, the Border Guard Department was reorganized into the Border Guard Service of the Republic of Moldova. The organizational structure was also redesigned, with border units transformed into regional directorates responsible for the surveillance and control of the state border.

On December 1, 2005, the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was launched in Moldova and Ukraine. The Presidents of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine initiated this international project. It marked the beginning of the real process of integrating Moldova's border institution into the European structures of national security. On November 22, 2006, an official delegation from the Border Guard Service of Moldova participated in a trilateral meeting on border issues between the Republic of Moldova, the European Union, and Ukraine, held in Brussels.

By Government Decision No. 1210 dated December 27, 2010, the National Strategy for Integrated Border Management was approved in Moldova. The guiding principles of the strategy are "European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, and Prosperity." Its implementation was required to ensure the success of the Association Agreement negotiations with the EU and the dialogue on visa liberalization.

The Government of Moldova passed a draft law in December 2011 that will reform the Republic of Moldova's Border Guard Service as the Border Police and move it to the Ministry of Internal Affairs beginning July 1, 2012. In addition to the responsibilities of the border guard service, the new institution assumed the duty to combat cross-border crime.³¹

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³¹ Ministerul Afacerilor Interne /Guvernul Republicii Moldova [Ministry of Internal Affairs /Government of the Republic of Moldova], in <https://border.gov.md/index.php/ro/istoria-politiei-de-frontiera> (Accessed on

Currently, there is effective international cooperation between the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and Moldova. The current challenges are the expansion of exports of goods in the context of Russia's full-scale aggression and the introduction of joint border control at the state border checkpoints.³² According to the official information of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, in 2020, the Border Guard Service of Ukraine on the state border between Ukraine and Moldova detained 241 illegal migrants. They found 40 weapons and 902 pieces of ammunition. Seized: 3.4 kg of drugs and goods worth UAH 18.2 million; 186,000 packs of cigarettes; 29,300 litres of alcohol.³³

To keep the information confidential, with the beginning of the Russian invasion in 2022, Ukraine's State Border Guard Service ceased giving comprehensive information on its activities in 2021, 2022 and 2023.

Therefore, it is possible to present only general reports on the results of the work of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the study. The official report of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine on the overall results of its work in 2021 indicated that the border guards detained about 15,300 illegal migrants. They found 630 weapons and 30,400 pieces of ammunition. 700 kg of drugs and goods worth UAH 690 million were seized.³⁴

The official report of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine on the results of its work for 9 months of 2023 indicated that its employees detained 4,231 illegal migrants at the border. They found 714 weapons and 50692 pieces of ammunition. They seized 131.7 kg of drugs and goods worth UAH 293.88 million. The official Report of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine on the results of work for 9 months of 2022 indicates that its employees detained 10013 illegal migrants. They found 364 weapons and 11571 pieces of ammunition. They seized 84.5 kg of drugs and goods worth UAH 456.81 million³⁵.

International cooperation with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex is an essential duty of Ukraine's State Border Guard Service.

05.05.2023).

³² *Moldova* [The Moldova], in <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/1590397040-Respublika-Moldova/> (Accessed on 04.11.2023).

³³ *Derzhavna prykordonna sluzhba Ukrainy* [The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine], in https://old.dpsu.gov.ua/upload/file/4_rozdil2020.pdf (Accessed on 03.11.2023).

³⁴ *Uriadovyi portal* [Government portal], in <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/zvit-derzhavnanyi-prikordonnoyi-sluzhbi-pro-rezultati-roboti-u-2021-roci> (Accessed on 04.11.2023).

³⁵ *Derzhavna prykordonna sluzhba Ukrainy* [The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine], in <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/Potochniy-rik/> (Accessed on 04.11.2023).

Ukraine continues the process of integration into the European Union. It is necessary to implement national border guard strategies and common national interests. Due to Russia's military aggression, the Government of Ukraine suspended the operation of 111 control points on the state border with Russia and Belarus. Border control was ensured at 124 control points on the state border with the European Union. In the first weeks of the war, people had to be evacuated through the operating control points to save their lives. According to official data from the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, from February 24, 2022, to September 2023, 55 million people crossed the state border of Ukraine, including 29 million people leaving Ukraine, as well as more than 77,000 vehicles with humanitarian cargo³⁶. Since the beginning of the war, Frontex has activated its crisis response mechanism and created a special response team that works 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Through this mechanism, Frontex regularly informs Member States and EU institutions about the situation at border crossings and monitors refugee flows. Between February 24, 2022, and the end of 2022, Ukrainian citizens travelled to Poland (8,318,304); Slovakia (994,881); Hungary (1,299,058); Romania (1,647,982); and Moldova (608,904).³⁷

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the research, Ukraine's border institution has undergone its historical development from a military structure to a European-standard law enforcement agency, alongside neighbouring countries that are now members of the EU.

With the formation of the EU as an economic and political union of states with common borders, reforms took place regarding the demilitarization of borders. The border institutions of EU countries transformed into state bodies that provide services to citizens for crossing borders, transporting goods, and travelling by vehicle, among other things. Purely military units within European border structures were reduced. Thus, law enforcement principles became the foundation for protecting the state border in European countries. Later on, the

³⁶ *Intehrovane upravlinnia kordonamy u formati FRONTEX* [Integrated border management in the FRONTEX format], in <https://dpsu.gov.ua/ua/news/Integrovane-upravlinnya-kordonami-u-formati-FRONTEX/> (Accessed on 04.11.2023).

³⁷ *Frontex. 2022. In brief.* Frontex, 2023. p. 8, in https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/General/In_Brief_2022/2022_in_brief.pdf (Accessed on 04.11.2023).

border agencies transitioned to the status of law enforcement agencies and started performing police control functions at the external borders of the EU.

Considering the socio-political changes in Europe at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, reforming the Border Guard Troops of Ukraine into the State Border Guard Service was a logical necessity. The reform involved shifting away from military defence tasks towards law enforcement functions.

Indeed, the evolution of Ukraine's border institution into a European law enforcement agency and the change in approaches to the organization of the entire border security system is entirely consistent with Ukraine's strategic course towards European integration and NATO membership. These transformations were aimed at harmonizing Ukraine's practices and standards with those of European and Euro-Atlantic structures, demonstrating Ukraine's commitment to aligning with international norms and fostering cooperation with its European partners.

Russia's armed aggression in 2014 proved that it was premature to exclude the military component of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service's duties. The elimination of military units within the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine was a mistake of the Ukrainian government. This mistake can only be explained by ignoring the potential military threat from neighbouring Russia.

Further research will examine the historical experience of border structures in other EU member states. Studying the development and evolution of their border institutions may provide valuable insights regarding best practices, strategies, and approaches to border security and management. Comparing and learning from the experiences of other EU countries will contribute to a broader understanding of effective border governance and assist in identifying potential areas for improvement in Ukraine's border institution. This analysis can also guide policy decisions and future developments in the context of Ukraine's European integration process.

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RESPONSE OF THE MEDIA TO THE WAR: THE CASE OF UKRAINE'S UNITED NEWS TELETHON¹

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Abstract: *In the conditions of war, the conflicting parties use the available means of communication to interact with the public and to achieve their strategic goals. The rapid development of communication technologies provides new communication opportunities. Even though the current war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is called "The First Social Media War", a powerful information role was played by television, particularly the United News telethon, founded by the largest media groups of Ukraine in the first days of the war. Media channels stopped their separate broadcasting and divided a common telecast among them to inform 24/7. The article analyses the achievements of this new practice of news reporting, particularly the consolidation of society, the influence on public opinion and support for government decisions, the provision of objective and verified information, the fight against fakes, the ability of channels to survive in wartime, etc. However, the unification of the news presentation format is criticised due to the uniformity of the content, the lack of alternative points of view, and the dominance of the authorities in the media space. The possible transformation/disappearance of the United News telethon is outlined.*

Keywords: war, media, communication, media space, public opinion, United News telethon.

Rezumat: *Răspunsul mass-media războiului. Cazul teledonului ucrainean „Știri*

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¹ This study was conducted in the framework of the Jean Monnet Module "EU Strategic Communications: Counteraction to Destructive Influences" (No.101047033 ERASMUS-JMO-2021-MODULE).

unite". În condiții de război, părțile aflate în conflict folosesc mijloacele de comunicare disponibile pentru a interacționa cu publicul și pentru a-și atinge obiectivele strategice. Dezvoltarea rapidă a tehnologiilor de comunicare oferă noi oportunități de comunicare. Chiar dacă actualul război al Federației Ruse împotriva Ucrainei se numește „Primul Război Social Media”, un rol informațional puternic l-a jucat televiziunea, în special teledonul United News, fondat de cele mai mari grupuri media din Ucraina în primele zile ale războiului. Canalele media și-au oprit difuzarea separată și au împărțit o transmisie comună între ele pentru a informa 24 ore din 24. Articolul analizează realizările acestei noi practici de reportaj de știri – în special consolidarea societății, influența asupra opiniei publice și sprijinirea deciziilor guvernamentale, furnizarea de informații obiective și verificate, lupta împotriva falsurilor, capacitatea canalelor de a supraviețui în timp de război etc. Cu toate acestea, unificarea formatului de prezentare a știrilor este criticată din cauza uniformității conținutului, a lipsei de puncte de vedere alternative și a dominației autorităților în spațiul media. Se subliniază posibila transformare/dispariție a teledonului United News.

INTRODUCTION

From the point of view of the media, war is a “story to be continued” where there are tension, unexpected turns of the “plot” and strong emotions. Consequently, any news about the war is sure to attract an audience and the media enter into fierce competition for exclusive material. However, media behaviour in times of war is significantly different from activities in peacetime because journalists interact with sensitive content and must be aware of and predict all the consequences of what they are talking about. In other words, reporters are not only able to unite and support citizens but also to incite hatred and provoke destructive actions. In addition, media professionals find themselves in the line of “crossfire” (not only in the literal sense) between politicians and pressure from the military, which also significantly affects the balance between objectivity, impartiality and the search for strong emotions.

Russia began aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and such media groups as *Inter*, *StarLightMedia*, *Ukraina* and *1+1* (23 TV channels in total), which represented the interests of certain political forces and oligarchs, used reports about the course of the military campaign to position political parties and their leaders.² Before 2014, the political struggle took place around the topic of social protection

² Roman Kravets, *Televizor i vybory. Koho pidtrymuyut' Akhmetov, Pinchuk, Kolomoys'kyi i Firtash*. [Television and elections. Who are supported by Akhmetov, Pinchuk, Kolomoysky and Firtash], in “Ukrayinska Pravda”, December 7, 2018, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/12/7/7200495/> (Accessed on 23.04.2023).

of the population. Since 2014, proposals for conflict resolution have become a “field of discord”. However, throughout 2014, in a situation of uncertainty, unexpected and incomprehensible threat, the Ukrainian media performed their function of rallying Ukrainian citizens to oppose the enemy. During this period, even political disagreements disappeared from the media space. However, the media and citizens gradually got used to the war. The next Presidential and Verkhovna Rada elections were approaching. And the media again began to concentrate on political problems and interests which led to the polarisation of Ukrainian society and the strengthening of protest sentiments.³

February 24, 2022, was a turning point for the media sphere in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine violated both the state and information borders of the country. Ukrainian media faced new conditions and requests. To provide citizens with all the necessary information promptly – from air alerts and possible missile strikes to events on the front – some Media Holdings in Ukraine united and started working 24/7. This is how the *United News* telethon was formed – a unique example of the joint coordinated activity of journalists (of previously competing channels) in the conditions of war.

Arnaud Mercier claims that “each conflict since the advent of war correspondents has seen innovations in the realm of media coverage: mobilising an entire nation by means of a censored press (WWI), radio and cinema used as a means of mass propaganda and mobilisation (WWII), more mobile filming equipment and an increase in the number of international journalists sent to the combat zone (Vietnam War), live satellite links and the appearance of the CNN worldwide non-stop news network (1991 Gulf War), and a globalised media scene, with several competing non-stop news channels representing opposing views on the issues (latest wars in Afghanistan and Iraq)”⁴.

We intend to scrutinise a new media practice, i.e., telethon, created under

³ Yuriy Pavlenko, Oleksiy Haran et al., *Vyborcha kampaniya 2020: u 2019-mu vsi media byly v odnu tochku, zaraz my povernulysya do oliharkhichnoho plyuralizmu. Opytuvannya ekspertiv i politykiv. Chastyna II* [The 2020 election campaign: in 2019, all the media hit the same spot, now we are back to oligarchic pluralism. Survey of experts and politicians. Part II], in “Detector Media”, October 28, 2020, <https://detector.media/infospace/article/181962/2020-10-28-vyborcha-kampaniya-2020-u-2019-mu-vsi-media-byly-v-odnu-tochku-zaraz-my-povernulysya-do-oligarkhichnogo-plyuralizmu-opytuvannya-ekspertiv-i-politykiv-chastyna-ii/> (Accessed on 23.04.2023).

⁴ Arnaud Mercier, *War and media: Constancy and Convulsion*, in “International Review of the Red Cross”, Vol. 87, № 860, December 2005, p. 653, <https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/a21918.pdf> (Accessed on 02.07.2023).

the conditions of the RF invasion of Ukraine. We assume that the *United News* telethon shaped the attitude of Ukrainians towards the war, in particular, the broad support of Ukrainian citizens to resist the enemy both on the battlefield and in public space. Therefore, we aim 1) to investigate whether the *United News* telethon fulfilled its main mission, i.e., to be a source of objective information, to consolidate society, to provide moral support to citizens; 2) to analyse the observance of journalistic standards in war conditions; 3) to find out the prospects for the transformation/closing of the telethon.

The research period covers February 24, 2022–March 24, 2023. The *United News* telethon was watched. The official reports of the *Ministry of Culture and Information Policy* (<https://mkip.gov.ua/>) and the *Institute of Mass Information* (journalistic analytical centre) (<https://imi.org.ua/>), the *Detector Media* monitoring and research of media landscape in Ukraine (<https://en.detector.media/>) and statistical data of the *Rating Sociological Group* and *InMind* company were analysed.

The methodological basis of the research includes the theory of framing⁵, i.e., how the media packages and presents information, for instance, about the war, the enemy and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, to the public; agenda-setting theory⁶, i.e., the more attention the media gives to certain issues, for instance, the heroic battle for the Ukrainian cities and settlements, the more likely the public will be to label those issues as vital ones; mediatization theory⁷ which outlines social changes “caused” by mass media, for example, the change of attitude to everything related to Russia. The authors have applied a complex of general theoretical methods, i.e., deduction, induction, generalisation and synthesis as well as the principles of scientific objectivity, comparison, reliability and analysis.

This paper contributes to furthering the understanding of the complex relations between war and media and provides insights into how media, specifically TV, respond to war, can shape public opinion, and unite the society to fight the aggressor. However, the research does not give a detailed analysis of the media impact on war outcomes; it could be the focus of further study.

⁵ Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, New York, NY et al., Harper & Row, 1974.

⁶ James Dearing and Everett Rogers, *Agenda-Setting*, Thousand Oaks, CA Sage, 1996.

⁷ Andreas Hepp, *Mediatization and the ‘molding force’ of the media*, in “Communication”, 37 (1), 2012, p. 7, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276202928_Mediatization_and_the_'molding_force'_of_the_media/references (Accessed on 12.07.2023).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The issues of media coverage and propaganda in war were not overlooked by scholars. For instance, V. Bratic has analysed the history of media use in conflicts since ancient times⁸. In *Propaganda and Conflict: War, Media and Shaping the Twentieth Century*, the authors explore the changing interactions of media, propaganda and diplomacy, specifically WWI, demonstrating that the media could shape public opinion which politicians feared; these tendencies intensified in WWII.⁹ G. S. Jowett examined propaganda from a historical perspective claiming that the WWI marked a watershed in the development of propaganda techniques.¹⁰ S. Aday analysed the relations between the news media and US foreign policy with particular emphasis on war.¹¹ Propaganda and genocidal campaigns were researched by A. Des Forges¹² and L. Kirschke.¹³ Myths of war and in war, communication and culture in peacetime and war, military-industrial communication complex and censorship in the Gulf War were the research topics in *Communication and Culture in War and Peace*.¹⁴

Analysing the role of media in recent wars, Hoskins and O'Loughlin¹⁵ identified three phases of conflict mediatisation, namely, 1) the broadcast war during the 1990s with the dominant role of international news channels, such as CNN; 2)

⁸ Vladimir Bratic, *Examining peace-oriented media in areas of violent conflict*, in "International Communication Gazette", Vol.70, Issue 6, 2008, p. 487-503, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048508096397> (Accessed on 19.03.2023).

⁹ Mark Connelly, Jo Fox, Stefan Goebel and Ulf Schmidt (Eds.), *Propaganda and Conflict: War, Media and Shaping the Twentieth Century*, Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.

¹⁰ Garth S. Jowett, *Propaganda and communication: The re-emergence of a research tradition*, in "Journal of Communication", 37 (1), 1987, p. 97-114.

¹¹ Sean Aday, *The US Media, Foreign Policy and Public Support for War*, in Kate Kenski, Kathleen Hall Jamieson (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on Political Communication*, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 315-332.

¹² Alison Des Forges, *Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/12/rwanda-leave-none-to-tell-the-story.pdf (Accessed 08.06.2023).

¹³ Linda Kirschke, *Broadcasting genocide; censorship, propaganda, & state-sponsored violence in Rwanda 1990-1994*, London, ARTICLE 19, 1996, <https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/rwanda-broadcasting-genocide.pdf> (Accessed 08.06.2023).

¹⁴ Colleen Roach (Ed.), *Communication and Culture in War and Peace*, Sage Publications, 1993.

¹⁵ Andrew Hoskins and Ben O'Loughlin, *Arrested War: The Third Phase of Mediatisation*, in "Information, Communication and Society", 18 (11), 2015, p. 1320-1338.

the “diffused war” during the 2000s when the internet and social media offered new possibilities to distribute information and documents; and 3) the “arrested war” in which professional media and military institutions can control social media dynamics and use them for their own needs.

Ph. Taylor, in his book *Munitions of the Mind*, suggests that, in a nuclear age, we need peace propagandists – people whose job is to increase communication, understanding and dialogue between different peoples with different beliefs. A gradual process of explanation will generate greater trust and therefore greater empathy and consensus will emerge. Fear, hypocrisy and ignorance are the principal enemies of peace and peaceful coexistence.¹⁶ In *War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective*, D. Miller claims that in wartime “the “unfriendly” information should be destroyed, wherever it comes from”.¹⁷

To some extent, war reporting contradicts the normative foundations of journalism, i.e., to present all sides of a conflict, to have some kind of neutrality,¹⁸ as journalists are supposed to support their “own side”¹⁹, to employ a patriotic framework of reporting and cover events that threaten the well-being of their nation.²⁰

Analysing the impact of wars on the evolution of the media over several centuries and following WWI, K. Jones claimed that “War not only creates a supply of news but a demand for it”.²¹ In other words, war makes media thrive. Referring to the period of WWI, H. Laswell focused on the power of mass media influence on audience attitudes: “After the Civil War, the American nation was a warm friend

¹⁶ Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the mind: A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present era* (3rd ed.), Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 324, <https://cryptome.org/2013/01/aaron-swartz/Mind-Munitions.pdf> (Accessed 18.03.2023).

¹⁷ David Miller, *Information Dominance: The Philosophy of Total Propaganda Control?*, in Yahya R. Kamalipour, Nancy Snow (Eds.), *War, Media and Propaganda: A global Perspective*, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004, p. 9.

¹⁸ Allan Stuart, Barbie Zelizer (Eds.), *Reporting war. Journalism in Wartime*, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, p. 4-5.

¹⁹ Piers Robinson, Stuart Allan, Barbie Zelizer (Eds.), *Researching US media-state relations and twenty-first century wars*, in *Reporting War: journalism in wartime*, Routledge, 2004, p. 96-112.

²⁰ Silvio Waisbord, *Journalism, Risk, and Patriotism*, in *Journalism after September 11*, London and New York, Routledge, 2002, p. 201-219.

²¹ Kennedy Jones, *Fleet Street & Downing Street*, London, Hutchinson and Co., 1919, p. 198, <https://archive.org/details/fleetstreetdowni00joneuoft/page/106/mode/2up> (Accessed on 12.05.2023).

of Russia <...> but American friendship passed over into active hostility. The explanation is very simple: America was fed on the British Press and Britain was in conflict with Russia.”²² The authorities use the media to their own advantage to strengthen their control in a potentially turbulent time even in countries far from the main theatres of combat actions.²³ Summarizing the results of the 20th century wars, A. K. Rai claims that “governments, mindful of their own popularity, generally seek to harness mass media in wartime to persuade citizens of a war’s justice and the enemy’s implacability”.²⁴

Since WWI, governments developed control regimes over media to counter enemy propaganda, the spread of unwanted information, and espionage.²⁵ During WWII, there was a military censorship service that controlled access to information for the press.²⁶ In the US, radio significantly exceeded the use of other mass media.²⁷ The Department of Information contained a Radio Division whose activity was recognised as an important tool of the psychological warfare program.²⁸

²² Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, New York, Peter Smith, 1938, p. 187, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015000379902&view=1up&seq=279> (Accessed on 12.05.2003).

²³ Jared Davidson, *The history of Censorship and State Control During the First World War, in New Zealand’s First World War Centenary Programme Ran From 2014 To 2019*, 2018, <https://ww100.govt.nz/censorship-state-control> (Accessed on 12.05.2003).

²⁴ Ajai K. Rai, *Media at War: Issues and Limitations*, in “Strategic Analysis”, 24 (9), 2000, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_dec00raa01.html (Accessed on 12.05.2003).

²⁵ Andreas Marklund, *Communications Surveillance during World War I*, in “EHNE. Digital Encyclopedia of European History”, 2020, <https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/material-civilization/between-control-and-liberty/communications-surveillance-during-world-war-i> (Accessed on 14.05.2003). Kendall Banning, *The Military Censorship of Pictures: Photographs that came under the ban during the World War – and why*, U.S. Army Signal Reserve Corps, 1926, p. 1-2, <https://sgp.fas.org/eprint/photos.pdf> (Accessed on 14.05.2003). *Espionage Act of 1917*, in “The State Historical Society of Iowa”, 2023, <https://iowaculture.gov/history/education/educator-resources/primary-source-sets/americas-involvement-world-war-i/espionage> (Accessed on 14.05.2003).

²⁶ *Media in Wartime*, in “PBS”, 08 August, 2022, <https://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/media-in-wartime/index.html> (Accessed on 28.03.2003).

²⁷ Anthony Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1976, p. 147-148, <https://archive.org/details/propagandaartofp0000rhod/page/n3/mode/2up> (Accessed on 28.03.2003).

²⁸ *Records of the Office of Inter-American Affairs*. Vol. Inventory of Record Group 229. Washington D.C.: National Archives and Record Services – General Services Administration, 1973, p. 26,

Consequently, *Radio War Guide* was created.²⁹ However, during the Vietnam War, the situation was completely different as it was the “first television war” – “For the first time in American history, the news from the front lines was brought straight into the living room”.³⁰ The media is believed to have played a large role in the defeat of the United States, as a tendency toward negative reporting helped undermine support for the war in the US while its uncensored coverage helped the enemy in Vietnam.³¹

As we can see, success in the conflict largely depends on media support and the resulting attitude (perception of the conflict). After the successful Gulf War in the early 1990s, the famous American general J. Shalikashvili confirms this idea: “We don’t win unless CNN says we win”.³² The US government took into account previous mistakes and both wars in the Persian Gulf received wide coverage in the media.³³ The government, primarily the military, managed to convey the war in the Persian Gulf to the American public in a favourable light, imposing certain restrictions on press coverage.³⁴

To understand how the media are involved in the state’s information control system, it is important to take into account the nature of the conflict. Obviously, in a time of total war, when the territorial integrity and national security of

<https://www.archives.gov/files/research/foreign-policy/related-records/rg-229-inter-american-affairs.pdf#page=33> (Accessed on 28.03.2003).

²⁹ *Radio War Guide*, US Office of War Information, U.S. G.P.O. Washington, D.C., USA, , July 1, 1943, <https://archive.org/details/RadioWarGuide-nsia/page/n1/mode/2up> (Accessed on 28.03.2003).

³⁰ Jessie Kratz, *Vietnam: The First Television War*, in “Pieces of History. National Archives”, January 25, 2018, <https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2018/01/25/vietnam-the-first-television-war/> (Accessed on 02.04.2003).

³¹ Ronald H. Spector, *The Vietnam War and the Media*, in “Encyclopedia Britannica”, 24 April, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Vietnam-War-and-the-media-2051426> (Accessed on 30.05.2023).

³² *Military Review. Cover Page*, November-December 1995, <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p124201coll1/id/447> (Accessed on 26.04.2023).

³³ Jason Deparle, *AFTER THE WAR; Long Series of Military Decisions Led to Gulf War News Censorship*, in “The New York Times”, May 5, 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/05/world/after-the-war-long-series-of-military-decisions-led-to-gulf-war-news-censorship.html> (Accessed on 26.04.2023).

³⁴ Jason Deparle, *AFTER THE WAR... Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War Revisited*, Routledge, 2004, <https://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/gulfwarrevisited.htm> (Accessed on 26.04.2023). John J. Fialka, *Hotel warriors covering the Gulf War*, Washington DC: Woodrow Willson Centre Press, 1992, p. 1.

a nation are at stake, it calls for total patriotism from the media. Instead, regional conflicts (like those in which the US or the USSR/Russia took part after WWII) are perceived differently – “limited wars in distant lands demand limited patriotism and the limited sacrifice of truth”.³⁵

Since the advent of access to the battlefield in real time, the role of the mass media has grown significantly. General C. Powell, who held key positions in the US during both wars in Iraq, emphasised the key role of television: “Turn your attention to television because you can win the battle or lose the war, if you don’t handle the story right”.³⁶ At first it was satellite television, later – transmission of content via the Internet and distribution in social networks. The civil war in Yugoslavia in 1999 was called the First “Internet War”.³⁷ Later, Social TV, i.e., a combination of social networks and TV, became relevant.³⁸ These can be video reposts from news TV channels, bloggers on YouTube, TikTok, content from Telegram channels and Twitter. Reports in real time or close to real time and multiplicity of access are their essential features. Back in 1992, Colonel A. D. Campen in his book *The First Information War* emphasised the related risks and problems of information control by the military, because journalists become direct participants in hostilities. His vision was the following: “A free, informed and responsible press can tell the whole story and do so without endangering current military operations”.³⁹

The modern war in Ukraine is called “The First Social Media War”⁴⁰, i.e., ow-

³⁵ Ali T. Sheikh, *Not the Whole Truth. Soviet and Western media Coverage of the Afghan Conflict*, in “Conflict Quarterly”, Fall, 1990, p. 88, <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/download/14919/15988/0> (Accessed on 26.04.2023).

³⁶ Pk Mallick, *Military Media Relation in Today’s Warfare*, in “Combat Journal”, September, 2000, p. 2, <https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/MILITARY%20MEDIA%20RELATION%20IN%20TODAY%20WARFARE.pdf> (Accessed on 09.03.2023).

³⁷ *Inside the First “Internet War”*, in “Wired”, January 1, 1999, <https://www.wired.com/1999/01/inside-the-first-internet-war/> (Accessed on 09.03.2023).

³⁸ Simon Dumenco, *Believe The Hype? Four Things Social TV Can Actually Do*, in “Ad Age”, April 13, 2012, <https://adage.com/article/the-media-guy/hype-things-social-tv/234134> (Accessed on 09.03.2023).

³⁹ Alan D. Campen, *Information, Truth and War*, in “The First Information War”, Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA, 1992, p. 89-90, <https://archive.org/details/firstinformation00camp/page/90/mode/2up?view=theater> (Accessed on 09.03.2023).

⁴⁰ Peter Suci, *Is Russia’s Invasion Of Ukraine The First Social Media War?*, in “Forbes”, March 1, 2022, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuci/2022/03/01/is-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-the-first-social-media-war/?sh=314552e81c5c> (Accessed on 13.03.2023).

ing to social media and messengers it was possible to convey adequate information about the events, despite the total superiority of Russia in terms of resources and the potential of information influence. And this is the first war when the invading party did not gain complete information dominance in the world.⁴¹

So, the use of media in war is a long-rooted practice, but the development of communication technologies incites the emergence of new ways to interact with the public and to create public opinion. In the next section, we consider the practice of telethon introduced in Ukraine.

UNITED NEWS TELETHON AS A MEANS TO UNIFY CITIZENS AND A SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE INFORMATION

In the conditions of war, the activity of the Ukrainian media develops in two directions: 1) to inform the domestic and foreign public about the course of events, decisions of the President and relevant public authorities, and to provide the citizens with access to information that is important to them during the war; 2) to counteract and combat fakes spread by the RF in Ukraine and the world, in particular in Europe. In other words, the media of Ukraine set the agenda of discussions, frame the perception of war, the Armed Forces and the political elite and change the attitudes toward Russia and to everything associated with it. This activity is aimed to consolidate the Ukrainian society to fight back, to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the decision-makers, to enhance the support of Ukraine by partners, to eliminate panic, to give hope for survival and good prospects.

To achieve the goals above, in the first days of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the editors of *Suspilne*, *Rada*, *Inter*, *ICTV*, *1 + 1* and *Ukraina 24* united and launched a joint information telethon *United News* (#UArazom – #UAtogether) under the supervision of the *Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine*⁴². Their

⁴¹ Dan Ciuriak, *Social Media Warfare Is Being Invented in Ukraine. Technological conditions determine how wars are communicated. However, these apply to both sides*, in "CIGI", June 15, 2022, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/social-media-warfare-is-being-invented-in-ukraine/> (Accessed on 13.03.2023).

⁴² UKAZ PREZYDENTA UKRAYINY №152/2022 *Pro rishennya Rady natsional'noyi bezpeky i oborony Ukrayiny vid 18 bereznya 2022 roku "Shchodo realizatsiyi yedynoyi informatsiyanoi polityky v umovakh voyennoho stanu* [DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE No. 152/2022 On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated March 18, 2022 "Regarding the implementation of a unified information policy under martial law"], the President of Ukraine Official Internet

slogan is “In unity is strength”. Since March 7, 2022, the *United News Telethon* has had an English-language track. Formally, it is not a channel, it does not have a joint editorship, and its producers are coordinated mainly at the strategic level. News sections that alternate in the joint broadcast are produced by editorials with different standards and different priorities (including the interests of the owners or political patrons), aimed at different target audiences.

To increase the access to the telethon news in conditions of war, the following opportunities were created: free access to major national TV channels (UA: *Pershiy, 1+1, ICTV, Inter, Ukraina, Rada, UNIAN TV* are accessible for free in *YouTV, SweetTV, OmegaTV, MEGOGO, KyivstarTV, 1+1 video, Olltv*); most TV channels have their own *YouTube* channels and also broadcast on their websites; one can listen to the telethon via the Internet radio *radioplayer.ua*, provided the appropriate application is installed; in the application *Diya* (Action) (public services online) there is a section *Diya TV*.

The format of the telethon was tested for the first time on the eve of the war when on the initiative of the *Minister of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine* O. Tkachenko, a telethon was held on February 16, 2022, on all Ukrainian TV channels on the topic of unity from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. At the request of the *Cabinet of Ministers*, a unified information platform of strategic communication “UA together” was created to provide daily information to the population about the security situation and the activities of state bodies.⁴³

On March 18, 2022, the *Decision of the National Security and Defense Council* “Regarding the implementation of a unified information policy under martial law” granted the joint telethon official status: “To establish that in the conditions of martial law, the implementation of a unified information policy is a priority issue of national security, the provision of which is implemented by unifying all national TV channels, the content of which consists mainly of information and/or information and analytical programs, on a single information platform of strategic communication – 24-hour information marathon “The United News #UAtogether” (Yedyni novyny #UArazom)”.⁴⁴ However, *Espresso, Pryamy* and *Channel 5* refused

Representation, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1522022-41761> (Accessed on 02.02.2023).

⁴³ Yevhen Kizilov, *U seredu vsi telekanaly Ukrayiny pokazhut' telemarafon na temu yednannyya – Tkachenko* [On Wednesday, all Ukrainian TV channels will show a telethon on the topic of unity – Tkachenko], in “Ukrayinska Pravda”, February 15, 2022, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/02/15/7324094/> (Accessed on 02.02.2023).

⁴⁴ UKAZ PREZYDENTA UKRAYINY №152/2022 ...

to broadcast *United News* 24 hours a day and their digital transmission was disconnected. The *State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection* explained that the channels were cut off to comply with the decision of the *Security Council* regarding the mandatory broadcast of the telethon.⁴⁵

For the Ukrainian competitive media landscape, it was a “miracle” that old media rivals began to work together to consolidate the society. Ukrainian media specialists even called it “information air defence in the war of civilizations”⁴⁶ because the marathon played a significant role in preserving Ukrainian statehood in February–March, 2022 when the threat was the greatest and the information attack on Ukraine was the most powerful.

We can single out three important reasons for the formation of this TV broadcasting format:

1. In the first weeks of the war, objective and timely information was a matter of life and death. The information space was full of fakes, disinformation, misrepresentations, attempts to incite panic or just information garbage. Online publications, even those that honestly tried to check the facts, repeatedly “blew up information mines”.⁴⁷ It was also dangerous to rely on official websites and pages in social networks as they were often hacked by Russians. Under these conditions, the idea of combining the broadcasts of the central top-rated channels into a joint marathon with a state “quality mark” was very appropriate. It had to be the space where, if they did not tell the whole truth about the war, at least they did not lie and did not spread Russian propaganda. That was both in the interests of the audience, who needed reasons to believe at least some news, and in the interests of

⁴⁵ «Espresso», *Pryamyy ta 5 kanal ne vymknuly z tsyfrovoho efiru, a peremknuly na kanal «Rada»*. *U Derzhspetsv "yazku vidpovily na petytsiyu* [“Espresso”, “Pryamy” and Channel 5 were not switched off from the digital airwaves, but switched to the “Rada” channel. The State Special Communications Service responded to the petition], in “Detector Media”, September 6, 2022, <https://detector.media/infospace/article/202591/2022-09-06-espresso-pryamyy-ta-5-kanal-ne-vymknuly-z-tsyfrovogo-efiru-a-peremknuly-na-kanal-rada-u-derzhspetsv-yazku-vidpovily-na-petytsiyu/> (Accessed on 04.02.2023).

⁴⁶ Svitlana Ostapa, *Spil'nyy telemarafon — informatsiyna PPO v tsyvilizatsiyniy viyni* [A united telethon is an information air defense in the war of civilizations.], in “Detector Media”, March 15, 2022, <https://detector.media/kritika/article/197522/2022-03-15-spilnyy-telemarafon-informatsiyna-ppo-v-tsyvilizatsiyniy-viyni/> (Accessed on 14.03.2023).

⁴⁷ Otar Dovzhenko, *Dyvo, shcho zatyahnulosya. Telemarafon «Yedyni novyny» u 2022 rotsi* [A wonder that took so long. United News Telethon in 2022], in “Detector Media”, December 22, 2022, <https://detector.media/shchodenni-telenovini/article/206445/2022-12-28-dyvo-shcho-zatyagnulosya-telemarafon-iedyni-novyny-u-2022-rotsi/> (Accessed on 14.03.2023).

broadcasters, some of whom could not work fully amid the chaos and panic of the first weeks of the war.

2. There was also the interest of the authorities: to channel information and prevent the enemy from using the most popular Ukrainian media to influence society. The wartime law gives the authorities the right to take control of the media, to shut down their work, and to impose military censorship.⁴⁸

3. No one knew how the oligarchs would behave if the invader successfully advanced and captured the capital. The owner of the *Ukraina* group, R. Akhmetov, had waged a fierce media war against the authorities which weakened somewhat in February but did not stop. In January 2022, D. Firtash (the *Inter* group) called on Ukraine to abandon NATO, and a co-owner of the *Inter* group, S. Lyovochkin, was one of the leaders of the pro-Russian party *Opposition Platform – For Life*. The behaviour of V. Pinchuk, the owner of *StarLight Media*, and I. Kolomoisky, *1+1 media*, was also unpredictable if all their enterprises ended up in the occupied territory (the Russian army was approaching Kryvyi Rih). “Not trusting the oligarchs and expecting a blow in the back from them is a healthy reflex of any Ukrainian government”,⁴⁹ because there was a potential threat that at a crucial moment the most influential TV channels could start shaking the fragile situation, or publicly turn society against the government, demanding immediate peace or negotiations.

Full-scale military actions radically changed the need for news among the citizens of Ukraine. There was a need to be in a constant stream of information. Control over the news, that is, constant monitoring of information sources, became one of the factors of feeling safe. Those who had previously deliberately avoided any news and preferred entertainment content began to follow them, i.e., with the start of hostilities, news content took first place in their consumption.⁵⁰

In the first months of a full-scale invasion, the very idea of a *United News* telethon was expedient and appropriate. It is confirmed by the survey conducted by the sociological group *Rating* in March 2022 (Table 1). The war changed the weight of ways to obtain information: central television dominated among the sources, including the news telethon (62%). The second position was occupied by

⁴⁸ Otar Dovzhenko, *Dyvo, shcho zatyahnulosya...*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Yuriy Vyshnevskiy, *Proval monopolii na pravdu. Chomu dvi tretyny ukrayintsiv ne dyvlyat'sya telemarafon* [The failure of the monopoly on truth. Why two-thirds of Ukrainians do not watch the telethon], in “Dilova Stolytsia”, December 1, 2022, <https://www.dsnews.ua/ukr/politics/proval-monopolii-na-pravdu-pochemu-dve-treti-ukraincev-ne-smotryat-telemarafon-30112022-470238> (Accessed on 28.04.2023).

channels in messengers (42%), which could be explained by the speed and number of publications, because the war created a high need for constant information, and messengers best met those needs, i.e. they could be read anywhere and any-time, one needed a smart phone and the Internet. The share of social networks decreased (37%; in November 2021 it was 49%), probably they were partially replaced by groups and channels in messengers, because by their function social networks were no longer about receiving information, but about communication and the ability to share information.⁵¹

Table 1

Preference of media channels in March 2022		
Position in rating	Channel	%
1	central television	62
2	messengers	42
3	social networks	37

In July–August 2022, the *InMind* company, commissioned by the *Internews* international organisation with the financial support of the *United States Agency for International Development (USAID)*, conducted the annual survey “Ukrainian media, attitudes and trust in 2022”⁵² which proved that social networks (and messengers were included) were the leading sources of information for Ukrainians (59% of all respondents had used them in the last 7 days and ranked them in the top 2 in terms of importance). The second position was occupied by the *United News* telethon (43% ranked it in the top 2 by importance). The majority of those who recognised the *United News* telethon as a prime information source explained it by the truthfulness/reliability of the information (Table 2).

⁵¹ *Shoste zahal'nonatsional'ne opytuvannya: adaptatsiya ukrayintsiv do umov viyny* [Sixth nationwide poll: adaptation of Ukrainians to the conditions of war], Rating Sociological Group, March 23, 2022, [HTTPS://RATINGGROUP.UA/RESEARCH/UKRAINE/SHESTOY_OBSCHENACIONALNYY_OPROS_ADAPTACIYA_UKRAINCEV_K_USLOVIYAM_VOYNY_19_MARTA_2022.HTML](https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/shestoy_obschenatsionalnyy_opros_adaptatsiya_ukraincev_k_usloviyam_voyny_19_marta_2022.html) (Accessed on 28.04.2023).

⁵² *Doslidzhennya DEMOKRATIYA, PRAVA I SVOBODY HROMADYAN TA MEDIASPOZHIVANNYA V UMOVAKH VIYNY* [Research DEMOCRACY, RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF CITIZENS AND MEDIA CONSUMPTION IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR], July 2022, <http://surl.li/rblacy> (Accessed on 26.04.2023).

Table 2

Media channel positive rating ranking		
Criteria	Social media	United News telethon
True, reliable information	26%	68%
Easy to use	36%	13%
A lot of information, different points of view	24%	6%
They inform quickly/promptly	20%	11%
Clear format	3%	1%

Among various sources of information, 57% of respondents trusted the *United News* telethon (rated 7–10 points on a scale, where 10 points mean “completely trust”). Only 7% did not trust the telethon (rating 0–3 points). 65% approved of the *United News* telethon as a method to form a common opinion, while 17% did not share this idea.

In December 2022, the website of the *Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine* provided the following statistics regarding trust in the telethon (the *News Trust Barometer* study was conducted by *Suspilne* TV channel and research company *Gradus Research*). Media experts also emphasise that, at the same time, there is a strengthening of trust, i.e., the share of those who “rather” trust the telethon has shifted to those who trust it “completely”:⁵³

Table 3

Citizens' trust in the <i>United News</i> telethon	
Criteria	United News telethon
They know about the existence of the telethon	91%
They are its regular audience	78%
They actively watch	41%
They declare their trust in it as a source of news	71%
They watch the telethon on TV channels	80%

⁵³ *Informatsiynyy telemarafon «Yedyni novyny #UArazom» zalyshayet'sya nadiynym dzherelom informatsiyi dlya ukrayintsiv – opytuvannya* [Informational telethon “United News #UArazom” remains a reliable source of information for Ukrainians – survey], Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, December 30, 2022, <https://mkip.gov.ua/news/8391.html> (Accessed on 01.05.2023).

They watch it because it always shows relevant information	28%
They watch it because different experts (guests) take part in it	27%
It unites people and does not divide society	24%
It gives only verified and objective information	23%
It is produced by channels I trust	20%
It provides more in-depth information	19%
It shows the diversity of opinions and positions	17%
It features presenters I trust	14%

V. Paniotto, Director General of the *Kyiv International Institute of Sociology*, defines the two biggest achievements of the telethon due to the uniformity of its information space: 1) it contributed to the cohesion of society and 2) it improved the attitude towards state institutions and the president. Before the beginning of the full-scale war, there were significant regional differences in people's views: in June 2021, 70% in the West of Ukraine supported Ukraine's accession to the EU, and in the East, only 29%. Then in May 2022, this support equalled to 94% and 76%, respectively (the difference decreased from 41% to 18%). The attitude towards the state and its institutions has significantly improved. From August 2021 to September 2022, trust in Zelenskyi increased from 36% to 80%, trust in the government from 18% to 35%, and in the Parliament from 19% to 35%. "This was influenced by both the war and the lack of opposition channels which constantly criticised the authorities and Zelenskyi personally".⁵⁴

The telethon fulfilled its mission of "a single united voice". Catching different waves, Ukrainians were guaranteed to hear official information from the highest leadership of the country on the leading channels. This both reassured and united Ukrainians, and justified the actions necessary for proper resistance to the occupiers. In the conditions of RF information dumping and fakes, the society received access to official information from primary sources and operative refutation of Russian disinformation. Television broadcasters, who did not have the resources for full-fledged information broadcasts, were able to share the load, supporting and helping each other in the regime of the marathon.

⁵⁴ Halyna Korba, *Telemarafon: yak vin zminyuye ukrayins'ke suspil'stvo ta media rynok* [The telethon: how it changes Ukrainian society and the media market], in "BBC News Ukraine", December 30, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-64112594> (Accessed on 26.04.2023).

CRITICISM OF THE *UNITED NEWS* TELETHON

The statistics from the previous section indicate a decrease in the level of attention to the telethon from 62% in March 2022 to 43% in July 2022. This is partly because citizens were not always able to watch television either due to the lack of electricity or due to the forced necessity to move, fleeing war. The already mentioned monotony of the TV broadcast was also a significant reason which induced viewers to turn to the Internet and social networks more often.

In their study (June–August 2022), *Detector Media* experts analysed the attitudes of viewers and media professionals to the telethon content⁵⁵ (Table 4).

Table 4

Perception of marathon news		
Perception	Media experts	Viewers (aged 18–65)
It covers the activities of the authorities	87.21%	65–55%
It is engaged in state propaganda	94.19%	77.62%
It shows reliable information about the war	51.16%	66.14%
It is managed by the Office of the President	87.21%	24.74%
It has lost its relevance	66.28 %	68.73%
I have stopped watching it	75.58%	46.74%
I have never watched it	20.93%	15.87%

The most important conclusions are the following: viewers think less about the telethon than the media professionals; the telethon is engaged in state propaganda; the telethon has lost its relevance.

In addition, typical violations of journalistic standards were recorded, but their number varies from channel to channel. In particular, the experts of *Detector Media* concluded that in October–December 2022, twice as many cases of serious violations of journalism standards and gross errors were recorded on the air of the *United News* telethon than in the previous six months (Table 5).

⁵⁵ Inna Serhiyenko, Orest Biloskurskiy, *Yak peresichni hlyadachi spryymayut' marafon «Yedyni novyny»?* [How do ordinary viewers perceive the United News telethon?], in “Detector Media”, September 1, 2022, <https://detector.media/blogs/article/202432/2022-09-01-yak-peresichni-glyadachi-spryymayut-marafon-iedyni-novyny/> (Accessed on 01.05.2023).

Table 5

Violation of journalistic standards in the <i>United News</i> telethon ⁵⁶							
Standard	1+1	ICTV/ STB	Inter	Rada	Suspilne	My - Ukraine	Total
Reliability	389	592	447	427	183	304	2342
Accuracy	195	234	112	185	89	147	962
Separation of facts from opinions	741	1496	889	459	173	460	4218
Completeness of information	31	41	27	42	26	45	212
Balance of thoughts	1	1	0	0	0	1	3
Availability of information submission	26	14	15	33	25	21	134
Operativeness	2	4	4	0	6	0	16
Ethical violations	0	1	2	0	5	0	8
Total violations of standards	1385	2383	1496	1146	507	978	7895

The report shows that in total, during one broadcast hour of the telethon, an average of 25 violations of standards occur. According to the general indicators of the channels, the situation concerning two key standards is the worst: the separation of facts from opinions (the average indicator for the telethon shows this standard is violated more than 13 times every hour) and reliability (it is violated an average of 7.5 times every hour).

There is also the problem of distributing telethon content. While editors worked on their channels, they were focused on the maximum distribution of their content on various platforms. Instead, the media brand *United News*, although positioned as the main reliable source of news, is not engaged in the distribution of content outside the live broadcast. There are no publicly available archives of the

⁵⁶ Ihor Kulias, *Pidsumky monitorynhu telemarafonu «Yedyni novyny» za zhovten'—hruden' 2022 roku. Druha chastyna* [Monitoring results of the United News telethon for October-December 2022. The second part], in "Detector Media", January 16, 2023, <https://detector.media/shchodenni-telenovini/article/207039/2023-01-16-pidsumky-monitoryngu-telemarafonu-iedyni-novyny-za-zhovtengruden-2022-roku-druga-chastyna/> (Accessed on 01.05.2023).

telethon. There is neither a *United News* website nor a YouTube channel, which would show all broadcasts, or a multimedia editorial office, which would cut and repackage exclusive content, as all full-fledged information channels do. The editors take care of “their” content independently by posting part of their telethon broadcasts (individual interviews, news releases and materials) on YouTube, and repackaging the stories for “their” sites.

In the first months of the marathon, the channels posted several hours of broadcast recordings on YouTube. Later, that practice was stopped, but it does not serve the interests of the audience since they cannot clearly identify the source of the news they have learnt from the telethon and do not know where to look for news or a conversation that has already passed on the air.

Towards the end of 2022, the joint telethon caused less enthusiasm and gave much more reasons for criticism, making the public fear that this emergent, temporary form of organisation of the Ukrainian information TV space would become permanent and would bury the diversity that had been the strength of Ukrainian TV channels. The mistakes of the authorities also contributed to the increase in criticism, namely: 1) the appearance of presenters who had been previously pro-Russian propagandists; 2) speeches of former People’s Deputies of the *OBFL*⁵⁷ party on the air of *Rada*; 3) removal of TV news that differed from the news of the telethon, particularly the channels close to the opposition *European Solidarity* of P. Poroshenko. However, in the first months of the war, *Channel 5*, *Pryamy* and *Espresso* did not criticise the government at all, so there was no objective reason to fear them; 4) during the broadcast of the telethon, the *President’s Office* started to actively use the *Rada* channel (which was launched specifically for PR of the President’s Office and the presidential party *Servants of the People*⁵⁸) for massive PR. Subsequently, the *Rada* began image-making of the President’s entourage, the latter should ensure the work of the head of state rather than be engaged in public policy. PR of individual deputies from *Servants of the People*, whitewashing of allies of the *Servants of the People* from the former *OBFL*, black PR against P. Poroshenko gradually became features of the telethon.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ OBFL – acronym for the pro-Russian party *Opposition Block – For Life*

⁵⁸ Hala Skliarevska, Otar Dovzhenko, *Vlada i ye novyny. Yak «Sluha narodu» peretvoryuye kanal «Rada» na instrument piaru y politychnoyi borot'by* [Power is news. How “Servants of the People” turns the Rada channel into a PR and political struggle tool], in “Detector Media”, December 16, 2021, <https://detector.media/infospace/article/194842/2021-12-16-vlada-i-ye-novyny-yak-sluga-narodu-peretvoryuie-kanal-rada-na-instrument-piaru-y-politychnoi-borotby/> (Accessed on 04.06.2023).

⁵⁹ Otar Dovzhenko, *Dyvo, shcho zatyahnulosya...*

Thus, the telethon, which in the first weeks of the war had an impeccable reputation and was perceived as a ray of truth in the sea of fakes and lies, started to move in the wrong direction, i.e., to the loss of the trust of a thoughtful and media-literate audience. “Because it’s hard to believe that the knights of the information war are in front of you, if they repost Yermak’s twitter every day⁶⁰”.⁶¹

Among the main objections to the telethon are the risks it can carry for the future of media as a business, as well as for freedom of speech in general. The head of the *Institute of Mass Information*, O. Romaniuk, warns that the existence of a single telethon for a long time can further distract people from television and spoil the democratic image of Ukraine in the world.⁶²

The European Union privately expressed concern to official Kyiv about Ukraine’s media policy. For example, German Ambassador A. Feldhusen said that the EU called Kyiv to move away from the *United News* telethon format on television and to give viewers a choice. According to the diplomat, the EU understands that information warfare is a component of modern wars, and its partners are aware of why Ukraine banned pro-Russian channels. But since the other channels were also affected by the restrictions, Kyiv has been repeatedly urged to move to a more open information space. “People should have alternative sources of information. It seems to me that all your political forces are now patriotic. Everyone wants Ukraine to win. Maybe there are different views, but still, everyone is a patriot. And people should be allowed to choose what they want to watch”.⁶³

In other words, what was created as a consolidation of society and counter-acting the RF’s information aggression turned into a consolidation of the political power of the President’s Office and restriction of freedom of expression for the media to avoid internal criticism. As a result, the question arises more and more often: “How long will the telethon last?”. Government representatives, in particular the *Minister of Culture and Information Policy* O. Tkachenko, reply that the telethon will continue until victory.⁶⁴ A related question is “Who should make the

⁶⁰ Andriy Yermak is the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, the “gray cardinal” of Ukrainian politics.

⁶¹ Otar Dovzhenko, *Dyvo, shcho zatyahnulosya...*

⁶² Halyna Korba, *Telemarafon: yak vin zminyuye ukrayins'ke suspil'stvo...*

⁶³ Serhii Sydorenko, *Posol Nimechchyny: U NATO zaraz shchodnya obhovoryuyut' te, yak vidpovisty u razi yadernoho udaru* [German Ambassador: NATO now discusses every day how to respond in the event of a nuclear attack], in “Ukrayinska Pravda”, September 28, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/interview/2022/09/28/7147648/> (Accessed on 24.05.2023).

⁶⁴ *Ministr kul'tury Tkachenko zayavyv, shcho derzhava povynna finansuvaty Yedyny*

decision about finishing the telethon?”. The *Ministry of Culture and Information Policy* in cooperation with the *National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting* are responsible for making all important decisions regarding the format of the telethon. These bodies will have to give instructions so that the big channels stop producing the telethon and return to their usual programming. However, this is also likely to be a matter of the political will of the *Office of the President*. *Detector Media* experts emphasise that events can develop according to different scenarios: 1) optimistic – the complete victory of Ukraine, the liberation of all Ukrainian lands, cessation of hostilities, the capitulation of Russia and multi-year payment of reparations (and the telethon may cease its work); 2) pessimistic – part of the territories will remain occupied or hostilities will continue, albeit with less intensity; martial law can be cancelled not in all of Ukraine, but only in certain regions. Then the “implementation of a unified information policy” in the form of a government-controlled telethon may drag on for years, or at least until the change of government.⁶⁵

CONCLUSIONS

In the difficult conditions of confronting mass systemic information influence by a much stronger aggressor, Ukraine had to solve several fundamentally necessary tasks, i.e., to ensure coverage of events at the front that would be profitable for the state and safe for the army, to consolidate the society, to decrease the panic, and to promote Ukraine’s position against the massive information influence of Russia in the world. The realisation of these intentions resulted in the creation of a new, unique TV practice – the *United News* telethon.

The national telethon has provided several solutions. Firstly, it has united the media channels represented on the market to produce a common view in the absence of a dominant channel (for example a powerful news agency) which could broadcast the official view and enable OpSec coordination. Secondly, it provides a conditionally independent but powerful platform for the formation of basic materials for further distribution in the world media space and use in social networks

marafon, oskil'ky yoho pryypynennya «ne na chasi» [Minister of Culture Tkachenko said that the state should finance the United Telethon, because its termination “is not at the right time.”], in “Bukvy”, October 5, 2022, <https://bykvu.com/ua/bukvy/ministr-kultury-tkachenko-zaiavyv-shcho-derzhava-povynna-finansuvaty-iedynyi-marafon-oskilky-ioho-pryypynennia-ne-na-chasi/> (Accessed on 24.05.2023).

⁶⁵ Otar Dovzhenko, *Dyvo, shcho zatyahnulosya...*

with the formation of a certain kind of “splinternet”. As for civilians, media, television for instance, may become the source “from which information, interpretations and images of war are acquired, either a supplement to or substitute for, first-hand experience.”⁶⁶ In the first months of the war, *United News* telethon helped the Ukrainians unite to fight against the aggressor. In this period, it was recognised as a main information channel since it did its best to offer objective, verified information and refuted fakes. Finally, the telethon provided its participants with certain guarantees of survival in conditions of war and uncertainty of market prospects. Moreover, television has played the role of an integrator for a wide range of information channels.

Instead, when the critical risk to the existence of the state and the nation in general decreased, which occurred as a result of the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s success in countering Russian aggression during the second half of 2022 and in 2023, the relevance of the *United News* telethon started to decline slightly, and its critics strengthened regarding media independence. Obviously, this is proof of the overall democracy of the media space in Ukraine, its participants can resort to consolidation under the leadership of the authorities in the face of an existential threat, but they are able to return to the usual competitive model with the onset of peacetime⁶⁷.

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⁶⁶ Ajai K. Rai, *Media at war...*

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AN AMERICAN PROJECT PROPOSED AROUND THE MARSHALL PLAN: APPLYING THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY MODEL FOR THE DANUBE

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Abstract: *The April 1947 issue of the prestigious American journal Geographical Review published an article titled „TVA on the Danube?”. The author, George Kiss/Kish, was born in Hungary and became a refugee in the United States of America in 1939. Throughout his extensive scientific and academic career, primarily at the University of Michigan, he established himself as an outstanding geographer, specialising in political geography. Kiss/Kish's article is a laborious scientific study in the field that established him, while simultaneously serving as a comprehensive demonstration in support of an interesting and innovative project, even by today's standards: the establishment of a supranational agency or authority, following the American model of the Tennessee Valley Authority, to effectively utilise the resources of the Danube river for the benefit of the inhabitants of its extended river basin. The objective of this study is not to conduct a scientific review of Kiss/Kish's article; instead, it is more important to comprehend the motivations behind the proposal, as well as the international context that initially encouraged such a project that eventually led to its failure. At the same time, adopting an integrated approach to effectively exploiting the Danube would reopen the long-standing dispute between a state's sovereign rights over its territory against the international value of a navigable watercourse.*

Keywords: *George Kiss/Kish, political geography, Danube, Cold War, integrated exploitation of resources, regional unity, Marshall Plan.*

Rezumat: *Un proiect american propus în preajma planului Marshall: aplicarea modelului Tennessee Valley Authority pe Dunăre. În numărul din aprilie 1947 al*

prestigioasei reviste americane "Geographical Review" era publicat un articol, intitulat *TVA on the Danube?*. Autorul său, George Kiss/Kish, născut în Ungaria și refugiat în Statele Unite ale Americii din anul 1939, s-a afirmat în lunga sa carieră științifică și academică petrecută îndeosebi în cadrul Universității din Michigan ca un remarcabil geograf, cu predilecție în ramura geografiei politice. Articolul lui Kiss/Kish este un laborios studiu științific în domeniul care l-a consacrat, însă, în egală măsură, se constituie și într-o amplă demonstrație în vederea susținerii unui proiect interesant și inovator (chiar și astăzi): constituirea unei agenții sau autorități supranaționale, după modelul american Tennessee Valley Authority, care să exploateze într-o manieră integrată resursele pe care Dunărea le putea oferi locuitorilor din bazinul extins al fluviului. Scopul cercetării noastre nu este acela de a analiza în maniera unei recenzii științifice studiul lui Kiss/Kish, dimpotrivă considerăm că mult mai importantă ar fi înțelegerea rațiunii care a stat la baza propunerii, precum și a cadrului internațional ce, inițial, a încurajat un astfel de proiect și, mai târziu, a decis eșecul lui. Totodată, readucerea în actualitate a unei viziuni integrate de exploatare a Dunării ar redeschide mai vechea dispută dintre dreptul suveran al unui stat asupra propriului teritoriu și caracterul internațional al unui curs de apă navigabilă.

INTRODUCTION

On the 5th of June 1947, during his acceptance speech for an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws at Harvard University, American Secretary of State George Catlett Marshall set out the principles which would act as the basis for the ample post-war economic assistance program offered by the United States for the recovery of European economies affected by the consequences of the Second World War. The European Recovery Program (ERP), later known as the Marshall Plan, proposed non-reimbursable financial aid to all states on the continent, on condition that these countries cooperate.¹ Just two months before, in April 1947, in the American *Geographical Review*, George Kiss/Kish had advocated for applying the framework of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a successful economic model, over the entire length of the Danube River. TVA was in fact a U.S. federal government agency, established in 1933 to coordinate actions for flood control, the improvement of navigation, the efficient use of water for irrigation, and electricity generation along the Tennessee River and its tributaries². Evidently,

¹ For George C. Marshall's biography, see Leonard Mosley, *Marshall. Hero for our times*, New York, Hearst Books, 1982; Thomas Parrish, *Roosevelt and Marshall. Partners in Politics and War*, New York, William Morrow and Company, 1989.

² For more details on the establishment and structure of this agency, see C. Herman Pritchett, *The Tennessee Valley Authority. A Study in Public Administration*, Chapel Hill,

such a project needed the full cooperation of all countries surrounding the extended basin of the Danube (including its tributary rivers)³.

This study seeks to re-emphasize the Danube cooperation initiative, as proposed by Kiss/Kish in 1947, which aspired to exploit the Danube's substantial hydrographic and economic potential for the advantage of the countries located along its banks. The organisational pattern proposed in 1947 can be reconsidered and adapted, given the current more favourable conditions for its application. Presently, the Danube basin, together with its tributaries, covers 18 countries⁴, including 11, officially recognised members of the European Union: Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Additionally, six other countries have obtained official candidate status: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine. Furthermore, Switzerland is a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA; AELS abbreviated in Romanian)⁵. In this sense, the element of novelty in this study is readily apparent.

Secondly, this study aims to determine *whether* and *to what extent* Kiss/Kish's project remained subordinate to the general framework of American foreign policy and the principles invoked and applied in the Marshall Plan. To draw the necessary conclusions, analyses were conducted on George Kiss/Kish's biography and the theoretical and conceptual framework of his scientific work, as well as the international circumstances that marked the period preceding the outbreak of the Cold War.

THE BIOGRAPHICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF GEORGE KISS/KISH

George Kish [native spelling Kiss] was born in Budapest, the capital of Hungary, on November 24, 1914. He achieved excellent academic performance in his own country, completing high school with outstanding results and emerging as the winner of a national geography competition. He pursued further

The University of North Carolina Press, 1943.

³ See George Kiss, *TVA on the Danube?* in "Geographical Review", Vol. 37, No. 2 (April), 1947, pp. 274-302.

⁴ The Danube River crosses the territories of 10 European states, namely Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine, without including its tributaries.

⁵ For more details, see Arthur-Viorel Tuluș, *Dunărea de Jos. Scurt istoric / The Lower Danube. A Brief History*, Brăila, Istros Publishing House, 2018, pp. 15-18, 79-82.

studies in France, earning a bachelor's degree in sciences from the École Libre des Sciences Politiques in 1935 and a master's degree in arts from the Sorbonne in 1937. However, his intellectual pursuits focused on political science, geography, and history. He returned to Hungary where and obtained another master's degree in economics from the University of Budapest in 1938, and a doctorate in sciences in 1939⁶. He held a series of positions in his home country, starting as an assistant within the Hungarian Bureau of Tariff Policy, then as assistant secretary of the Association of Hungarian Textile Industries, and finally as secretary for the Association of Hungarian Master Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers⁷.

In 1939, George Kiss/Kish moved to the United States to pursue further education in Geography⁸. From 1940 until he died in 1989, he held positions of researcher and professor at the University of Michigan. Initially, he worked as a research assistant in geography and in 1943 was appointed to the position of geography instructor. He obtained his PhD title in geography from the same university in 1945. Additionally, he served as curator of maps in Clements Library from 1944 to 1946. George Kiss/Kish worked as a research analyst in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, specifically focusing on translating Hungarian publications and documents. His role and contributions during the war earned him American citizenship in March 1948. As a result, he chose to change his surname to Kish, which better reflects the Hungarian pronunciation of his

⁶ The University of Michigan Library holds a fund of *George Kish papers, 1932-1989*, including a biography. See <https://findingaids.lib.umich.edu/catalog/umich-bhl-90123> (accessed on 20.03.24). Furthermore, see Mary S. Pedley, *George Kish (1914–1989)*, in “Imago Mundi”, Vol. 43, 1991, pp. 100–101 for an in-memoriam biography of the geographer George Kish.

⁷ According to a short biography of the author, included at the bottom of the first page of one of his articles. See George Kish, *India, Africa and 'Point Four'*, in “Quarterly Review of the Michigan Alumnus”, Vol. 56, No. 14, 4 March 1950, p. 132.

⁸ Given his professional position in Hungary, it is questionable whether George Kiss/Kish left Hungary for the United States solely to „further his studies in geography”. The anti-Semitic atmosphere in Europe and his Jewish heritage may have played a great role in his decision, however, no evidence to support such claims can be found in the aforementioned biographies. The only reference in this sense is Peter Barber, *'I draw a line here and open a new chapter': The Bagrow-Almagià Correspondence 1947-1955*, in “Imago Mundi”, Vol. 66. *People, Places, and Ideas in the History of Cartography: Supplement* (2014), pp. 70-82. It says “(...) George Kish, a Jewish-Hungarian emigre in the United States who was befriended by Almagià (...) from the early 1950s”. Roberto Almagià (1884–1962) was an Italian geographer and historian of cartography.

name. After the war, he resumed his various teaching and research positions at the University of Michigan. He was promoted to professor in 1956⁹.

George Kiss/Kish acquired recognition as a renowned geographer and cartographer, especially in the subfield of political geography. He held membership in several honorary societies such as the Association of American Geographers, the Research Club, the American Geophysical Union, the American Council - Institute of Pacific Relations, the Arctic Institute of North America, and the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and the Hungarian Geographical Society. As a recognized expert in his field, he collaborated (as visiting professor or associate professor) with other institutions or associations, such as Northwestern University, Oxford University, London School of Economics, Cambridge University United Nations Association, Stockholm School of Economics, University of Tel-Aviv, the Academy of Universities in Rome, Florence, Naples, Bari (he was a Fulbright Research Professor in Italy in 1951-1952 and again in 1963), the University of Liège, the Universities and Academies of Sciences of both Poland and Hungary.

Kiss/Kish's many awards included the Andrée Plaque for Polar Studies from the Swedish Geographical Society, the Greater Linnaeus Silver Medal from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The University of Michigan's Henry Russel Lectureship, and the Honors Award from the Association of American Geographers. In 1981, he received the Jornard Prize from the Paris Society of Geography, which is awarded once a decade. He was also a Commander in the Order of the Star of Italian Solidarity. Over time, he actively supported and participated in the academic life of the University of Michigan; he continued to teach there even after his retirement in 1984 until he passed away on July 11th, 1989. The stability of his family life greatly contributed to this long-lasting academic relationship. Kiss/Kish married Elvina Anger, a Canadian physicist, in 1949; the couple had a daughter and set their permanent residence in Ann Arbor, where the University of Michigan is located¹⁰.

In his long career, George Kiss/Kish authored several monographs¹¹ and

⁹ See <https://findingaids.lib.umich.edu/catalog/umich-bhl-90123> (accessed on 20.03.24); Mary S. Pedley, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101.

¹⁰ See <https://findingaids.lib.umich.edu/catalog/umich-bhl-90123> (accessed on 20.03.24); Mary S. Pedley, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101; George Kish, *India, Africa and 'Point Four'*, p. 132.

¹¹ A few authored monographies: George Kish, *Economic Atlas of the Soviet Union*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1960; Idem, *La Carte. Image des civilisations*, Paris, Seuil, 1980; Idem, *To the Heart of Asia: The Life of Sven Hedin*, Ann Arbor, University of

published over 140 articles in English, French, German, Italian, and Hungarian; a significant part of these articles appeared in the prestigious *Geographical Review*¹² and *Imago Mundi*¹³ journals.

To reflect on the conceptual framework of George Kiss/Kish's thinking at the time he elaborated and proposed his Danube cooperation project in the *Geographical Review*, research was conducted on what he wrote during and immediately after the Second World War, when he was still using his Hungarian surname, Kiss. His scientific interests were diverse, ranging from the use of old maps to more recent aspects, such as the economic development of South-Eastern Europe, communication and transport in the Balkans, Italian borders, etc¹⁴. However, his publications focusing on combating Nazi German geopolitics won him great academic acclaim; this degree of reputation would not be equalled, even with his later work. The study he published in 1942 – *Political Geography into Geopolitics: Recent Trends in Germany*¹⁵ – has been used in almost all critical analyses of Nazi geopolitics, at least as interpreted by Karl Haushofer and the followers of his journal, *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. Accused of complicity with Nazism and the authoritarian regimes of Italy and Japan, geopolitics became, in the early postwar period, an academic concept best avoided by most geographers in the United States and Europe¹⁶. Despite the distortion of geography into geopolitics, used to serve ideology and ambitions of territorial expansion, George Kiss/Kish campaigned for the establishment and support of a scientific political

Michigan Press, 1984.

¹² The oldest journal in the United States solely dedicated to geography and one of the most important international publications in this field. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geographical_Review (accessed on 22.03.24).

¹³ A scientific publication dedicated exclusively to cartography and map history. For more details, see <https://www.jstor.org/journal/imagomundi> (accessed on 22.03.24).

¹⁴ See George Kiss, *Some Aspects of the Political Geography of the Hungarian Basin*, in "Journal of Geography", Vol. 41, No. 2, 1942, pp. 69-72; Idem, *Italian Boundary Problems: A Review*, in "Geographical Review", Vol. 37, No. 1, 1947, pp. 137-141; Idem, *Quelques Notes sur les Communications dans les Balkans: Principales lignes ferroviaires; ponts sur le Danube; issue a la Mer Egee by Lubin Bochkoff*, in "Geographical Review", Vol. 37, No. 1, 1947, pp. 167-168; Idem, *TVA on the Danube?*, pp. 274-302; Idem, *The Correspondence of Continental Mapmakers of the 1770's and 80's with a London Firm*, in "Imago Mundi", Vol. 4, 1947, pp. 75-77.

¹⁵ Idem, *Political Geography into Geopolitics: Recent Trends in Germany*, in "Geographical Review", Vol. 32, No. 4, 1942, pp. 632-645.

¹⁶ Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, Joanne Sharp, *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, London - New York, Routledge, 2013, pp. 3-4.

geography¹⁷. Moreover, he delved into history to uncover when and where the distortion or contamination of the domain originated. He claims that the great German philosopher Hegel is responsible for the beginnings of German geopolitics. In response to Prussia's humiliation after being defeated by Napoleon Bonaparte, he allegedly preached to his fellow countrymen that „Germany's eternal mission was one of conquest and domination”¹⁸. The unanimous conclusion was that Political Geography existed in the Free World, just as Geopolitics had been present in the Unfree World, although in an altered form of Political Geography that was used to serve the state (and thus subjective) interests¹⁹.

Therefore, when George Kiss/Kish publicly proposed the project for cooperation on the Danube in April 1947, he was both a connoisseur of the problems in South-Eastern Europe, implicitly those of the Danube basin, and a declared enemy of geopolitics, defined as political geography in service of subjective or imperial interests.

GEORGE KISS/KISH'S PROJECT: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ON THE DANUBE

Kiss/Kish's article, *TVA on the Danube*, consisted of a technically extensive and extremely well-documented approach regarding the integrated development of the resources that the Danube could offer to the inhabitants of its extensive river basin²⁰. „A river valley may be a logical regional unit and as such a means for realising common purposes which require that state boundaries be transcended”²¹. The Danube holds even greater potential in this regard, as it has historically been, and still is, together with the Rhine, (at the end of the Second World War) the primary transportation route connecting the industrial centres of northwestern Europe to the granaries in the east of the continent. The Hungarian-born American geographer viewed the Danube Valley in Central Europe as a suitable place to establish an agency with similar tasks as the Tennessee Valley

¹⁷ Rob Sullivan, *Geography Speaks Performative of Geography*, London, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011, p. 140; Pradeep Sharma, *Economical Political Geography*, New Delhi, Discovery Publishing House, p. 270.

¹⁸ George Kiss, *Political Geography into Geopolitics*, pp. 632-633.

¹⁹ Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, Joanne Sharp, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4; Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire. The Legacy of Halford Mackinder*, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 18-19.

²⁰ Along with its tributary rivers.

²¹ C. H. Grattan, *A Hard Look at TVA*, in “Harper’s Magazine”, Vol. 191, 1945, p. 209.

Authority – TVA functioning over the Tennessee River. According to him, other American specialists such as David E. Lilienthal²², Julian Huxley²³, and Arthur Morgan²⁴ additionally agreed with this perspective. However, unlike the Tennessee or Columbia River basins, the Danube valley was considered „a regional unit with national frontiers”.²⁵ The establishment of any agency to coordinate and develop resources in an integrated manner would require the existence and acceptance of a supranational authority with extended powers and adequate international support, which could only happen after a radical change in the political and economic climate of the region.

Nowadays, Kiss/Kish's proposal could be seen as idealistic. Nevertheless, it is important to note that he was not merely a theorist and was well-informed about the topic. The first explanatory note of the article in the *Geographical Review* stated that the author had studied various aspects of the Danube basin, which involved numerous trips along the way by steamer, barge, and skiff. At the same time, benefiting from grants from the University of Michigan, he had done similar field research along the Tennessee and Columbia Rivers, which enabled him to learn about two organisational models – Tennessee Valley Authority and Columbia River Developments. Additionally, he had the opportunity to interact with engineers, administrators, and senior representatives of both entities²⁶. It is important to note that at the end of the Second World War, there was pressure – at least theoretical – to move toward regional human resources development, with similar projects proposed for the British colonial area in Africa and the Yangtze River Valley²⁷.

In essence, Kiss/Kish's Danube project proposed the establishment of a supranational agency or authority, modelled after the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), to coordinate the development of resources in the Danube region at an integrated level. More specifically, similarly to TVA, the purposes of such an agency on the Danube would include effective flood control, enhancing navigability of the river and generating electric power consistent with flood control and navigation. Additionally, it would involve proper use of marginal lands, reforesting the

²² See David E. Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March*, London - New York, Harper & Brothers, 1944.

²³ See Julian Huxley, *TVA: Adventure in Planning*, California, Architectural Press, 1946.

²⁴ Arthur Ernest Morgan was the first chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), between 1933 and 1938. See George Kiss, *TVA on the Danube?*, p. 274.

²⁵ A distinction must be made between state borders within a federation, as in the case of the United States of America, and national borders, which separate two independent states.

²⁶ George Kiss, *TVA on the Danube?* p. 274.

²⁷ See David E. Lilienthal, *op. cit.*; Julian Huxley, *op. cit.*

drainage basin and promoting the economic and social welfare of the residents of the river basin. The importance of imposing unified control over the exploitation of the river and its resources was further highlighted by the inefficiency of previous works that had already been made to improve the navigable channel, made by each state in an individualistic and selfish manner. Kiss/Kish concluded that regardless of the extensive and expensive hydrotechnical works executed by the Danubian nations since the mid-nineteenth century to regulate the navigable channel and prevent flooding, the outcomes of these efforts were short-lived and inconclusive due to the lack of coordination strategy between various governments. More precisely, nearly every attempt made by a state on its specific segment of the Danube was largely countered by similar works made by other riparian countries located upstream or downstream.²⁸ However, the history of this untamed and at times dangerous waterway (as described by the Hungarian-American geographer), mentions an exception – the establishment of the European Commission of the Danube. This international body was created in 1856 to find, engineer and maintain a navigable channel on the maritime sector of the Danube, from Brăila to its flowing into the Black Sea, including the Danube Delta in its attributions. However, even this European body did not have a unitary evolution. Kiss/Kish noted that the design of the international administration received wholehearted support from its members. However, this cooperation was lost after the First World War, resulting in the cessation of almost all hydrotechnical efforts aimed at improving navigation on the maritime channel of the river until the beginning of the Second World War²⁹. The study's author provided limited information; thus certain explanatory additions are necessary to fully understand his point of view.

The Definitive Statute of the Danube, signed on July 23rd, 1921, established the interwar regime of this navigation and transport waterway within the Versailles system. It divided the navigable course of the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea into two sectors. Each sector had a corresponding Commission, exercising different powers. The International Commission of the Danube was established on the riverine sector from Ulm downstream to Brăila, consisting of riparian countries and the victorious major powers (France, Great Britain, Italy). The sole duties of this body were to supervise that riparian states properly maintained the navigable channel and applied equal rights treatment for all pavilions. The European Commission of the Danube, an international

²⁸ George Kiss, *TVA on the Danube?*, pp. 275-277.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 277, 282.

administrative organisation with extensive legal, legislative, and fiscal authority, was maintained to oversee the marine sector from Brăila to the sea. Its operational principles closely resemble those of the current European Union. Unlike the pre-war structure, when all great European powers were members,³⁰ the interwar period saw the European Commission of the Danube limited to only four members (Romania, as a territorial authority, along with the other victorious powers – France, Great Britain, and Italy). This limitation generated a negative international representation and great deficiencies in achieving the hydrotechnical goals set since its establishment in 1856³¹.

The lack of a strategy or vision for the integrated development of resources, the selfish national policies of riparian countries (mutually applying restrictive trade practices), disparate or non-implemented works to improve the navigable channel, and many other factors had all had negative consequences on Danube River traffic before World War II. In 1936, the peak year of the interwar period, the circulation of goods registered on the maritime sector of the Danube was around 7.5 million tons – just 10% of what was carried out on the Rhine. Border formalities, customs duties, tug costs or loading/unloading costs greatly increased the price of transport. In 1929, the cost of transporting a ton of wheat from Budapest to Mannheim (on the Danube to Regensburg and thence by rail) was 38 marks/ton, compared to just 19 marks for a ton of wheat brought by sea from the United States of America. Similarly, a ton of Hungarian wheat transported from Budapest to any of the ports located on the Rhine, Elbe, Danube, or the Mediterranean cost about 30 marks, a huge sum compared to the mere 11 marks/ton of wheat brought to the same ports by ocean freight from the United States of America³².

³⁰ When the European Commission of the Danube was established in 1856, it included all the great European powers: France, Great Britain, Austria/Austria-Hungary, Russia, Sardinia/Italy, Prussia/Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. Romania joined them in 1878, as a territorial authority, after the annexation of Dobruja [Dobrogea] and the Danube Delta.

³¹ For more details see Arthur-Viorel Tuluș, *Problema Dunării la conferința de pace de la Paris (1919) și în perioada imediat următoare* [The Danube Question during the Paris Peace Conference and the immediately subsequent period], in "Analele Universității 'Dunărea de Jos' din Galați". Istorie, Tom VII, 2008, pp. 175-182; Idem, *Dunărea maritimă între Aranjamentul de la Sinaia și Acordul de la Belgrad (1938-1948)* [The Maritime Danube between the Sinaia Settlement and the Belgrade Agreement (1938 – 1948)], Galați, Galați University Press, 2008, pp. 30-35.

³² George Kiss, *TVA on the Danube?* pp. 300-301.

George Kiss/Kish concluded that merely improving navigation would undoubtedly address these shortcomings. However, transforming this great river into a true commercial route required a radical change of vision or strategy, which involved establishing an authority to oversee the integrated regional development of resources in the Danube Valley. This authority would not have been limited solely to the maintenance of the navigable channel; instead, it would have also focused on improving the lives of inhabitants through flood control, maximum use of hydropower potential to produce electricity, appropriate use of marginal land for agriculture through irrigation or appropriate reforestation of lands in the drainage basin. Given the successful implementation of a similar approach on the Tennessee River since 1933 by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Kiss/Kish's study focused on two main issues:

(1) motivating the need to move to a new form of qualitative regional integration – in which case his approach is historical-geographical, carrying out a broad analysis of available resources, their previous use, and their potential, with an emphasis on distribution models;

(2) the advantages of adapting the American TVA model to the post-war reorganising of the Danube – a rather political approach, because any authority proposing such goals must obtain and possess supranational competencies, which involve founding acts, administrative powers and structure. Any supranational authority or agency commissioned to plan, arrange, and maintain a system covering over 500,000 km² would need strong political support from its member states, to have sufficient financial capital to materialise its projects, including valuable human resources such as engineers, administrators, agronomists, etc.

A thorough analysis of George Kiss/Kish's project revealed that the Hungarian American geographer remained consistently committed to the concept of political geography, which earned him notoriety in the scientific world. His historical analysis of the evolution of the Danube regime takes a comprehensive approach that opposes geopolitics. Concretely, the river's vast potential can never be sufficiently exploited as long as any kind of Danube organisation serves the ideology or ambitions of certain states.

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND FAILURE OF THE PROJECT

Implementing the TVA model on the Danube was challenging even in a favourable international context. It required overcoming historical rivalries between the riparian countries, as well as substantial funds, which their governments did not have after the war ruined them financially. The solution could

have also come from overseas, through the non-reimbursable American financial aid European Recovery Program (ERP), later known as the Marshall Plan. Although a direct link between George Kiss/Kish's plan to establish a Danube supranational authority/agency and the Marshall Plan cannot be identified, both initiatives have several similarities:

(1) they were means to prevent the recurrence of the great depression of 1929-1933, a traumatic experience for Americans and not only for them. In the USA, the complex crisis of the interwar years was overcome by applying the New Deal plan of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who became the longest-serving American president³³. The New Deal included a broad set of economic programs, based on state intervention in the economy. The establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933 followed this line of action. The Marshall Plan was conceived and designed as a New Deal for post-war Europe, even if in the end, for known reasons, it was applied only to the western part of the continent³⁴.

(2) both the Marshall Plan and the establishment of a Danube agency required cooperation between beneficiaries/partners as a crucial prerequisite. „Cooperation" was interpreted by Moscow as a way for American influence to enter Europe. Claiming that the American financial aid would violate the „sovereignty of participating states", the Soviet Union refused the Marshall Plan and coerced its Eastern European satellites into rejecting it as well³⁵.

Without American financial and technical aid, George Kiss/Kish's project for the Danube was doomed to fail. Its last chance was wasted during the Danube Conference, held in Belgrade between July 30th and August 18th, 1948, when a new regime for the Danube was established. Under the generous slogan „The Danube belongs to the riversides", the Soviet Union imposed the following through the Belgrade Agreement:

(1) elimination of any form of internationalization of the Danube to conceal

³³ President of the United States of America between March 1932 and April 12th, 1945.

³⁴ Concerning the elaboration, application, and consequences of the European Recovery Program (ERP), see: John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1976; G.S. Prentzas, *The Marshall Plan*, New York, Chelsea House, 2011; Michael Holm, *The Marshall Plan. A New Deal for Europe*, London - New York, Routledge, 2017; Benn Steil, *The Marshall Plan. Dawn of the Cold War*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018.

³⁵ Michael Holm, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-57. Between July 9th and 11th, 1947, the governments of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland announced that they would not participate in the discussions over the Marshall Plan, scheduled to take place in Paris on June 19th, 1947.

the Soviet Union's hegemon that was exercised in an authoritarian manner until the death of Soviet leader I.V. Stalin (March 1953);

(2) unification of the official course of the Danube under the authority of a single institution, the Danube Commission, which was only granted supervisory powers (replicating the former interwar International Danube Commission) over how riparian states maintained their own navigable sectors;

(3) since the Danube was divided between the two worlds of capitalism and communism by the Iron Curtain, the unification of the river was utopian from the start. Furthermore, the conflict between Tito and Stalin divided the navigable channel of the communist sector into three other segments between 1948 and 1954³⁶.

Assessing the project of George Kiss/Kish in light of current knowledge, it would be simplistic to blame the whole failure on the Soviet Union and Moscow's dictatorship over the Danube satellite states. Even if the communist bloc seems predominantly responsible, the lack of reaction from American and Western politicians remains particularly surprising. Under these conditions, George Kiss/Kish's project of reorganizing the Danube regime on new bases remained a „scientific suggestion”, and the lack of reactions either for or against it rapidly led to abandonment and disregard, even within the scientific world. To further simplify, it may be said that political geography had triumphed over geopolitics only theoretically since politicians and diplomats from both ideological sides still viewed the world in geopolitical terms at the beginning of the Cold War.

CONCLUSIONS

Even today, implementing the model of integrated development of resources that the Danube can offer to the inhabitants of its extensive river basin is difficult to achieve. George Kiss/Kish was a visionary and an innovator, but equally an idealist. Considering the extensive damage caused by the Second World War and the financial ruin that threatened Europe, Kiss/Kish argued that the governments of the Danube states should have agreed to cede their powers in favour of a supranational agency or authority. Modelled after the American Tennessee Valley Authority, it would have been responsible for the collective and efficient use of the

³⁶ Arthur-Viorel Tuluș, *Dunărea maritimă...*, pp. 257-285; Idem, *A consequence of the Second World War: The Belgrade Agreement (August 18, 1948) and its consequences upon the navigation on the Danube*, in “Analele Universității Maritime din Constanța”, Vol. 18, 2012, pp. 67-72.

economic potential of the Danube. The objectives of the new agency/supranational authority would have extended beyond the mere improvement of the navigable channel, unlike all previous Commissions formed for the Danube. On the contrary, the exploitation of hydropower potential, flood control, or the appropriate use of marginal land for agriculture would have also been pursued. Kiss/Kish's project was a significant challenge, necessitating close cooperation between states and substantial financial funds to get the process off the ground. Unfortunately, almost simultaneously with the publishing and dissemination of Kiss/Kish's study, the whole of Europe and, implicitly, the Danube basin entered the logic of the Cold War, resulting in the project's ultimate downfall.

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THE THREE STAGES OF THE DISPERSION OF THE KURDISH POPULATION INTO ANATOLIA IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA

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Abstract: Kurds are a Middle Eastern people dispersed across four countries, i.e. Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The purpose of this study is to examine the external reasons for the dispersion of the Kurdish population throughout Turkey after World War II. Until the end of World War II, Kurds in Turkey largely lived together in specific regions of the country. According to the claim of this study, Kurds in Turkey have been forced to disperse throughout the country beyond natural population growth and internal factors due to several external reasons over the past millennium. The first reason is the push factor and domino effect created by autocratic regimes in the Middle East, with Turkey attracting this population as a relatively safe country. The second reason is the PKK terrorism recognized as a terrorist organization by many states, including the United Nations and the United States. The third reason is the rapid urbanization trend in Turkey.

Keywords: Kurds, Turkey, Middle East, Dispersion of Kurdish Population, Post-World War II Era.

Rezumat: Cele trei etape ale dispersării populației kurde în Anatolia în epoca de după cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Kurzii sunt un popor din Orientul Mijlociu răspândit în Turcia, Irak, Iran și Siria. Studiul examinează motivele externe ale dispersiei populației kurde în Turcia, după cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Până atunci, aceștia trăiseră în mare parte într-o anumită regiune a Turciei, fiind forțați să o părăsească, deși

trăiseră acolo circa un mileniu, și să se disperseze în întreaga țară din cauze externe, dincolo de creșterea naturală a populației și de alte motive interne. Prima dintre cauzele externe a fost dată de puterea de atracție și efectul de domino creat de regimurile autocratice din Orientul Mijlociu. De aceea, Turcia a atras această populație din cauza calității sale de țară relativ sigură. A doua cauză este indusă de către terorismul PKK, recunoscut ca organizație teroristă de multe state, în special de SUA, precum și de către Națiunile Unite. A treia cauză a fost constituită de către tendința de urbanizare rapidă din Turcia.

INTRODUCTION

There are numerous ethnic groups in the world. Some claim that this number exceeds 5 thousand. Similarly, there are also different languages whose number is closer to this figure. However, only a small group of those ethnic groups, approximately 250 of them, have their own separate states but there are only 194 member states of the United Nations. Moreover, particular groups of those states belong to the same ethnic groups. For instance, Arabs have 22 states, the nations that speak English and speak Spanish have similar numbers of states and some others as well.¹ Although being a unique and homogenous ethnic group is not necessary for a society in theory like Sweden, Belgium and USA to become a state, most states rely upon an ethnic group in reality.

The Kurds are a Middle Eastern ethnicity mostly spread to four countries which are Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. This ethnic group is one of the most political groups that have a big population without state in the world alongside some similar others such as Berbers throughout north African countries, Baloches and Azarees in Iran, Tamils in India, Moros in Philippines, Chechens in Russia, Catalans and Basques in Spain, Scots and Irish in England, Hutus in Rwanda and Uganda, Sundanese and Madurese in Indonesia, etc.² Most of these ethnic

¹ John Meyer et al., *World society and the nation-state*, in "American Journal of sociology", Vol. 103, 1997, No. 1, pp. 144-181.

² Paul R. Brass, *Ethnic groups and the state*, in "Ethnic groups and the state", Routledge, 2023. pp. 1-56. For further information, see: Walker Connor, *A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a....*, in "Ethnic and racial studies", Vol. 1, 1978, no. 4, p. 377-400; Myron Weiner, *Peoples and states in a new ethnic order?* in "Third World Quarterly", Vol. 13, 1992, no. 2, pp. 317-333; Andreas Wimmer, *Who owns the state? Understanding ethnic conflict in post-colonial societies*, in "Nations and nationalism", Vol. 3, 1997, No. 4, p. 631-666; Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without groups*, Harvard University Press, 2006; Montserrat Guibernau, *Nations without states. Political communities in a global age*, Polity Press, 1999.

groups have spread from limited and small regions to other bigger and larger geographies in history. However, the one that spread to the largest areas compared to the others is probably the Kurdish population.


Almost all of societies have changed their homelands throughout history due to factors such as natural population growth, drought, famine, epidemic, war, exile or any other similar reasons. The ethnicities' change of their location might produce several problems such as ethnic, political, economic, judicial, cultural and religious issues and the like. One of two main reasons of emergence of ethnic minorities is migration with all the dimensions mentioned above and the other one is imperial conquests. The Kurdish population has spread throughout the Middle Eastern geography due to several special reasons appropriate to its own geopolitical circumstances throughout history.



Map-1: The Zagros Mountains, which have been accepted as the historical Kurdish homeland.³

³ The Zagros Mountains, http://www.eecrg.uib.no/projects/AGS_BotanyExp/Iran/Iran.htm (Accessed on 05. 02. 2024).

Two events can be considered crucial in the migration history of Kurds in the Middle East. The first is the dispersion of Kurds from the Zagros Mountains region⁴ in Iran, considered their homeland, over the past millennium, spreading as a nomadic people to other mountainous areas of the Middle East. The second is the demographic mobility following World War II, marking their departure from south-eastern Turkey and their spreading throughout the country. This study will focus on, evaluate, and interpret the latter demographic mobility rather than the former.



Map-2: Areas where Kurdish people populated mostly since the 18th century.⁵

⁴ Vladimir Minorsky et al., *Kürtler & Kürdistan* [Kurds & Kürdistan], in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, translated by Kamuran Fıratlı, İstanbul, Doz Publication, 2004, p. 51-57. For further information, see Ferdinand Hennerbichler, *The origin of Kurds*, in "Advances in Anthropology", Vol. 2, 2012, No. 2, p. 64-79; John Limbert, *The origins and appearance of the Kurds in pre-Islamic Iran*, in "Iranian Studies", Vol. 1, 1968, No. 2, p. 41-51.

⁵ Map of most populated regions: https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kurdish_lands_92.jpg (Accessed on 09.03.2024).

In this study, the concepts of expansion for relatively spontaneous and natural population growth among Kurds and dispersion due to external reasons and partly coercion have been employed. The population expansion of Kurds in Turkey is closely related to events in the Middle East. The expansion of this population in Turkey, fundamentally, relies on three factors after World War II. Firstly, Kurds fleeing from authoritarian regimes in the Middle East viewed Turkey as a relatively safe and accessible haven, leading to their entry and, in a domino effect, the dispersal of larger Kurdish-origin populations across the country. The second reason for migration is PKK terrorism, which began in Turkey in 1984 and has continued to the present. The third and final factor driving movement is the urbanization process in Turkey. It can be said that the first two factors result in population dispersion, while the third leads to population spread.


**FIRST STAGE: THE INTER-STATE MIGRATION CAUSED
BY THE AUTOCRATIC REGIMES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
IN THE 20TH CENTURY**

The Middle Eastern states are characterized by their autocratic and authoritarian political administrations. All the states around the world have some kind of tension with their peoples due to their societies' demand for more liveable circumstances to survive and more right to express themselves, on the one hand, and the state's desire to maintain political and economic stability on the other. The Middle Eastern states are among the most prominent in the world in terms of tensions with their people.

While Iran already had an autocratic state tradition as a Middle Eastern state, it was transformed into another autocratic system after the Islamic Revolution. As all states undergoing a revolution experience, Iran also excluded a significant amount of people from the state apparatus formally and/or informally. Due to this exclusion, approximately 1.5 million Iranians migrated to Turkey and obtained temporary refugee status in Turkey between 1980 and 1991.⁶ During this period, the Turkish government adopted a temporary policy allowing Iranians to enter and stay in the country without formal permission. Although Turkey intended to pursue a policy related with Iranian refugees encouraging them to resettle in a third country, a considerable part of them continued to stay

⁶ Celia Mannaert, *Irregular migration and asylum in Turkey*. UNHCR., 2003. p. 2. <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/3ebf5c054.pdf> (Accessed on 11.02.2024).

in Turkey and obtain citizenship in time.⁷ There is no doubt that some of them were Kurdish refugees. They preferred to stay in Turkey as a place where they already had cultural, religious and historical ties.



Map-3. Spread of the Kurdish population according to Kurdish dialects⁸


Another Kurdish migration wave from Middle Eastern states having autocratic regimes came from Iraq. During the Halabja bombings in 1988, approximately 70 thousand northern Iraqi Kurds fled from the other side of the border to the Turkish side and, at the end of the turmoil, most of the immigrants chose to stay in Turkey receiving citizenship from the Turkish government.⁹ The

⁷ Caysie Myers, *Refugee Flows Through Turkey: 1980 to 2017*, <https://www.turkheritage.org/en/publications/issue-briefs/refugee-flows-through-turkey-1980-to-2017-4421> (Accessed on 08.03.2024). For further information, see: Martin Van Bruinessen, *The Kurds in movement: Migrations, mobilisations, communications and the globalisation of the Kurdish question*, Tokyo, Islamic Area Studies Project, 1999; Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kurdish society, ethnicity, nationalism and refugee problems*, in *The Kurds*, Routledge, 2005, p. 7, 14-15.

⁸ Ferdinand Hennerbichler, *The Origin of Kurds*, in "Advances in Anthropology", Vol. 2, 2012, No. 2, p. 67.

⁹ Caysie Myers, *op. cit.*, *passim*. For further information, see: Diane E. King, *Asylum*

author of this essay also met two of them while residing in İstanbul as a student at İstanbul University. They were the second generation of Kurds in Turkey and were speaking fluent Turkish. These types of migrations have been continuing almost uninterruptedly based on individual, family or small group experiences.



Map-4. The Kurdish population according to the 1965 census.¹⁰

SECOND STAGE: THE SECURITY CONCERN CAUSED BY PKK TERRORISM FROM 1984 UP TO TODAY


The Kurdish migration has been proceeding increasingly from eastern Anatolia to the western regions of Turkey for centuries due to the natural increase of population, economic, social and security related conditions. This migration is much more measurable in the last century. The proportion of the Kurds in all regions of Turkey constantly increased from 1965 to 1993. In these 28 years, the Kurdish population increased from 0.9 to 4 percent in the west; from 5 to 11 in the south; from 4 to 6 in central Anatolia; from 0.5 to 2 percent in the north and from 48 to 60 percent in the eastern regions.¹¹ It can be easily said by looking at

seekers/patron seekers: interpreting Iraqi Kurdish migration, in "Human Organization", Vol. 64, 2005, No. 4, pp. 316-326.

¹⁰ Servet Mutlu, *Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study*, in "International Journal of Middle East Studies", Vol. 28, 1996, pp. 517-541.

¹¹ İbrahim Sirkeci, *Exploring the Kurdish Population in the Turkish Context*, in "Genus", Vol. 56, 2000, No. 1-2. p. 156.

the data that the proportion of the Kurdish population in Turkey was not more than 1 percent prior to the 20th century except the eastern part of the country. While tracing these increasing proportions related to the Kurdish population in Turkey, some researchers predicting that within fifty years, the Kurdish population would exceed the Turkish population in Turkey¹², Kirişçi and Winrow do not agree with this idea because most Kurds living in western Turkey transform their identity and make intermarriages with the Turkish population.¹³ Moreover, they adapt to city culture and city social conditions in two–three decades and have fewer children. Therefore, their natural birth-rate decreases in cities, and this also make Izady's prediction impossible to come true.



Map-5. Kurdish Population – 1990 according to Mutlu¹⁴

The terrorist activity in eastern Turkey began in 1984 and escalated to significant unrest in the region by the mid-1990s.¹⁵ Terrorism-induced instability

¹² Mehrdad R. Izady, *A Concise Handbook: The Kurds*, Washington DC-Londra, Taylor and Francis, 1992, p. 119.

¹³ Kemal Kirişçi, Gareth M. Winrow, *Kürt Sorunu Kökeni ve Gelişimi* [The Kurdish Question: Origins and Development], translated by Ahmet Fethi, İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Publication, 1997. p. 140.

¹⁴ Servet Mutlu, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

¹⁵ Djordje Stefanovic, Neophytos Loizides, and Samantha Parsons, *Home is where the heart is? Forced migration and voluntary return in Turkey's Kurdish regions*, in "Journal of Refugee Studies", Vol. 28, 2015, No. 2, p. 276-296.

had a domino effect, exacerbated by ineffective security measures. In this turbulent environment, a small portion of the local population fled from the state to join the organization, while others sought refuge by collaborating with the state. A third segment escaped from one state to another. The second group consisted of tribes that began collaborating with the state, typically assuming security roles like village guards in rural areas, to escape the organization's pressure. The third segment encompassed broad swathes of society migrating from rural areas under state control to urban areas and from the eastern region's dominance to the western region's dominance.

Because of the armed conflict and the security policy of the Turkish governments due to the PKK terror, it can be said that a massive domestic migration wave has occurred in Turkey since 1984. This massive migration began through the 1980s and rose each year and peaked in the 1990s. There are different figures in the literature about how many villages were subjected to evacuation. Natali claims that 1800 villages were abandoned, and 3 million people were forced to migrate from the eastern rural provinces to the city centres.¹⁶ President Süleyman Demirel determined those settlements as 2.253 in 1995.¹⁷ Bruneau claims that 3.500 villages were evacuated in this process by the security forces.¹⁸ The most reliable figure is probably given by Sirkeci. He reports that 400 thousand people, mostly Kurdish, migrated from the region to the eastern but mostly to the western city centres of Turkey.¹⁹ Depending on that reality, urban dwellers among Kurds (about 85 percent) are higher than their Turkish fellows (about 75 percent) in western Turkey.

Table-1. Estimated Kurdish population by region in Turkey 1965–1990 ²⁰				
Geographic Regions	1965		1990	
	Thousand	Percent	Thousand	Percent
Marmara	72.65	1.24	810.13	6.09

¹⁶ Denise Natali, *Kürtler ve Devlet Irak, Türkiye ve İran'da Ulusal Kimliğin Gelişmesi* [The Kurds and the State Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey and Iran], translated by İbrahim Bingöl, İstanbul, Avesta Publication, 2009. p. 165.

¹⁷ Kemal Kirişçi, Gareth M. Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 135.


¹⁸ Michel Bruneau, *Küçük Asya'dan Türkiye'ye Azınlıklar, Etnik-Milli Homojenleştirme, Diasporalar* [Minorities, Ethnic-National Homogenization, and Diasporas from Asia Minor to Turkey], translated by Ayhan Güneş, İstanbul, İletişim Publication, 2018. p. 219. For further information, see: Joost Jongerden, *The settlement issue in Turkey and the Kurds: an analysis of spatial policies, modernity and war*, Vol. 102, 2007, Brill.

¹⁹ İbrahim Sirkeci, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

²⁰ Servet Mutlu, *op. cit., passim*.

Aegean	15.77	0.36	296.99	3.93
Mediterranean	190.22	4.98	726.55	8.95
Central Anatolia	262.64	4.13	579.38	5.53
Black Sea	28.72	0.51	37.88	0.50
Eastern	1,192.73	38.87	2,230.29	41.96
South-eastern	1,192.73	64.24	2,365.04	64.98
Total	3,132.39	9.98	7,046.25	12.60

Table-1 illustrates the percentages of the ethnic groups and the spread of the demographic structure of the ethnic groups in four categories – Kurds, Turks, Zazas and Arabs – throughout eastern and south-eastern Turkey. It is clear from Table-1 that there are 19 cities throughout eastern Turkey, while 12 of them (Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, Van) have predominantly Kurdish population, and 7 of them (Adıyaman, Elazığ, Erzurum, Gazi Antep, Kahraman Maraş, Malatya, Şanlıurfa) have predominantly Turkish population. The ethnic distribution of the 19 cities in the region consists of 55% Kurdish, 30% Turkish, 6% Arabian, and 6% Zaza populations in total.



Map-6. Distribution of the Kurdish Population by regions in 2010²¹

According to another research, which was conducted in 12 cities consisting of Adıyaman, Ağrı, Bingöl, Batman, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Kars, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Tunceli and Van that are mostly populated by the Kurds, carrying out a poll involving 1918 persons, the Kurdish population was 73 percent, the Zaza

²¹ KONDA, *Biz Kimiz'10 Kürt Meselesinde Algı ve Beklentiler* [Who We Are'10 Perceptions and Expectations on the Kurdish Issue], İstanbul, İletişim Publication, 2011, p. 16.

population was 12.8 percent, the Turkish population was 8.9 percent and the Arab population was 4.6 percent.²²

THIRD STAGE: URBANIZATION AND THE SPREAD OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY

After World War II, Turkey rapidly began urbanizing. The urbanization rate, which was 20% in 1950, tripled to 60% by the year 2000. It is believed that, in present-day Turkey, the urbanization rate has exceeded 70%.²³ This process affected not only rural areas but also urban centres in the east. Similarly, this process effectively encompassed Kurds, leading them to migrate to cities in mass numbers due to both push and pull factors. These migrations definitively influenced the volume and proportion of the Kurdish population both in the areas they left and in the areas they moved to. While the Kurdish population sharply decreased in rural areas in the east, the number and proportion of Kurds in urban centres in both the east and west markedly increased.

Table-2. Ethno-demographic structure in Eastern and Southeast Turkey²⁴

Table-2. Ethno-demographic structure in Eastern and Southeast Turkey ²⁴						
Ethnicity	First Region (12 City)		Second Region (7 City)		Eastern and Southeast Anatolia, Total Population and Percentages of 19 Cities	
	Ağrı – Batman – Bingöl – Bitlis – Diyarbakır – Hakkari – Mardin – Muş – Siirt –Şırnak – Tunceli – Van		Adıyaman – Elazığ – Erzurum – G.Antep – K.Maraş – Malatya – Ş. Urfa			
	Population	Percent	Population	Percent	Population	Percent
Kurds	4,987,068	80.49	2,191,819	32.62	7,178,887	55.59
Turks	243,037	3.92	3,701,857	55.10	3,944,894	30.55
Zazas	550,018	8.87	319,065	4.75	869,083	6.73

²² Mesut Yeğen et al, *Kürtler Ne İstiyor Kürdistan'da Etnik Kimlik, Dindarlık, Sınıf ve Seçimler* [What Do the Kurds Want? Ethnic Identity, Religiosity, Class, and Elections in Kurdistan], İstanbul, İletişim Publication, 2016, p. 85.

²³ Gülen Elmas, *Women, urbanization and regional development in Southeast Anatolia: A case study for Turkey*, in "Turkish Studies", Vol. 5, 2004, No. 3, p. 1-24.

²⁴ BILGESAM, *Kurds and Societal Perceptions in Turkey*, (Institutional Report), prepared by Mehmed Sadi Bilgiç, Salih Akyürek, İstanbul, BILGESAM Publication, 2012.

Arabs	372,117	6.00	488,353	7.27	860,470	6.64
Others	42,971	0.69	16,252	0.24	59,227	0.45
Total	6,195,211	100.00	6,717,350	100.00	12,912,561	100.00

According to the data, the Kurdish population increased from 3.1 million in 1965 to 10.2 million in 2003. As it is shown in Table-2 the same population rose from 9.2 percent to 14.5 respectively. This rapid increase should be considered a result of both the increase of the average natural birth rate (3.3% percent for the Kurds between these two years and 2.4% for the national average of Turkey) and the declining mortality rates of the Kurdish population in Turkey.²⁵

Table-3. Difference of the Kurdish population in Turkey when compared to the Turkish population and others ²⁶							
	1935	1965	1990	1992	1993	1998	2003
Turks	89.2	90.1	-	85.8	82.7	83.2	82.6
Kurds	9.2	7.6	12.6	12.4	13.0	14.4	14.5
Others	1.6	2.3	-	1.8	4.3	2.4	2.9

"In 1965, the Kurdish-speaking population constituted less than 1% of the population in the western provinces and 5% in the southern provinces. By 2003, the shares of the Kurdish population had reached to 6.2 and 9.5% respectively in these two regions".²⁷

According to Mutlu's estimations, the percentages of the Kurdish population in big metropolitan centres increased between 1965 and 1990 as follows, from 3.84 percent to 6.74 percent in Ankara; from 2.77 percent to 8.16 in Istanbul and from 1.04 percent to 6.91 percent in Izmir, respectively.²⁸

As Table-1 shows, while the Kurdish population in Turkey was roughly 3 million in 1965, it increased to 7 million in 1990 and as a percentage of the total population of Turkey, it increased from 9.98 to 12.60. Both figures indicate that the Kurdish population in Turkey grew by 124.94 percent during this 25-year period, while the non-Kurdish population of the country increased by 73.02


²⁵ İsmet Koç et al., *Demographic Differentials and Demographic Integration of Turkish and Kurdish Population in Turkey*, in "Population Research and Policy Review", Vol. 27, 2008, no. 4, p. 449.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 449

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 450.

²⁸ Servet Mutlu, *op. cit.*

percent. However, it should be noted that urbanization gained momentum and accelerated in Turkey after the 1980s. The Kurdish population, also influenced both by the attraction of cities and the push factor of terrorism, began migrating to urban areas from the 1980s onwards.²⁹



Map-7. Kurdish population – 1993 according to Sirkeci.³⁰

DISCUSSION AND EFFECTS OF THE KURDISH SPREAD ON THE CURRENT KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY

The most important incident in the last hundred years that enabled the Kurds to concentrate and form a majority in eastern Anatolia was the exile of the Armenians from the region in 1915.³¹ The fact that this outcome benefits the

²⁹ Rebecca Lucas, *Taking to the streets: the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the urbanization of insurgency*, in "Small Wars & Insurgencies", Vol. 31, 2020, No. 1, pp. 61-86. For further information, see: Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kurds and the City*, Joyce Blau, *L'éternelle chez les Kurdes*, Paris, Institut Kurde de Paris, 2013.

³⁰ İbrahim Sirkeci, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

³¹ Hans Lukas Kieser, *İskalanmış Barış Doğu Vilayetleri'nde Misyonerlik, Etnik Kimlik ve Devlet 1839-1938* [The squandered peace. Missionaries, ethnicity and the state in the eastern provinces of Turkey 1839–1938], translated by Atilla Dirim, İstanbul, İletişim Publication, 2013, p. 272, 277-8, 283, 303.

Kurds indicates that the cause may be related to the same actor.³² This exile fundamentally changed the fate of Anatolia in demographic, economic and political terms. First, the demographic situation changed significantly in two respects. Firstly, the exile of the Armenians enabled the Kurds who were in pending statehood to settle these places. This process occurred sequentially. The Kurds that were in the rural areas settled in towns, districts and city centers; the nomads filled empty rural regions and, finally, the Kurds that lived as nomads on the Iranian side found empty spaces to continue their nomadic way of life by passing over to the Turkish side. These developments led to a further increase in the Kurdish population on the Anatolian plateau in comparison with the three other countries. This quantitative increase would also produce some qualitative problems in the future.

The expulsion of the Armenians from eastern Anatolia, which was populated by a relatively urbanized, educated, prosperous and artisan people embracing urban culture, caused this region to regress economically and socially in such a way that it could not recover again.³³ The Kurdish population, which occupied the traditional places of the Armenians, did not have their social capital, and some of them were still adapting to the settled way of life from a nomadic lifestyle. Even though the Kurds seized the property and land left by the Armenians³⁴, instead of running this economic capital, they just managed to consume it. As a result, the national wealth and human resources accumulated in hundreds of years in this region were wasted. The worsening of eastern Anatolia's economy in such a degree resulted in the Kurds, who had settled here, causing a social problem after a while, which finally evolved into an ethnic problem.

Politically, however, as a natural result of the first two circumstances, in eastern Turkey, a Kurdish issue emerged.³⁵ If the Armenians had not been exiled, the Kurds would not have been able to achieve the majority in this region.³⁶ If the

³² Hikmet Öksüz, İsmail Köse, *ABD Yüksek Komiseri Amiral Bristol'un Rapor ve Savaş Günlüklerinde Ermeni Meselesi (1919-1927)* [The Armenian Question in the Reports and War Diaries of the U.S. High Commissioner Admiral Bristol (1919-1927)], Trabzon, Karadeniz Technical University Publishing, 2015, p. 113, 268, 272.

³³ Uğur Ümit Üngör, *Modern Türkiye'nin İnşası Doğu Anadolu'da Ulus, Devlet ve Şiddet (1913-1950)* [The Making of Modern Turkey Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, (1913-1950)], İstanbul, İletişim Publication, 2016, p. 46, 63.

³⁴ Hans Lukas Kieser, *op. cit.*, p. 40, 198-9, 465, 513.

³⁵ Zeynep Gamberetti, Joost Jongerden, *Kurdish issue in Turkey*, London, Routledge, 2015, *passim*.

³⁶ Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlı Nüfusu (1830-1914) Demografik ve Sosyal Özellikleri* [Ottoman

Armenians had not been exiled, the economic situation of the Kurds in the east would not have been so bad. Finally, if these bad experiences had not taken place, Turkey would not have been able to experience a Kurdish problem. As it happens around the world, the dominating central planning has constantly produced problems in Turkey, as well. Instead, a controlled liberal and free market approach is the greatest solution for ethnic problems. Indeed, while the strict management of central planning of the Young-Turks and the new Republic of Turkey regarding the Kurds largely became unsuccessful³⁷, urbanization alone, carried out in a highly improvised way, provided much more successful integration and social integration of the Kurds, which the central planning was unable to do.

On the one hand, this experience points to the cost and incapacity of an intentional and centralized assimilationist policy; on the other, it strongly points out that a spontaneous, democratic and liberal economic-political process is full of costless and more tangible results. Therefore, while America is able to integrate ethnic groups, France cannot.³⁸ While America, Canada and especially the northern European countries represent the successful group in this regard, France, as well as Russia and many of the centralized states such as China and Turkey, can be added to the category that fails to integrate different ethnic groups.³⁹ Because the first one is based on democracy, liberalism, free market, spontaneity and volunteerism in social and economic relations; the second one demonstrates an approach based on anti-democratic, oppressive, centralist, planning and obligatory tendencies. Similarly, the first model tries to integrate the ethnic groups; the second model tries to reshape them. Yet social integration and coexistence are possible without reshaping ethnicities, and the richer social life precisely exists in this second place.

CONCLUSIONS

The Kurds are one of the nomadic and/or semi-nomadic peoples of the

Population 1830–1914. Demographic and Social Characteristics], İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Publication, 2003, p. 91-96.

³⁷ Uğur Ümit Üngör, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-339.

³⁸ Robert A. Levine, *Assimilating Immigrants. Why America Can and France Cannot*, Occasional Paper, RAND-Initiated Research, 2004. www.rand.org, [Accessed on: 02.06.2024], pp. 1-13.

³⁹ Soner Çağaptay, *Türkiye’de İslam, Laiklik ve Milliyetçilik Türk Kimdir?* [Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?], translated by Özgür Bircan, İstanbul, Bilgi University Publication, 2009, pp. 17-19, 23-28.

Middle East, like the Baluches, Pashtuns and Berbers. Nevertheless, due to their geostrategic position, they are one of the most prominent ethnic groups in contemporary international relations. Although Kurds are known as an Iranian-origin people, today they are a people that rather lives outside Iran.

Because the Kurds live on the junction connecting the three continents, they have to spread to a wider area as compared to the other nomads in the Middle East. Roughly 25 percent of the Kurdish population lives in Iran today, their historical homelands. The remaining 75 percent of the population is scattered in the neighboring countries such as Turkey, Iraq and Syria, in the region outside of their historical motherland.

There is only one way for Turkey to overcome all these problems. It has been seen in the historical processes that hard military interventions, centralized political structures and uniform cultural approaches are not a solution. Therefore, even if it is integrated with other methods, the solution is a democratic, multicultural and decentralized approach beginning from the cultural field to the administrative one. Spain and England in the west, Iran and Indonesia in the east were able to solve these problems mostly through such methods. Otherwise, these problems will continue to haunt Turkey for many years to come.

Iraq's attempts to resolve ethnic issues through violence resulted in the establishment of a de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Currently, this entity lacks nothing but recognition by world powers, including the United Nations and neighboring states. A similar situation is unfolding today in northern Syria. Fighting terrorism is categorized differently; attempting to suppress ethnic issues through violence is synonymous with forcing communities to establish states in the long term to secure humane living. Every ethnic group, community, religious belief, and class has the right to live in humane ways, even at minimal levels, within each nation-state. Modern nation-states are political structures where this public satisfaction can be upheld, beyond ethnic, religious, and racial mandates. Nation-states in the Middle East, including Turkey, should provide and preserve this public satisfaction for ethnic, religious, and class diversity.

At first glance, Turkey can indeed turn these intense waves of migration, which may appear negative as a "Kurdish invasion" or "demographic Kurdification," into opportunities from multiple perspectives. Firstly, migrations from east to west and from rural to urban areas can be viewed as a fresh infusion of labour into economic production sectors. Secondly, these migrations can enhance competition and social dynamics in western cities. Thirdly, the different perspectives on life, the world, and the environment

brought by migrants themselves can lead to the development of diverse and more productive trends in technical, intellectual, and artistic fields. Fourthly, this population, as educated Kurds with Western modern and urban values, could serve as a facilitator for communication and collaboration with Kurds in eastern regions of the Turkish Republic in the future. Fifthly, this population could play a mediating and pioneering role in Turkey's communication and collaboration processes with Kurdish representatives in neighbouring countries and the Kurdish diaspora abroad. Sixthly and finally, these migrations and migrants could not only alleviate Turkey's Kurdish issue domestically but also strengthen collaborations with neighbouring countries and sensitive European countries on this matter. As previously mentioned, the fundamental dynamic Turkey will need in order to activate all these potentials is observable and measurable realistic democratization.

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THE CURRENT OIL AND NATURAL GAS POLICY OF THE EU AND THE PRC TOWARD THE GCC STATES

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Abstract¹: *The authors explore the doctrinal roots of the European Union's (EU's) and People's Republic of China (PRC's) policies toward the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies in the oil and natural gas fields in the changing security environment. To this end, the authors analyse international treaties and other types of documentation, scientific papers and statistical data. The article describes successes and failures and compares the EU's and the PRC's approaches toward the GCC on the bilateral and multilateral levels in the energy sector due to the detailed analysis of cornerstone documentation.*

This research article provides a thorough overview of the processes of forming the legal framework in the EU and the PRC toward the GCC. It characterizes the evolution of the Middle East policy of the EU and the PRC and reflects on the geopolitical factor in international relations. The authors outline the obstacles in developing international dialogue between the countries, with an accompanying mention of the steps that could not be implemented during cooperation, while being declared within the official agreements. Finally, the attention is drawn to the Russian factor and the influence of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of this issue.

The authors claim that a free trade area would refresh and deepen relations between the EU and the GCC. It is noted that relations between the PRC and the GCC are developing more intensively with mutual benefit for both parties. The EU and the PRC are interested in signing an FTA with the GCC, and this step will allow them to form strategic partnership

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¹ The manuscript has been prepared within the framework of the “Erasmus+ Capacity Building in Higher Education” project titled “Academic Response to Hybrid Threats” (#610133-EPP-1-2019-1-FI-EPPKA2-CBHE-JP), carried by the National University of Ostroh Academy (Ukraine).

mechanisms in the current security situation.

Keywords: *EU, PRC, FTA, GCC, free trade area (FTA), agreement, security threats, oil and gas energy sector.*

Rezumat: *Politicile actuale ale UE și ale R.P.C. în domeniul petrolului și gazelor naturale față de statele Consiliului Cooperării al Golfului.* Autorii explorează rădăcinile doctrinare ale actualelor politici ale Chinei și Uniunii Europene față de monarhiile din Golf, în domeniul petrolului și gazelor naturale. În acest scop, autorii analizează tratatele internaționale și alte tipuri de documente oficiale, lucrări științifice și date statistice. Articolul descrie succese și eșecuri, comparând abordările Chinei și ale UE în sectorul energetic față de statele din Golf, la niveluri bilaterale și multilaterale.

Demersul științific oferă o privire de ansamblu aprofundată asupra proceselor de formare a cadrului legal al relațiilor dintre UE și China pe de o parte, monarhiile din Golful Persic pe de altă parte, reflectând asupra factorului geopolitic în relațiile internaționale. Sunt evidențiate obstacolele în dezvoltarea dialogului internațional între țări, cu menționarea acțiunilor care nu au putut fi implementate practic în cursul cooperării, deși erau menționate în cadrul acordurilor oficiale. În sfârșit, se atrage atenția asupra factorului rus asupra respectivelor relații și a influenței războiului ruso-ucrainean în contextul acestei probleme.

Autorii articolului susțin că o zonă de liber schimb ar reîmprospăta și aprofunda relațiile dintre UE și Consiliul Cooperării din Golf. Se observă că relațiile dintre China și monarhiile din Golf se dezvoltă mai intens, cu beneficii reciproce pentru ambele părți. UE și China sunt interesate să semneze un Acord de Liber Schimb cu CCG, iar acest pas le va permite să formeze mecanisme de parteneriat strategic în situația actuală de securitate.

INTRODUCTION

The EU and the PRC are the greatest economies in terms of nominal GDP after the US. Both international actors are trading superpowers and global manufacturing centres. This makes the PRC and the EU dependent on other states with larger energy resource outputs and affordable prices for them. In particular, the EU is the second-largest oil importer, and the PRC has been the world's top buyer of crude oil and refined products since 2022². Thus, the global status of the EU and the PRC is partially determined by their dependence on oil-exporting countries.

² Nikos Roussanoglou, *Tankers: China is Now the Biggest Oil Importer in the World*, in "Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide", 2023 in <https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/tankers-china-is-now-the-biggest-oil-importer-in-the-world/>. (Accessed on 01.02.2024).

An important role in this group of energy producers is played by the member states of the GCC. The GCC (1981) brings together the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait, which are located within one of the most strategically meaningful regions in the world. The main aim of the organization is to coordinate policies in the fields of economy, finance, commerce, and culture between the member states. To this end, the Supreme Council was created as the highest authority of the organization, the Ministerial Council, and the Secretariat General, which is the advisory body to the Supreme Council³. Due to its location on the coasts of the Red Sea, the Northwest Indian Ocean, and the Strait of Hormuz, the GCC monarchies are close to maritime trade routes between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Simultaneously, the GCC has significant energy reserves and large production capacities (Table 1), making the cost of oil comparatively low. Due to the peculiarities of oil production in the GCC, the member states can quickly respond to changes in the global oil market and increase or cut production. Consequently, the GCC states located in the geostrategic region play a vital role as stabilizers of oil prices, which is beneficial both for oil-producing countries and for countries that depend on the supply of petroleum and petroleum-based products.

Table 1. GCC monarchies oil reserves⁴ and production⁵ as of 2021

Country	World Rank (Total Amount of Reserves)	Reserves (Bil- lion Barrels of Oil)	Production (Barrels per day)
Saudi Arabia	2	297,5	11 039
Kuwait	6	101,5	2686
United Arab Emirates	7	97,8	3657
Qatar	13	25,2	1809
Oman	21	5,4	951
Bahrain	67	-	-

³ *The Charter*, in <https://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/Primarylaw.aspx>. (Accessed on 17.02.2024).

⁴ *Crude oil – proved reserves*, in “CIA World Factbook” 2021, in <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/about/archives/2021/field/crude-oil-proved-reserves/country-comparison>. (Accessed on 04.02.2024).

⁵ *bp Statistical Review of World Energy 2021*, in <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf>. (Accessed on 04.02.2024).

The EU and the PRC are essential trading partners of the GCC. The latter is the most significant trade partner, exporting large amounts of goods, services, and technologies while importing energy products from the monarchies of the Gulf⁶. The EU is the GCC's second-largest trading partner while being less dependent on these states for energy⁷. Both the EU and the PRC are great innovation centres that can become a source of modernization of the GCC, specifically in promising areas of renewable energy, and are large energy importers.

METHODOLOGY

The study of the dynamics of the formation of the energy policies of the EU and PRC with the GCC is extremely relevant considering the transformation of the security environment in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian war and its impact on the global security and energy markets. It can be assumed that the PRC will continue to expand the framework of relations with the GCC and deepen the mechanisms of bilateral relations with the states of the region as a whole. Now, the GCC member-states are the only ones that can meet the oil needs of the PRC. In addition to the deterioration of relations with the Russian Federation and the loss of the energy supply market, the EU will seek to intensify its presence in the GCC energy markets. Under these conditions, the EU focuses on developing a common energy policy, intensifying bilateral relations with the states of the region to offer the Gulf states clearer and more pragmatic mechanisms for political, trade, economic and security cooperation.

This article aims to compare the features of the doctrinal basis of the energy policies of the EU and China concerning GCC monarchies in the oil and gas sectors to identify the stages of its formation and the transformation of implementation mechanisms. The authors assume that, given the new security challenges caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU will continue to focus on developing a common energy policy and strategy, moving away from the level of individual member states. At the same time, the key features of China's energy policy will be high industrial development rates and increased energy dependence on foreign oil and

⁶ *Beijing: China, GCC Complete 90% of Free Trade Agreement* in "Asharq Al-Awsat", 2024 in <https://english.aawsat.com/business/4822066-beijing-china-gcc-complete-90-free-trade-agreement>. (Accessed on 17.02.2024).

⁷ *EU trade relations with the Gulf region. Facts, figures and latest developments*, in "European Commission", 2024 in https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/gulf-region_en. (Accessed on 14.02.2024).

gas imports. Despite several government initiatives to decarbonize the economy, traditional energy sources will continue to constitute the lion's share of the Chinese economy's consumption.

The documentation basis can be divided into three parts: statistical data, EU-related and PRC-related documents. Eurostat's analysis of EU–GCC trade provides us with an understanding of trade structure, dynamics and role of oil and oil-related products. The EU Energy Deals Tracker is a crucial tool in analysing the current trends in EU–GCC energy relations and the level of cooperation between both sides.

The EEC–GCC Cooperation Agreement (1989) provides valuable insight into the basis of energy cooperation between the EEC (now EU) and the GCC. Furthermore, European Strategies Global Europe: competing in the World (2006), European Security Strategy (2009) and A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (2016) provide us with the European perspective on the GCC during the first two decades of the 21st century. Finally, a REPowerEU Plan and a Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Strategic Partnership with the Gulf (2022) provide us with the modern European view of energy cooperation with the GCC.

On the Chinese side, it is important to mention China's Energy Policy (2012) and Energy in China's New Era documents that give us a brief overview of the Chinese vision of energy relations, including energy relations with the monarchies of the Gulf. Additionally, China's Arab Policy (2016) defines the Chinese-specific goals and vision for the future of the energy relations with the GCC.

The research has used a systematic approach, which helped to consider the subject through the lens of aspects that interact with each other in a single space to reveal the meaning of various events to establish their relationship and interdependence. In addition, this method has made it possible to draw up a complete picture of the formation of the legal framework of relations between the EU and the PRC about the GCC states. The work has also used a method of research synthesis, which, in complex use, helped to determine the main stages of the interaction of states and analyse the geopolitical factors in the relations of international actors. Furthermore, the scientific work has used historical methods, which made it possible to trace the evolution of the Middle East policy of the EU and the PRC; event analysis helped to trace changes in the domestic political situation and external environment; content analysis aided in analysing the content of official regulatory documents. Prognostic methods have been used to forecast the prospects for deepening the EU's and the PRC's relations with the GCC.

THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ENERGY POLICY TOWARD THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

The creation and expansion of the EU at the beginning of the 21st century put the issue of forming a common energy policy on the agenda, first outlined in the Lisbon Treaty (2007). Particularly, the Lisbon Treaty added Article 194 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which stated that the EU's energy policy, together with the policies of the member states, should aim to ensure the functioning of the energy market, ensure the security of energy supply, promote energy efficiency and energy saving, and the development of new and renewable energy sources; and promote the interconnection of energy networks. However, importantly, the article confirms the inalienable right of member states to determine the conditions for using their energy resources, the freedom to choose between different energy sources, and the freedom to determine the general structure of their energy supply⁸. Thus, due to the guarantee in Article 194, the EU energy policy consists of various elements and different degrees of centralization. Partially centralized elements include climate policy and the establishment of internal market rules. In turn, decentralized elements include the security of energy supply, technology, and energy efficiency⁹. Therefore, given the new security challenges, the EU member states must transform the energy policy from the level of individual member states to a more integrated one. It can be demonstrated by the evolution of the EU's doctrinal approaches to the GCC.

Nowadays, the only treaty regulating energy relations between the European Union (at that time, the European Economic Community, EEC) and the GCC on a multilateral level is the Cooperation Agreement¹⁰. They signed it on February 20, 1989, for an indefinite period. The two sides defined three major goals of signing the treaty. First, the EEC and the GCC declared the desire to institutionalize

⁸ Consolidated version of the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*. Part three – *Union policies and internal actions*. Title XXI – *Energy*, in https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_194/oj (Accessed on 16.07.2024).

⁹ Lehmann P. *Towards a general Europeanization of EU Member States energy policies?* in "Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy", 2015 in https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/39006/ssoar-2014-strunz_et_al-Towards_a_general_Europeanization_of.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2014-strunz_et_al-Towards_a_general_Europeanization_of.pdf (Accessed on 14.07.2024).

¹⁰ *EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement*, in https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/tradoc_140300.pdf (Accessed on 23.12.2023).

relations. To this aim, both sides created a mechanism for cooperation named the Joint Council. Secondly, both sides wanted to raise economic cooperation. Therefore, the third goal was to diversify the economies of the GCC. This step would support not only the economies but also the stability of the whole Gulf region.

The treaty consists of twenty-six articles and deals with various fields of cooperation. The Sixth Article is specifically devoted to the energy sector and calls for a closer partnership in the energy field. In addition, the EU and the GCC should jointly analyse the oil and gas trade and constantly share information on the state of the energy sector and various energy policies. Both sides should train specialists jointly. Furthermore, the EU and the GCC declared that they would carry out research on renewable energy. The parties agreed to create a Joint Council, which should convene at least once yearly. Consequently, in the Fifteenth Article, it is noted that a Joint Committee on Cooperation should assist the Council in performing its duties.

In 1990, after the Cooperation Agreement came into force, the EEC and the GCC initiated negotiations on a free trade area (hereunder FTA). Unfortunately, there is a scientific consensus regarding the unsuccessful conclusion of the negotiations: it is closely related to disagreements in the energy sector. Expressly, the lobbying role of the European petrochemical industry¹¹ and EU climate policies are noted as the ones which hindered the signing of the agreement even after the resolution of the issue related to the standard external tariff and the GCC's accession to the GATT (WTO). Nevertheless, some scholars mention the refusal to cease subsidizing energy industries by the GCC member states as one of the reasons for the failure of the negotiations in addition to the lobbyists from the European petrochemical industry¹². Finally, among the reasons for suspending the talks is the potential expansion of European investments and service companies into the GCC market. However, the role of the EU petrochemical sector is also acknowledged¹³.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian Federation drastically increased its energy presence in European markets while the GCC countries lost their oil export to the EU (Table 2). Given the geographical proximity and the economic


¹¹ Nivien Saleh, *The European Union and the Gulf States: A Growing Partnership*, in "Middle East Policy", 1999, vol. 7, p. 52-56.

¹² Rym Ayadi, Salim Gadi, *Trade and Investment Cooperation between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council: Current trends and future prospects*, in "Sharaka Commentaries", 2012, no. 2, December, p. 2.

¹³ Jim Rollo, *Prospects for an EU-Gulf Cooperation Council Free Trade Area. The World's First Region-to-Region FTA?*, in Chatham House, 2008: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Economics/bp0408ftagcc.pdf>. (Accessed on 14.12.2023)

advantage of pipeline gas over liquefied from the GCC, the Russian Federation had a clear advantage over the GCC. It was the interest in reliable long-term supplies of oil that pushed the EU to the Russian Federation and Russia's interest in stable and predictable markets pushed it to the EU¹⁴. According to the Canadian Energy Centre¹⁵, from 2005 to 2019, the Russian Federation provided almost 58% of the total European gas imports and the second-largest natural gas provider, Algeria, fulfilled about 30% of the EU's energy needs. In addition, from the last quarter of 2021 to the beginning of January 2022, the Russian Federation supplied 24–31% of all oil imports to the EU. Likewise, oil exporters such as the USA, Norway, Kazakhstan, Libya, and the United Kingdom had significant shares in the European market¹⁶. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia held a leading position in the European energy market, and this fact partly explains the pointlessness of EU energy market diversification, the search for new partners, and the lack of effective cooperation with the GCC.

Table 2. EU oil import from Russia and the GCC (million tons)¹⁷



¹⁴ Debra Johnson, *EU-Russian energy policy – single or multiple policy paradigms?*, in “Energy & Environment”, 2004, Vol. 15, no. 3, p.451-468.

¹⁵ Lennie Kaplan, Mark Milke, *EU Natural Gas Imports: €286 Billion Imported From Tyrannies and Autocracies Since 2005. For the past 15 years Russia has been the largest source of natural gas for European Union nations*, in “Canadian Energy Centre”, 2021, in <https://www.canadianenergycentre.ca/eu-natural-gas-imports-e286-billion-imported-from-tyrannies-and-autocracies-since-2005/> (Accessed on 5.01.2024).

¹⁶ *Crude oil imports and prices: changes in 2022*, in “Eurostat. News Articles”, 2023, in <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230328-1> (Accessed on 5.01.2024).

¹⁷ *Imports of oil and petroleum products by partner country*, in “Eurostat”, 2024 in https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_ti_oil_custom_12043542/default/table?lang=en. (Accessed on 5.07.2024).

The superiority of the Russian Federation in the European energy markets has led to a decline in mutual interest in a joint FTA between the EU and the GCC. Thus, the narrowing of the EU's regional interests to security-related ones can be observed. According to the EU's first security strategy of the Union, the GCC are crucial partners in maintaining regional security against Iran¹⁸. Although the authors of the strategy briefly recognized the EU's dependence on energy supplies from the GCC, it was clear that energy issues were less important compared to security ones. Thirteen years later, the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS)¹⁹ mentions the GCC's inseparability from Iran only in the context of a secure and stable EU periphery. The EUGS provided for interaction between the EU, the GCC and Iran in the context of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to establish trade and cooperation in the scientific, environmental and energy fields, as well as in security.

Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has brought severe changes not only to world politics but also to the global economy. In particular, drastic changes were made, first of all, in the energy sector. For the EU, it meant losing a significant energy supplier. This event pushed the EU to review its energy policy, turning its attention to other participants in the global energy market. On May 18, 2022, European institutions published three critical documents for European energy and relations with the GCC. One of the first was the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions REPowerEU Plan²⁰. The paper is a further development of the main provisions laid out on March 8, 2022, by the European Commission. The authors of the document claim that Russia uses energy to put pressure on the EU and utilizes the money from energy sales to fund the war against Ukraine. The Communication is a plan on how to eliminate the European reliance on Russian energy. The additional goal is a faster transition to renewable energy sources. The EU plans to achieve energy independence from the Russian Federation with the help of four steps. These

¹⁸ *European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe In A Better World.* in <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf> (Accessed on 13.12.2023).

¹⁹ *A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, in https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (Accessed on 14.12.2023).

²⁰ *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. REPowerEU Plan*, in <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0230> (Accessed on 16.12.2023).

steps are energy savings, substituting fossil fuels, accelerating Europe's clean energy transition, diversifying energy imports and, finally, smart investments into the energy sector. According to the document, three of the four significant steps to energy independence are internal European ones (energy savings, accelerating the green transition and investments in European energy) and one links to foreign policy (energy import diversification).

The same day, the European Commission issued a Joint Communication on EU External Energy Engagement in a Changing World²¹. The Communication is dedicated to relations with other foreign policy actors to overcome oil and natural gas dependence on the Russian Federation. The document praises Qatar as a reliable, liquefied natural gas supplier out of all GCC monarchies. Moreover, it is underlined that it is ready to contribute to the redirection of energy flows from Asian countries like Japan and Korea to the EU. The importance of the GCC for the EU is underlined by abundant resources for large-scale hydrogen production. The European Commission claims that GCC member-states have the potential to support the global transition to renewable energy. In addition, these states can invest in the EU's Mediterranean neighbours, where they hold a significant political and economic influence. This document is the EU's first attempt to influence bilateral energy relations, which have traditionally been the prerogative of individual EU member states. Particularly, it envisages establishing partnerships with other countries with substantial energy reserves worldwide through financial support, international assistance, technology transfer, and expanded trade relations. The EU seeks to develop ties within its competencies.

In the Third Communication²², published on the same day as the previous two, the European Commission states that it is willing to strengthen its ties with the GCC. The document is strongly influenced by the state of world security. In addition, the intention to level up relations with the GCC may be motivated by Iranian behaviour on the international stage and in the regional system. Iran continues to repress people at home despite mass protests from the West calling for change, it sells drones to help Russia in its war against Ukraine and continues to

²¹ *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "EU external energy engagement in a changing world"*, in <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52022JC0023> (Accessed on 17.12.2023).

²² *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. A Strategic Partnership with the Gulf*, in <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52022JC0013> (Accessed on 19.12.2023).

imprison European tourists demanding political and economic concessions in exchange for their release. There are six domains of possible cooperation mentioned in the paper. It is offered to cooperate economically on renewable energy and security issues. Moreover, the EU offers the GCC to coordinate their humanitarian aid, enhance people-to-people contacts and boost relations between political institutions. Energy cooperation is the second chapter in the Communication and the second-largest one. It is noted that deeper cooperation with the GCC could help the EU realize its other energy strategies mentioned in this paper and overcome its dependence on Russian fossils. The GCC can assist the EU in stabilizing oil prices by increasing its extraction. Furthermore, these countries can provide liquefied natural gas to the European markets by sea, substituting natural gas from Russia. As a result, the key interests of both sides mentioned in the Strategic Partnership with the Gulf paper include crucial areas for both the EU and the GCC, namely climate politics, energy, trade, finance and investment interests. The strategic partnership will help build trust between the EU and the GCC through closer contacts and more active EU involvement in the region's affairs (including a special representative). The EU is also actively involving the GCC in the climate agenda and the integration of energy networks. Even the title of the document underscores the Gulf's importance for the EU.


The document outlines the most promising areas of cooperation, in particular, hydrogen and renewable energies. The EU invites GCC states to join its Mediterranean Green Hydrogen Partnership initiative. Additionally, the EU is interested in developing the potential of the GCC in the wind and solar energy sectors. The EU offers to create a special expert group on energy and climate issues, which should include representatives from both the GCC and the EU. Finally, it is planned to hold annual meetings of the ministers of the EU and the GCC to discuss renewable energy issues, stimulate private initiatives and forums, and promote the creation of expert groups to identify potentially attractive initiatives for cooperation.

According to Eurostat²³, in 2022, the size of EU imports from the GCC increased from forty to €87 billion, which is 115% compared to the previous year. In particular, the value of fuel imports increased by almost two and a half times from €25 billion in 2021 to €65 billion in 2022. Thus, energy products account for 74% of all GCC exports to EU member states and almost 8% of all European imports. In total, the EU is the second largest market for the GCC and its member states are the EU's 8th biggest trading partner. It is important to mention that, in

²³ European Union, *Trade in goods with GCC*, in https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/region/details_gcc-6_en.pdf (Accessed on 15.12.2023).

addition to the increase in import volumes, the increase in the value of imports from the GCC was influenced by the invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine and the high value of the US dollar. Thus, according to the US Energy Information Administration²⁴, the medium price for a barrel of Brent oil in 2022 increased by almost 30% compared to 2021. Still, the oil imports from GCC rose by 37% in 2022 compared to the previous year (Table 3).

Table 3. EU oil import from the GCC (Changes in per cent to the previous year)²⁵



Thus, one can trace the increase in pragmatism in the EU's policy in the Gulf region and towards the GCC particularly. Due to the deterioration of the security situation in the Middle East following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, as well as the escalation of tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the EU began to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy by establishing trade ties with Iran and a security mission in the Strait of Hormuz²⁶. The "Strategic Partnership" document continues

²⁴ Crude oil prices increased in first-half 2022 and declined in second-half 2022, in <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55079> (Accessed on 15.12.2023).

²⁵ Imports of oil and petroleum products by partner country in "Eurostat", 2024 in https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg_ti_oil_custom_12043542/default/table?lang=en. (Accessed on 5.07.2024).

²⁶ Robert Mason, *The European Union's "Strategic Partnership With the Gulf": Half-Speed Ahead*, in "Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW)", 202, <https://ag-siw.org/the-european-unions-strategic-partnership-with-the-gulf-half-speed-ahead/> (Accessed on 21.12.2023).

the EU's pragmatic approach: the EU has returned to a more pragmatic policy towards the Gulf states despite its previous emphasis on soft power. The new relationship strategy is highly Eurocentric, as it offers the GCC a list of areas where the EU is interested in deepening cooperation. Particularly, promoting "green" energy in the region will not only help diversify the GCC economies but also help the EU achieve its own energy goals and reduce its energy dependence on the Russian Federation²⁷.

The EU has intensified political dialogue with the Gulf: high-level meetings have become more frequent. There is a call for greater pragmatism in Gulf policy: the EU needs a new approach to energy cooperation with the MENA states that meets both energy security and climate goals, and the GCC is a good test case for such an approach, thanks to their environmental ambitions, rich resources, and role in the fight against climate change. Still, the situation may worsen if the EU's status as an energy consumer is entrenched, reducing its influence on issues such as human rights²⁸.

Despite certain intensification of bilateral relations, the EU and the GCC did not have an FTA. European interest in the region had been gradually declining and remained on the periphery of the European energy policy for a long time. Only the Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a reassessment of the European interests in the GCC in general and energy cooperation in particular. Regarding the current state of the EU–GCC relations after the Russian invasion, looking for other mutually beneficial points of contact is necessary, and energy and climate initiatives may become turning points. Nevertheless, it is essential to take into account changes in the security environment, like the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war, hybrid threats and the increased activity of Chinese foreign policy.

DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHINA'S ENERGY POLICY TOWARD THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL


Considering that the Gulf is vital to the EU for foreign policy reasons, its importance to China is connected to domestic political reasons and closely tied to

²⁷ Timo Behr and Saskia van Genugten, *Can a new EU strategy bring EU and Gulf actors closer together?*, in "Middle East Institute", 2022, in <https://www.mei.edu/publications/can-new-eu-strategy-bring-eu-and-gulf-actors-closer-together> (Accessed on 20.12.2023).

²⁸ Cinzia Bianco, *The EU'S Strategic Partnership with the Gulf: one year on*, in Brussels International Center, in <https://www.bic-rhr.com/research/eus-strategic-partnership-gulf-one-year> (Accessed on 04.01.2024).

Chinese rapid economic growth. Cheap oil is necessary to sustain economic growth and create new jobs, and GCC monarchies can solve China's energy problems²⁹. The development of trade relations between the PRC and the GCC states is one of the most rapid in the world. In 2000, the total trade volume between the PRC and the GCC was less than \$10 billion. However, by 2014, the bilateral trade between the PRC and the GCC states had increased significantly, reaching more than \$175 billion. A significant part of the trade balance consisted of energy resources from the GCC because, in total, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the UAE and the State of Kuwait provided 32% of the PRC's energy imports, with only energy resources from the Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman accounting for 16% and 10% of the total imports respectively³⁰. Thus, the GCC member states play a vital role in Chinese energy security (Table 4).

Table 4. GCC Crude Oil Export to the PRC (millions of tons)³¹



The White Paper on China's Energy Policy 2012³² is one of the primary doc-

²⁹ Jonathan Fulton. *China's Relations with the Gulf Monarchies*, Routledge, New York, 2019, P. 48-50.

³⁰ Xuming Qian, Jonathan Fulton, *China-Gulf Economic Relationship under the "Belt and Road" Initiative*, in "Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies" 2017, in <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023306> (Accessed on 09.01.2024).

³¹ *China-GCC Oil Trade Statistics* in "Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs", 2024 in <https://resourcetrade.earth/>. (Accessed on 5.07.2024).

³² *China's Energy Policy*, in <https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/>

uments explaining the PRC's energy policy. It investigates the threats to the economic security of the world's second-largest economy, such as limited domestic resources, low energy efficiency, the environmental impact of fossil fuels and growing dependence on imports. The document neither mentions any country in the Gulf region nor defines mechanisms for energy cooperation. In the context of the importance of collective international efforts to maintain energy security and dialogue, only OPEC is mentioned, whose members are major energy partners of the PRC like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait. The PRC viewed the Middle East as an important and influential region in ensuring oil production, transportation and refining. With the help of its White Paper, the PRC called on the international community to support the sustainable development of the Middle East. In addition, Chinese authorities urged the global community to avoid politicizing the energy sector and to refrain from using force or armed force.

In 2016, on the eve of Xi Jinping's Middle East tour as the President of the PRC, a document, China's Arab Policy Paper³³, was published on the official website of the Chinese government. The uniqueness of the Paper lies in the fact that this is the first strategy of the PRC concerning specific relations with the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa region, in particular, with the members of the Arab League, who actively participate in the China-Arab State Cooperation Forum (CASCF) and the PRC-GCC strategic dialogue³⁴. It can be assumed that the Arab monarchies of the Gulf are the primary recipients of the document because the region is closer to the PRC than other Arab regions of the Mashreq and Maghreb. The GCC member states occupy a strategic position for implementing the maritime part of the Belt and Road Initiative and are also politically stable. It was with the Gulf states that the PRC developed the closest cooperation in the field of trade and investment.

The Paper did not propose any type of political integration. Still, it emphasized the traditional areas of cooperation for the PRC, such as the economy, energy, the fight against terrorism, security, technical cooperation, and the Belt and Road Initiative. Security is a key point as in the case of Iran, Saudi Arabia and their Sunni allies starting a regional war involving physical damage to oil infrastructure, crude oil prices will rise to the point of damaging the global economy. With a third of China's crude oil imports coming from the GCC alone, such a crisis would likely

White%20Paper-%20China%27s%20Energy%20Policy%202012%20%28EN%29.pdf (Accessed on 06.01.2024).

³³ China's Arab Policy Paper, in http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2016/01/13/content_281475271412746.htm (Accessed on 07.01.2024).

³⁴ *China-GCC Strategic Dialogue was launched in Beijing in 2010.*

hurt the PRC more than any other major economy. The Arab Policy Paper envisages cooperation in the '1+2+3' format, where the core is cooperation in the energy sector. The authors pay special attention to investments in the oil sector, particularly in the exploration of oil reserves, oil extraction and refinery. The two wings of cooperation in the document are infrastructure construction and trade, along with investments, which may also be indirectly related to the energy sector. The three breakthroughs should be nuclear and renewable energies and space technologies. The document reflects the critical interests of the PRC in the region, namely the interest in the oil supply and the trade expansion of Chinese technology companies to the GCC market; thus, the primary addressees of the Arab Policy Paper are the Gulf monarchies, which are crucial suppliers of energy resources to the PRC and have the necessary resources for cooperation in such areas as nuclear, renewable energy and space exploration. It is important to note that the '1+2+3' format for collaboration with the Arab states, as a whole, does not go beyond the scope of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Joseph Webster and Jose Pelayo³⁵ claim that the share of the GCC member states in oil imports of the PRC increased from 30% in 2016 to 41% in 2022. Growth also occurred in absolute sales figures. In particular, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia increased oil sales from 50 million tons/year in 2016 to 90 million tons/year in 2022. Thus, the GCC might also hope for closer relations with the PRC because this will stimulate the return of the US to the region and make it more tolerant of regional policies³⁶.

In 2020, a White Paper on Energy in China's New Era³⁷ was published on the website of the State Council of the PRC. This document aims to present the achievements and goals of the Chinese energy sector and outline its near future as well. Even though the White Paper is centred on the PRC, the authors point out the

³⁵ Joseph Webster and Jose Pelayo, *China is getting comfortable with the Gulf Cooperation Council. The West must pragmatically adapt to its growing regional influence*, in "Atlantic Council", 2023 in <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/china-is-getting-comfortable-with-the-gulf-cooperation-council-the-west-must-pragmatically-adapt-to-its-growing-regional-influence/> (Accessed on 10.01.2024).

³⁶ James Dorsey, *China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom*, in Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2017, Vol. 11, no. 1. in: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023322?need-Access=true&role=button> (Accessed on 09.01.2024).

³⁷ *Energy in China's New Era*, in https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202012/21/content_WS5fe0572bc6d0f725769423cb.html (Accessed on 06.01.2024).

progress made as a part of the realization of the Belt and Road Initiative. According to the White Paper, trade barriers between energy markets should be removed globally. The Chinese government promotes trade and encourages investments. In addition, the PRC invited states from all over the world to improve energy infrastructure and work on further global integration.

Notably, the White Paper indicated that the PRC still cannot abandon traditional energy sources in the short-term and mid-term perspectives. The State Council of the PRC encourages energy companies to import more petrochemicals and develop local oil fields. Thus, it is safe to say that the energy cooperation between the PRC and the GCC countries will be on the rise.

It is worth noting that the PRC and the GCC held ten rounds of FTA negotiations between 2005 and 2022. Due to the substantial expansion of Beijing's cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain over the past year, the creation of an FTA between these countries is possible. The official government in Beijing hopes for a quick and successful conclusion of the negotiations soon. In 2022, the trade volume between the PRC and the GCC countries will reach \$315.8 billion. The PRC has also become the main trading partner of the GCC and the leading destination for the export of petrochemical products within the group³⁸.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the research demonstrate the different approaches the PRC and the EU are using towards the GCC. While the EU has a comprehensive set of documents regarding its GCC policy, the PRC does not have as much documentation on the matter. Still, the GCC plays an important role as an oil exporter to the PRC and at the same time shares a relatively small part of the EU's energy market.

It is worth noting that the EU's Strategic Partnership with the Gulf (2022) and the PRC's Arab Policy Paper (2016) are different types of documents that regulate the policies of the respective parties. Once the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine started, the EU found itself in a confrontation with the leading provider of its energy needs. Thus, the Strategic Partnership with the Gulf can be considered as a part of the EU's response to significant political and security changes. On the other hand, the Arab Policy Paper of the PRC was adopted on the eve of the important visits of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Above

³⁸ Nan Zhong, *China, GCC member economies keen to step up free trade talks*, in "China Daily", 2023, in <https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202310/26/WS6539cd54a31090682a5ead84.html> (Accessed on 07.01.2024).

all, the visit took part in raising the PRC–Saudi relations to the level of a strategic partnership, so the Paper brings consistency to the relations between the PRC and the GCC and outlines the areas of possible cooperation.

The energy focus of the EU and Chinese documents is also worth noting. The second part of the EU's Strategic Partnership with the Gulf is devoted to energy. Specifically, the EU will strive to develop bilateral ties in energy investments, hydrogen production and preservation of biodiversity. Additionally, ministerial meetings should be held to deepen further cooperation. In the Arab Policy Paper, the Chinese leadership provides a less detailed list of possible areas of collaboration with an emphasis on the '1+2+3' formula and energy at its core but not limited to it.

While analysing the legal framework of the EU–GCC relations in the energy field, this article has underlined that a significant step forward is the creation of the FTA. The FTA mechanism will facilitate exchanging goods and services in multiple areas, including energy, allowing affordable prices for production and refining technologies and petrochemicals. As a step toward a mutually beneficial mechanism, the free trade area negotiations have been supported by both the scientists and the European Commission. To achieve this goal, the EU should engage in a dialogue with the GCC from the position of pragmatism, which can be observed in the Strategic Partnership with the Gulf document. Both sides ought to develop effective mechanisms of trade and investment cooperation to solve the regional security and energy problems, as well as issues connected to human rights, climate change, and asymmetric and hybrid threats³⁹.

Moreover, the current research has indicated that the GCC does not play any major role in the European energy markets. The main obstacle for the GCC was the presence of the energy-rich Russian Federation. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to the deterioration of the security situation on the whole continent. It has resulted in a complete overhaul of the EU's energy policy with sanctions and further removal of Russian presence on the European energy markets. The rise of energy imports from the GCC and the Joint Communication on the Strategic Partnership with the Gulf are among the other consequences of this overhaul. The declining security situation has made the EU interested in deeper cooperation with the GCC in the areas of stable energy prices, liquefied natural gas, and flawless climate transition.

³⁹ *Training methods in the context of hybrid threats* (2023), edited by E. Balashov, M. Bilokon, T. Borozentseva et al., Kharkiv: TOV "Tekhnolohichnyi Tsentr Group". <https://doi.org/10.62067/978-617-8242-02-2>.

The article has identified that although the doctrinal basis of the PRC–GCC relations is relatively small, the bilateral trade relations are mutually beneficial, and both sides develop them intensively. The PRC avoids criticizing the internal policies of the GCC and does not intervene in regional affairs. Like the EU, the PRC is interested in the FTA with the GCC, which will allow it to deepen ties in the face of new security threats.

Given the arguments presented above, the hypothesis is proven. The research of the documentation related to the energy policies proves that after the beginning of the full-scale Russia–Ukraine war, the EU focuses more on developing a common energy policy and strategy, specifically through the External Energy Engagement in a Changing World and Strategic Partnership with the Gulf communications. There is a drastic change in the perception of the GCC within EU's doctrinal base towards a more pragmatic vision. At the same time, the key features of China's energy policy towards the GCC is focused on unimpeded access to the GCC's energy markets. The PRC is focusing on the traditional energy resources while leaving the cooperation in renewables for the future.

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A SHORT HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT

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Abstract: *Richard Saull's work on the far right makes a fundamental contribution to our knowledge of the post-fascist phenomenon in today's world. Although the book presents itself as a historical sociology of the far-right's connections with neoliberal ideology and politics in the United States, United Kingdom, and Western Europe, it goes beyond these methodological boundaries, indicating the emergence of a new concept, far-right neoliberalism. Despite the author's small shift toward a left-wing perspective, R. Saull demonstrates post-fascism's ability to survive with the Western neoliberal elite and adapt to new political, social, economic, and ideological goals. Furthermore, the extreme right has recast itself as an anti-system force and movement, continuously identifying new actual, imagined, or fabricated adversaries. Post-fascism retains its "traditional" populist and militant elements while remaining within the confines of legality for the time being, not proposing or failing to restructure the societies in which it exists in a totalitarian sense.*

Keywords: *anti-system movement, Establishment, far-right neoliberalism, historical sociology, militant features, neoliberalism, populist features, post-fascism, totalitarian.*

Rezumat: *Lucrarea lui Richard Saull dedicată extremei drepte reprezintă o contribuție semnificativă la înțelegerea fenomenului post-fascist din zilele noastre. Deși cartea ni se relevă ca o sociologie istorică a legăturilor extremei drepte cu ideologia și politica neoliberală din SUA, UK și Europa occidentală, lucrarea depășește aceste limite metodologice, indicând apariția noului concept, și anume far-right neoliberalism. În pofida unei ușoare balansări a autorului spre o viziune de stânga, R. Saull reușește să ne*

demonstreze capacitatea post-fascismului de a conviețui cu establishmentul de nuanță neoliberală din lumea occidentală și de a se adapta la noi obiective politice, sociale, economice, ideologice. De asemenea, extrema dreaptă s-a reinventat ca o forță și o mișcare anti-sistem, găsindu-și în permanență noi dușmani reali, imaginari sau inventați. Păstrându-și trăsăturile populiste și militante „tradiționale”, post-fascismul rămâne deocamdată în limitele legalității, ne-propunându-și, sau în orice caz nereușind, să transforme societățile în care există în sens totalitar.

Richard Saull graduated from Portsmouth Polytechnic University in 1990 with a BA in Political Science and later earned an MA in International Relations. He taught English for two years in the Czech Republic and Spain. He returned to the UK in 1994 and earned a PhD in International Relations in 1999. He lectured at SOAS University in London¹, American International University (London), the University of Leicester, and Queen Mary University of London. His most recent publications focus on far-right social and political forces in the modern era and their historical development. R. Saull's studies focused on materialist and post-colonial sociological and historical approaches to international relations. His primary research interests include revolutionary internationalism during the French Revolution, the theory of international relations during the Cold War, the historical evolution of this period, theorizing American hegemony and debates about the decline of the United States, international historical sociology of far-right movements, neoliberal political economy², and so on.

¹ SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), London.

² Richard Saull wrote and published a series of valuable and interesting books: *The Far-Right in World Politics*, London, Routledge, 2024, co-edited with Alexander Anievas; *Capital, Race and Space*, Vol. I, *The Far-Right from Bonapartism to Fascism*, Leiden, Brill, 2023; *The Longue Durée of the Far-Right: An International Historical Sociology* (eds.) with Alexander Anievas, Neil Davidson and Adam Fabry, London, Routledge, 2015; *The Cold War & After*, London, Pluto Press, 2007; *The War on Terrorism and the American Empire After the Cold War*, London, Routledge, 2005, editor with Alejandro Colás; *Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power and Social Revolution*, London, Frank Cass, 2001. He also published studies and articles of high academic value - *The Far-Right in World Politics/World Politics in the Far-Right*, "Globalizations", 20/5, 2023, pp. 715-30 – with Alexander Anievas; 'Reassessing the Cold War and the Far-Right: Fascist Legacies and the Making of the Liberal International Order after 1945', "International Studies Review", 22/3 (2020), pp. 370-395 – with Alex Anievas; *Racism and Far-Right Imaginaries within Neoliberal Political Economy*, "New Political Economy", 23/5 (2018), pp. 588-608; *Neoliberalism and the Far-Right: An*

Saull's work on the far right has two volumes: Volume I covers the far right from *Bonapartism to fascism*, while Volume II covers the far right from "*post-fascism*" to *Trumpism*³. The book provides a global historical sociology of the radical right, with a focus on alterations inside developed capitalist countries. Volume II of the historical study contains three chapters that describe the evolution of the far right as a post-fascist form of politics, beginning with the early years of the Cold War and continuing through the current developments of the radical right in Great Britain, the United States, and Western Europe. The shifts within right-wing extremist movements and parties happened in an environment marked by overlapping crises in geopolitical organisation and liberal international order.

The first chapter, *Fascist Legacies, the Far-Right, and the Making of the Cold War Liberal Order*, examines the establishment of a new liberal system under American hegemony following World War II. This chapter examines the impact of the fascist far-right's legacy on capital accumulation, private property, and other issues. Thematically, he explores topics such as fascist legacies and reminiscences within the liberal state model after the Second World War; theoretical analysis of the Western liberal order during the Cold War; far right-wing movements and parties within liberal constitutionalism after the Second World War; racialized anticommunism, racialized capitalism, and political economy. According to Richard Saull's left-wing vision, postwar international relations were characterized by a social and moral logic, manifested by the defence of liberal capitalism against the "assault" of democratic forces on the moderate and radical political left. The liberal historical bloc entailed incorporating different and often opposing political and ideological forces while simultaneously subordinating them to the American hegemonic model.

According to Richard Saull, capitalist hegemony excludes democratic action, discussion, and political legitimacy. As a result, an authoritarian liberalism therefore emerged, able to rationally and organically embrace far right-wing groups and parties.

Introduction, "Critical Sociology", 43/4-5 (2017) - with Ray Kiely; *Neo-Liberalism and the Far-Right: A Contradictory Embrace*, "Critical Sociology", 43/4-5 (2017), pp. 707-24 - with Neil Davidson; *Capitalism, Crisis and the Far-Right in the Neoliberal Era*, "Journal of International Relations and Development", 18/1 (2015), pp. 25-51; *Capitalist Development and the Rise and 'Fall' of the Far-Right*, "Critical Sociology", 41/4-5 (2015), pp. 619-39 etc.

³ Richard Saull, *Capital, Race and Space*, Vol. II, *The Far-Right from 'Post- Fascism' to Trumpism*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2024.

The second chapter, *Neoliberal Globalization and the Rise of the 'New' Far-Right* discusses the resurrection of a new type of far-right politics in the 1980s and its linkages to neoliberalism in the United Kingdom and the United States. This chapter examines themes such as the racial imaginary, the origins of the far-right in the modern world, the evolution of neoliberal thought and politics, the political landscape after the Cold War; racialized social conservatism, nativism, and racialized social protectionism; political economy; the nature and limits of the far-right; anti-capitalism, post-fascism, and commitment to liberal democracy.

During the neoliberal era, before and after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, far-right parties began to exhibit similar traits to neoliberalism, such as opposing the welfare state's collectivist and Universalist orientation and perceiving humanity in terms of natural inequality and hierarchy. Richard Saull argues that both neoliberalism and the far-right use authoritarian tactics against left-wing movements and parties. In today's society, the radical right has developed a strong anti-system stance.

The Third Chapter - *Crisis Neoliberalism and the Far-Right* - includes interesting topics such as Trump and the American far-right; Trumpism and the US political economy after the 2007-2008 crisis; the presidency of Donald Trump; Great Britain, Brexit, and the crisis of neoliberalism; the relationship between Brexit and the far-right; the contradictions of the neoliberal order in the EU; the post-crisis political economy of Europe; the refugee crisis; synthetic examination of the far-right in nations such as Germany, France, Italy, and Greece etc.

In the 2020s, the far right resurfaced in both the United States and Western Europe. This renaissance does not represent the return of fascism, but rather a consolidation of populism that opposes COVID, crises, unemployment, and immigration.

The author concludes that Brexit was the culmination of radicalized neoliberalism paired with nativist sovereignism, reviving a specific brand of white working-class Thatcherism. The social and political forces associated with Brexit were not limited to the far right; they also included large elements of the Conservative Party, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and the British National Party. Although certain members of the Labour Party's left supported Brexit because they disagreed with EU institutions and activities, it was mostly associated philosophically and politically with the British radical right.

The election of Donald Trump as president of the United States is a result of the crisis, but it also marks a period of heightened support for the country's far right. Trump has used demagogic and populist techniques, such as the *Make America Great Again* slogan, to portray himself as a radical anti-establishment

insurgent who views the old political class from the outside. From an ideological perspective, Trumpism seems to be a concoction of neoliberal internationalism, managerial federalism criticism, and white grievances. Republican leaders have remained supportive of Trump during his presidency, believing that the office's responsibilities will restrain his actions. The House of Representatives attempted to remove him twice because of his authoritarianism but was unable to do so since there was not a quorum. The dismissals were linked to abuses of authority, corruption, and constitutional norm violations. Following Trump's defeat in the 2020 presidential contest, supporters of the former attempted to obstruct President-elect Joe Biden's inauguration on January 6, 2021, by storming the Capitol building in Washington, DC.

The far-right political group *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) emerged in 2012 as a Eurosceptic party oriented against the liberal order, consisting of intellectuals and economists with close ties to the conservative establishment and criticizing the Eurozone's legal framework as well as Germany's role in it. It gradually developed into a mass party characterized by xenophobia and populism. Between 2013 and 2017, its electoral support increased, and following the 2017 federal elections, it emerged as the primary opposition force to the Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (CDU).

Far-right parties in Germany have achieved notable success in small towns and rural areas, with middle-aged males exhibiting higher voter turnout. In general, imported (mainstream) German parties refrained from associating or collaborating with the AfD; however, there were few exceptions. In 2020, the CDU branch in Thuringia worked with the AfD to remove the SPD chancellor and form a new right-wing coalition. This reality triggered a crisis in the Christian democratic camp. The AfD's national populism was focused on subjects of interest or controversy in Germany, such as racism, anti-Islamic xenophobia, the refugee crisis, the country's public debt, and so on.

The rise of the AfD reflects disillusionment among certain CDU circles, rather than a continuation of Nazism or neo-Nazism. The formation comprises two ideological currents: nationalist and liberal. In the May 2019 elections, the AfD won 11% of the vote. However, it is unlikely that this party will be able to govern alongside mainstream political entities such as SPD or CDU.

The National Front made less progress in France than the AfD did in Germany. Under the leadership of Marine Le Pen taking, the group has seen a new ascent and rejuvenation. Following the 2007-2008 economic and financial crisis, the French far-right integrated significant topics of French politics into its ideology, such as anti-immigrant speech, anti-Muslim bigotry, the Republic's

economic and social crises, and so on.

The French National Front (FN) opposes the European Union and favours policies such as economic and social protectionism, and governmental intervention in investments and regulations. The collapse of François Hollande's presidency and the socialist government contributed to the birth of this radical right-wing party. The FN's anti-EU stance, while strong and consistent, lacked the unilateralism and degree of schism that marked the British far-right Brexit campaign.

During her 2011 inaugural statement as group leader, Marine Le Penn declared her support for the French Revolution, human rights, and republicanism. Furthermore, the National Front has toned down its anti-immigrant rhetoric, discarding extremist components such as the mass expulsion of immigrants and the reinstatement of the death penalty. It championed republican secularism, demonstrating the party's detachment from Catholicism. The political organization founded by Marine Le Penn disguised its anti-Islamism by promoting secular ideals relevant to the functioning and safeguarding of a liberal democracy.

Regarding the economy, the National Front coupled nativism and the promotion of social and economic policies centred on national preference with the notion of a *welfare state*, tax reductions for small and medium-sized businesses, raise to the minimum wage, etc.

The role and significance of Italy's far-right vary from those of the radical right in Germany and France. During the neoliberal era, Italian far-right parties were in power. Because the Italian political and electoral systems are significantly more fluid, several far-right groups have been able to form coalition governments. The populist coalition of the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Northern League, which controlled Italy from 2013 to 2019, did not favour leaving the Eurozone. Matteo Salvini modified the party's orientation after taking over as leader of the Northern League in 2013, prioritising Euroscepticism over regional autonomy. Salvini led various anti-EU initiatives, including "No Euro Day!" on November 23, 2013, in which he described the EU as a dictatorship and demanded revisions to the treaties and the Schengen framework. During the 2014 election campaign, critics who accused the European Union's bureaucrats, thieves, and crooks referred to the Euro currency as a "crime against humanity".

Salvini's repositioning plan was bolstered by the outcome of the 2018 general election, which saw the Northern League overtake Silvio Berlusconi's Center-right Force, becoming a relevant national political force. The Northern League has used social media effectively, yet, it has associated with or implicitly condoned the anti-immigrant violence of neo-fascist groups such as Forza Nuovo and Casa Pound. The League's electoral success in 2018 continued into 2019 when

the party obtained over 9 million votes in the European parliamentary elections. League voters share the following characteristics: they live in small towns, are middle-aged, and have a low level of education.

Greece stood out for both the severity of the Eurozone crisis's social and economic consequences, as well as the severe political response, which was shaped by the rise of the neo-Nazi political group Golden Dawn. Although this political formation did not make it to the government, as the Northern League did in Italy, nor did it win a large number of votes, as the FN did in France, its existence, radical views, and street violence served as a warning sign for Greece's political and democratic health. Parallel to this, the radical political left (Syriza) saw a dramatic increase, eventually gaining control of the government in 2015. Between 2011 and 2015, Greek society experienced a significant political crisis involving traditional party clientelism, a social crisis marked by levels of poverty unprecedented since World War II and crushing austerity measures for the population. The onerous restrictions imposed by the European Union to keep Greece in the Eurozone have resulted in widespread Europhobia, which the far right has exploited.

Golden Dawn advocated not just the country's secession from the EU, but also its transformation into a national dictatorship that would safeguard the Greek race and foster national rebirth, including actions such as racial cleansing. This party's political radicalism has been demonstrated by the use and justification of violence, disrespect for institutions and democratic processes, street fighting, and political assassination (for example, the April 2013 murder of anti-racist rapper Pavlos Fyssas in Athens). Support for Golden Dawn was strongest in urban and semi-urban areas, including the capital and the Attica region, as well as the northern border districts. This party's voters were largely young and had low levels of education.

The rise of a far-right-wing party in Greece also has a nationalist component. External meddling in the country's future has reawakened nationalist passions and myths about Nazi Germany's occupation of Greece. Chancellor Angela Merkel was referred to as a Nazi due to her determination on enforcing the severe regulations that accompanied the economic bailout.

The radical right underwent a series of transformations between 2008 and 2019 in response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis and its political, socioeconomic, and geopolitical consequences. The radical right's evolution has often been uneven in that, except for Italy between 2018 and 2019, far-right parties have failed to seize power and enter government. With the start of the 2020s, far-right currents, movements, and parties have begun to integrate within the social

structures of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe, frequently partnering with mainstream politics and reaching a degree of legitimacy and normality. This occurrence does not indicate the return or rebirth of fascism, but rather an evolution of the far right towards national-populist, sovereigntist, and anti-European ideologies.

Although the author covers a wide range of topics concerning the evolution of neoliberalism in the modern world, correctly revealing the link between its crises and the rise of the far right, we contend that he overstates the role of capitalism's systemic flaws in the emergence of far-right neoliberalism.

In addition, when discussing the drawbacks of the US hegemonic paradigm, R. Saull occasionally exaggerates the importance of American imperialism in the world's development and transformation since the Cold War era. The author employs formulations of the *international neoliberal order* type, implying the existence of a distinct form of authoritarianism with liberal or neoliberal roots. Liberal ideology is not only concerned with man, individual rights, and liberties, but it also adheres to the concept of democratic governance. Liberalism promotes equality before the law, which is one of the bases of democracy, whereas conservatism's beliefs of natural inequality can lead to authoritarian forms or serve as the foundations of right-wing totalitarianism. That is why it is so difficult for liberalism to take on authoritarian, let alone totalitarian, forms. If this happens, the liberal/neoliberal political and ideological model will be destroyed. Although Saull discusses the far right in Western Europe, his research only includes instances from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Greece. However, post-fascism has many faces, expressions, and evolutions across the continent that would have merited even a simple empirical or synthetic investigation. For example, Saull's work differs from Enzo Traverso's in that it does not address the core elements of Right-Wing Identitarianism, such as Identity Politics, Laïcité, Intersectionality, Identity and Memory, and Civil Religion. Some authors compare radical forms of Islam to new post-totalitarian forms⁴ and interpret fascism and post-fascism through mentalities, culture, imagery,⁵ etc.

R. Saull provides new approaches to investigating the transformations and syncretisms of current phenomena impacted by fascism, commonly known as post-fascism. Richard Saull, who is developing a historical sociology of the far right in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe, proposes a novel

⁴ See Enzo Traverso, *New Faces of Fascism Populism and the Far Right*, London, Verso, 2019, *passim*.

⁵ See Michel Onfray, *La Pensée postnazie. Contre-histoire de la philosophie, X*, Paris, Éditions Grasset et Fasquelle, 2018, *passim*.

concept: *far-right neoliberalism*. One could argue that neoliberal principles cannot combine democratic and authoritarian ideological lines. However, we believe that such criticism is relative and subjective because all ideologies have a viral-metamorphic quality (i.e., they absorb parts from prior ideologies, including contradictory ones, to form new ideologies). Can we discuss *far-right-wing neoliberalism* considering that the modern world has understood the viral-metamorphic ideological construction of neo-Marxism for over a decade? If capitalism was able to integrate neo-Marxist intellectual structures, then neoliberalism was able to incorporate similar ideological aspects with the far right, even introducing interesting novelties. We recall here the social basis of political support, "its ideology of social conservatism rooted in a racialized hierarchical ideological imaginary that also extends to issues around gender and sexuality; the welfare nativism that provides a key element in its social conservatism and racialized national protectionism and also where its ability to traverse the ideo-political terrain of both neoliberalism and social democracy..., its political economy and the significance of immigration in particular in defining the neoliberal far-right, as well as the nature and limits of supposedly 'anti-capitalist' and 'anti-systemic' radicalism; its international orientation and the role of international relations and geopolitics in its overall political orientation, its attitude towards and presence within the constitutional politics of liberal democracy and the extent to which the neo-liberal far-right can be considered post-fascist"⁶. Richard Saull's work demonstrates the far-right's political and intellectual adaptability to the neoliberal welfare state model. In our opinion, the infection of neoliberalism with specific aspects of the far right poses a threat to current society; but, if it does not lead to the development of new totalitarian state models, it represents a *manageable, benign pathology*.

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Acknowledgement

The journal is edited with the support
of the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitization.

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